Thanks, @JJSchroden. I’ll discuss where negotiations in Afghanistan could go next, based on two agreements announced recently. I would echo @BRRubin’s points on COVID-19 and its impact, but still think examining these structural issues is helpful for the long term. #AFGPanel 1/11
A close comparison of the US-Taliban deal and US-Afghan joint statement is useful for identifying tensions among the three sides and likely future bumps in the road. I noted several key differences for @lawfareblog. #AFGPanel 2/11 lawfareblog.com/reading-betwee….
On prisoner releases, the US and Taliban agreed to work for the release of 5,000 Taliban and 1,000 government prisoners by March 10 and all remaining within 3 months. The Afghan government only committed to “determining the feasibility” of releases. #AFGPanel 3/11
On CT guarantees, the Taliban committed to prevent any group “from using the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and its allies,” without explicitly breaking with al Qaeda. This US-Afghan text commits to the “defeat” of al Qaeda. #AFGPanel 4/11
On US withdrawal, the US-Taliban deal drops troops to 8,600 w/o conditions followed by withdrawal w/ Taliban CT commitments. The US-Afghan text sets conditions for the initial drawdown and premises Afghan support for withdrawal on inter-Afghan agreement compliance. #AFGPanel 5/11
These might be tactical choices by US negotiators seeking to build momentum and use one deal to force progress with the other side. I wasn’t part of the talks and can’t say for certain. This might still pay off if it allows negotiators to move past these logjams. #AFGPanel 6/11
With prisoner release delays, though, there are signs the inconsistencies will be problematic. The deals didn’t create these tensions, but they did codify them and commit the US–as party to both–to managing challenging contradictions and incompatible expectations. #AFGPanel 7/11
Also noteworthy are statements by Pres. Trump and Sec. Pompeo holding the Taliban to commitments beyond the deal. These might be part of two secret annexes, but without their being made public, it’s impossible to gauge Taliban compliance on ceasefire etc. #AFGPanel 8/11
We’re still early in the peace process, and building trust among all sides is vital to maintaining progress over the long run. Should either (or both) sides see the US as an unreliable negotiating partner, it could make a complex process all the more challenging. #AFGPanel 9/11
Looking forward, U.S. commitments in both texts to seek continued security assistance & economic cooperation + non-intervention in Afghan domestic affairs are notable given Sec. Pompeo’s recent political negotiations in Kabul and the threatened $1 billion cut. #AFGPanel 10/11
Lots more to discuss, including potential opportunities to break some of these impasses as part of the COVID-19 response, but I’ll turn it over to our other panelists and look forward to your questions. END #AFGPanel 11/11
