Despite capital controls in #Lebanon, there is a large amount of FX leakage going on. Looking at sources of remaining real hard $ suggests the FX outflow accelerated from $1bn in Oct to more than $3bn in Nov (the month when banks were closed or capital controls were in place)
This is worrying because a) the controls aren’t preventing seepage, as is widely suspected. @AndyKhalil1 this point in his thread on banks’ balance sheets. Capital controls on resident FX deposits are working, but not all nonresident FX deposit withdrawals are necessarily exiting
@AndyKhalil1 And b) it means that BdL’s reserves will last less than previously estimated (thread below), under assumptions of functional capital controls and import compression. If this pace of outflows is maintained, gross reserves would be depleted by August 2020.
@AndyKhalil1 Which is why, as @lebfinance pointed out, the existence of a reverse swap clause in BdL’s latest circular. The willingness to repay March 2020s exists, but BdL needs a backdoor to be left open if it is still unable or unwilling to control how much FX leaks out of the country
A few thoughts to follow up an earlier conversation on ABL’s “contribution” to the gov’t plan. The ABL plan is definitely NOT an alternative plan. It largely sticks to the government’s projections and figures, with deviations almost minor (except in a few instances).
The ABL plan makes the state the main culprit and absolves itself of responsibility, demanding treatment the way a lender using utmost due diligence would of a borrower having liquidity issues. Well, neither was due diligence used nor is this a mere liquidity issue
1. The reliance on using state assets to settle the govt’s debt to BdL solves only a part of the problem. The structure of the Defeasance Fund begs the question of how it can generate enough $ streams to remain solvent. If this is stealth privatization it won't fly in parliament
Some questions/comments that sprang to mind while reading Lebanon’s leaked govt reform plan today. In no particular order, but points which I think we need more debate and clarity on:
1. Is the expected additional increase in debt (IMF, CEDRE, other IFI) being factored into the debt sustainability analysis? IMF will not lend unless the cumulative is considered sustainable. Not clear from plan if that the extra borrowing is being factored in.
There is a risk that we may not generate FX fast enough to repay back FX liabilities (incl any new borrowing) even with reduced debt burden. Assumption on remittances flows seems over optimistic given low oil prices + global economy in contraction. Macro assmptions generally rosy
Initial thoughts on gov't presentation: It did what it was supposed to. Gov't signalling its intentions clearly and professionally. Good delivery. Nothing new in terms of prognosis, but good to acknowledge the basics at least. Reasonable estimates for growth/inflation
But obviously lots of vagueness that needs to be worked out. What's a "tolerable" primary surplus. What's the actual plan for the banking sector? Most imp: acknowledging that financing model is dead is admission of need for external financing. From what sources?
And it goes without saying that the overalp in balance sheet exposures in the system means banking sector restructuring is key here. And how that pans out for depositors. This is the common denominator across all stakeholder claims
Lebanon's debt restructuring negotiations will largely involve three parties: the sovereign (seeking relief), the foreign creditors (seeking to maximize recovery values), and the local banks (seeking to preserve capital). But who represents the fourth stakeholder - the depositor?
No matter how you do the DSA or how you tackle the maths, its inescapable that local-currency debt will also have to be restructured. So if haircuts on EBs, USD CDs and adding in NPLs doesn’t wipe out banks’ capital, then haircuts on the LBP-held notes portion surely will
In other words, the negotiations cannot proceed without clarity on who bears the recapitalisation costs. If the sovereign does through contingent liabilities, then any reduction in debt ratio it secures gets offset by bailout costs
We can’t talk about a way out of Lebanon’s crisis w/o knowing how deep of a hole we’re in. Depending on how we measure this, the consolidated balance sheets of the gov’t, the banks, and BdL point to a gap of anywhere between $40 & 80 bn (w/ various assumptions given opaque data)
The dark blue bar nets resident FX deposits from the consolidated net foreign asset position banks (nonresidents) and BdL. This is essentially a measure of the lollarisation rate and shows the lack of FX in the system to satisfy FX resident deposits. see @AndyKhalil1 below
@AndyKhalil1 But the gap need not be so big. Some resident $ loans will be paid for using resident $ deposits. Not all though. So assume half will (the other half in LBP), and you get the red bar.
Restructuring Lebanon's FX debt (eurobonds) is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for putting debt on a sustainable footing. Negotiations with bondholders is just one piece of the puzzle – even an aggressive haircut (principal+interest) won’t create a big enough dent
For the debt ratio (160% of GDP, o/w 60% in USD and 100% in LBP) to actually budge, a plan needs to encompass restructuring the massive internal (LBP) debt, restructuring the BdL’s CDs, and, by extension, recapitalising the banks.