Thank you @JJSchroden
1/10: STATUS OF US-TALIBAN AGREEMENT AND IMPLICATONS FOR NON-FULFILLMENT #AFGPanel
I have in a previous thread dealt with the challenges of ascertaining whether the US-Taliban📜is one to which international law applies. Refer to👇🏽
2/10: Without belabouring the point, I have argued that as this is not an international agreement, no parties can resort to ICJ or other forums to ensure fulfillment.
Thus, if any issues emerge, the parties have to resolve them amongst themselves bilaterally or trilaterally.
3/10: I do not wish to undermine the importance of this Agreement because in any political accord, the most powerful incentive is counter-measures which is present here. In other words, if one party reneges, so will the other.
4/10: However, one clear issue that has merged in the weeks following this Agreement, has been the lack of a clear dispute settlement mechanism. We saw this immediately after the end of RiV period when US airpower scrambled to defend ANDSF positions against Taliban onslaughts.
5/10: We also see this currently with the failure of Afghan govt and the Taliban to expediently proceed with prisoner exchanges.
The Agreement was intentionally worded ambiguously to allow for a compromise. Yet it leaves too many questions unanswered and 2 much room to wiggle.
6/10: This ambiguity, coupled with the lack of dispute settlement mechanisms, means every time the #peaceprocess runs into an obstacle, all parties have to run back to the drawing board and restart the process. For a recent illustration of this, see 👇🏽 voanews.com/south-central-…
7/10: Equally importantly, this ambiguity of text and uncertainty of status of the Agreement, allows various sides to play spoiler and defeat the entire process.
Today we see the AFG govt dragging its feet on prisoners' release, tomorrow TB will drag the intra-AFG talks...
8/10: Or other parties and individuals trying to hijack the timeline of intra-AFG talks.
To overcome this outcome, it is crucial that all sides build a robust mechanism to resolve any such future obstacles & allow the process maximum chance of a successful outcome.
9/10: Yes, building such a mechanism will be difficult and require creative thinking, but I believe that all sides must be driven by the urgency that, should Trump get re-elected, the US will mostly likely be leaving according to the timetable. nbcnews.com/news/world/pom…
10/10: Unless Afghans work tirelessly, once US leaves, incentives for a peaceful settlement will evaporate, compromise will become harder, regional powers will enter the fray with new rigour, & the country will likely descend into another cycle of a bloody and unwinnable war. END
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@CrisisGroup published a report this week about regional states’ engagement with the Taliban. Reading our paper could help you understand the extraordinary news in recent days about Afghanistan’s relationship with its neighbors. A short thread. 1/
The Taliban hosted their first international conference on Monday. China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Turkey and Indonesia sent officials to Kabul to talk regional cooperation — a diplomatic ‘win’ for the unrecognized Taliban regime.
Article states:
“Bahiss says TB leaders are divided into two groups: relative pragmatists who see the militant group’s policies as an obstacle to gaining international recognition and securing the removal of sanctions,…
and extremists who are bent on monopolizing power and imposing a strict form of Shari’a law.”
The actual quote provided to outlet was:
“Bahiss sees the Taliban leaders broadly driven by two lines of thinking...
On the other hand, it keeps insisting that the reserves are frozen by court orders and the administration has no capacity to unfreeze them, regardless of the compromises the Taliban can offer.
But unfreezing half the assets, it is only signalling that the above argument is only partially true and there are workarounds that would unfreeze the assets.
Sheikh Abdul Hakim is a top spiritual leader amongst the Taliban, particularly the southerners. He is often considered to be Hibatullah Akhundzada’s right hand man.
Worth noting that in the previous government, the leadership of the Supreme Court was not among the most desired jobs.
For the past two decades, the Court sometimes acted as a rubber stamp for the President, at least on matters having political implications.
Yes, media’s role varies from advocacy, to awareness to accountability and so forth. But media has huge impact and often informs policy that can have huge ramifications.
IMO, this offers is a far more realistic assessment on composition of cabinet:
(I have included Ghazni, Wardak, Logar etc in “Loya Paktya” and the entire North in “Shamal”.
“Sharqi” is eastern provinces including Kunar & Nangarhar).
NOTABLE PROMOTIONS:
Most of the names are “old guard” and respectable figures within the movement.
Salam Hanafi & Muttaqi were notable promotions. Haqqani & Yaqub have also solidified their positions, taking control of all security sectors.