So Trump now considers himself a “wartime president”? I’ve seen three presidents (including him) make wartime decisions and teach a course at @FSIStanford on wartime decision-making from Truman to Trump. Also writing a book on it. Here’s what he might do (but won’t) 👉
First: establish a decision-making and execution process that can readily assess new information, anticipate, set realistic goals (proximate and long-term), mobilize essential resources to where they’re needed, and adapt to new circumstances. For my class, it looked like this👇 
This schematic runs counterclockwise because it’s counterintuitive in the midst of major crises and information overload to think systematically and remain disciplined on essential tasks. A leader must force the system to do this; otherwise it will react to events haphazardly.
The first quadrant (upper left) is most critical and explains why we’re now so far behind. The net assessment of an emerging situation must be based on facts, science, intelligence. A wartime president must force the system to deliver hard truths, guard against rosy assumptions.
Rosy assumptions and failure to force rigorous inquiry in an emerging crisis (“I want to keep our numbers down”) leads to debacles. It’s an error that’s hard to reverse. There are countless examples in wartime and here it seems to explain the lack of testing and preparedness.
The second quadrant is the essence of strategy: defining objectives (based on a sound net assessment), then aligning resources and mobilizing them accordingly. Gaps between ENDS, WAYS, MEANS can get people killed and lead to failure. This is an elementary rule, often unheeded.
There is tendency in wartime or foreign policy crises to downplay risks and hard truths, declare grand objectives without asking what resources might be required to achieve them, where those resources will come from, and how they can be mobilized. Same lessons apply here.
The third quadrant is execution, which breeds new uncertainties, delivers new information, and requires regular adaptation (fourth quadrant), revision of net assessments and assumptions (back to first quadrant), realignment of ends and means (second quadrant), in a regular loop.
Finally, rather than press briefings that have no standard criteria and seem ad hoc, regularly share with the public standardized metrics (such as tests, diagnoses, deaths), gaps in resources (tests, beds, PPE, respirators), and how they can be filled, etc. Happy talk loses wars.
Wartime leaders take responsibility for inevitable setbacks (“The buck stops here”). They attract and empower competent subordinates, establish clear lines of responsibility, and forge alliances to coordinate and share burdens. Coalitions win wars! Trump doesn’t build them.
Bottom line: there is some merit to a wartime analogy. The question is what lessons that implies and how the USG is being structured and led to organize its response. Results to date suggest it’s a war we’re losing due to early false assumptions, unpreparedness, and ad hoc tasks.
