Looking into Twitter traffic around the #IowaCaucus mess.
Lots of Americans trolling each other, and some accusing others of being Russians.
Always useful to look at the evidence at times like this.
(Hashtags below, not wanting to add to the trends...)
This hashtag, about Mayor Pete, got the most mentions of the ones I looked at - 105k earlier this evening (over 120k now).
Some people were saying it must have been driven by Russian bots, but...
... these were the first two tweets. Both from verified users.
This was the most-retweeted post on the hashtag, calling for Democratic unity, but also suspecting Russian propaganda accounts.
Yes, division was one of the Russian IRA's goals, but there's no proof of it here that I've seen yet.
The sad fact is that, on Twitter at least, America is so polarised you don't need Russians to feed division. Americans are doing it.
Here's the next hashtag. A bit over 50k mentions, but spiked on January 31.
The most-retweeted posts on that hashtag are interesting: Jill Stein, Dan Scavino, and "BernieWon2016".
This one really didn't go well. Under 5k tweets. That's barely a pimple on the face of Twitter.
Again, a mixture of pro-Trump, pro-Sanders and "Russians are driving this" comments.
Great little tool here from my colleagues at @Graphika_NYC. Summary stats for this traffic.
"CTM" is the coefficient of traffic manipulation. A normal score would be 12 or under. Heavily gamed and bot-manipulated traffic would usually score 24+.
12.8 looks pretty organic.
Definitely some active posters in the mix, but the number tails off sharply (in serious bot spikes, I've seen dozens of accounts that posted the same hashtag 200+ times each in a couple of hours).
Again, doesn't look like the whole flow was massively gamed at this stage.
Upsum: this doesn't look like "Russian bot" activity.
It looks like polarised American users jumping on a chaotic moment to push hyper-partisan lines.
Not a great outlook for the rest of the year.
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🚨BREAKING🚨 @Meta took down two covert influence ops:
Big one from Russia🇷🇺 targeting Europe with spoofed media websites like the Guardian and Spiegel
First one from China 🇨🇳 to focus on both sides of domestic US 🇺🇸 politics and Czech-China relations. about.fb.com/news/2022/09/r…
@Meta The operations were very different, but both worked on multiple social media platforms and petitions sites.
The Russian op was even on LiveJournal (cute).
List of domains, petitions etc in the report. #OSINT community, happy hunting!
@Meta China: this was the first Chinese network we’ve disrupted that focused on US domestic politics ahead of the midterms and Czech foreign policy toward China and Ukraine.
It was small, we took it down before it built an audience, but that’s a new direction for Chinese IO.
🚨JUST OUT🚨
Quarterly threat report from @Meta’s investigative teams.
Takedowns from around the world:
Cyber espionage in South Asia;
Harassment in India;
Violating networks in Greece, South Africa, India;
Influence ops from Malaysia & Israel
AND... about.fb.com/news/2022/08/m…
A deep dive into a Russian troll farm, linked to people with ties to what’s known as the Internet Research Agency.
It used fake accounts across the internet to make it look like there’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine - and to pretend the troll farm's doing a good job.
The operation called itself “Cyber Front Z”.
We think of it as the Z Team, because it was about as far from being the A Team as you can get.
🚨JUST OUT🚨
Quarterly threat report from @Meta’s investigative teams.
Much to dig into:
State & non-state actors targeting Ukraine;
Cyber espionage from Iran and Azerbaijan;
Influence ops in Brazil and Costa Rica;
Spammy activity in the Philippines... about.fb.com/news/2022/04/m…
🚨 TAKEDOWN 🚨
This weekend, we took down a relatively small influence operation that had targeted Ukraine across multiple social media platforms and websites. It was run by people in Russia and Ukraine: about.fb.com/news/2022/02/s…
It consisted of approx 40 accounts, Groups and Pages on FB and IG, plus on Twitter, YouTube, VK, OK, Telegram.
It mainly posted links to long-form articles on its websites, without much luck making them engaging. It got very few reactions, and under 4k followers.
It ran a few fake personas posing as authors. They had fake profile pics (likely GAN), and unusually detailed public bios - e.g. former civil aviation engineer, hydrography expert.
The op posted their articles on its websites and social media, & amplified them using more fakes.
Personal 🧵 based on years of OSINT research into influence operations since 2014.
Looking at the Russian official messaging on “de-nazification” and “genocide”, it’s worth putting them in context of the many different Russian IO that targeted Ukraine over the years.
* Iran, targeting the UK, focusing on Scottish independence;
* Mexico, a PR firm targeting audiences across LATAM;
* Turkey, targeting Libya, and linked to the Libyan Justice and Construction Party (affiliated w/Muslim Brotherhood).
It’s not the first time for an Iranian op to pose as supporters of Scottish independence.
In the past, FB found a page that copied and posted political cartoons about independence as far back as 2013. @Graphika_NYC writeup here (pages 26-27) graphika.com/reports/irans-…