Analyst @CrisisGroup || All about Afghanistan (occasional deviations) || Multilingual tweets || RT = FYI || Like = bookmark || Tweet = personal capacity ||
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Jan 31 • 19 tweets • 4 min read
@CrisisGroup published a report this week about regional states’ engagement with the Taliban. Reading our paper could help you understand the extraordinary news in recent days about Afghanistan’s relationship with its neighbors. A short thread. 1/
crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asi…
The Taliban hosted their first international conference on Monday. China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Turkey and Indonesia sent officials to Kabul to talk regional cooperation — a diplomatic ‘win’ for the unrecognized Taliban regime.
Jun 3, 2022 • 17 tweets • 3 min read
This is an interesting article and worth a read.
However, it seems to have misquoted my ideas on this topic.
THREAD
gandhara.rferl.org/a/taliban-rift…
Article states:
“Bahiss says TB leaders are divided into two groups: relative pragmatists who see the militant group’s policies as an obstacle to gaining international recognition and securing the removal of sanctions,…
Feb 12, 2022 • 15 tweets • 4 min read
More broadly, the problem is in the way the US govt keeps changing signals it is giving to Afghans as well as the Taliban.
One the one hand, it insists that the Taliban govt would need to meet certain “conditions” for it to have access to the funds.
On the other hand, it keeps insisting that the reserves are frozen by court orders and the administration has no capacity to unfreeze them, regardless of the compromises the Taliban can offer.
Oct 28, 2021 • 11 tweets • 2 min read
The appointment of Sheikh Abdul Hakim to this position is not an altogether surprising turn.
Sheikh Abdul Hakim is a top spiritual leader amongst the Taliban, particularly the southerners. He is often considered to be Hibatullah Akhundzada’s right hand man.
Sep 9, 2021 • 25 tweets • 4 min read
I am seeing a lot of emotional analysis on Indian media about the Taliban.
Some have accused the new Taliban government of cowering to the Pakistani deep-state.
THREAD
I think the Indian media is failing in providing a clear-eyed assessment of what India’s options are going forward.
(I have included Ghazni, Wardak, Logar etc in “Loya Paktya” and the entire North in “Shamal”.
“Sharqi” is eastern provinces including Kunar & Nangarhar).
Sep 7, 2021 • 5 tweets • 1 min read
For 20 years the Taliban promised not to “monopolise” power and for 2 years they promised “inclusive” government.
As far as I can tell, all 33 are Taliban members with only 2 Tajiks and 1 Uzbek. The rest are Pashtuns.
Don’t know which definition of “inclusive” this meets…
In terms of seniority, Mullah Hasan Akhund was always one of the most senior Taliban commanders. Mullah Omar (if I am not mistaken) was under his Mahaz during the Soviet Jihad.
Sep 5, 2021 • 21 tweets • 4 min read
Since taking over Kabul, the Taliban increasingly seem to be tilting towards the Chinese/Pakistani orbit of influence.
Here why this might be their first major foreign policy blunder.
THREAD
Given that China, Russia, and Pakistan are increasingly calling for normalisation of relations with the Taliban and have retained embassies in Kabul, this move might make sense, yet it is likely to prove counterproductive long-term.
Sep 4, 2021 • 20 tweets • 4 min read
The impact of financial suspension & the challenges of future engagement with the Taliban de facto government.
THREAD
Afghanistan has a trade deficit equalling around 30% of its GDP. This was previous financed entirely from grant inflows.
Although Afghanistan had seen a nearly two digit GDP growth since 2002, much of this was driven by foreign aid and foreign military spending in the country.
Sep 3, 2021 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
Interested in #Afghanistan’s humanitarian crisis, impact on the population what can the different actors do?
1. The Taliban must follow through on their promises of unrestricted access for humanitarian workers, without diverting assistance into their own coffers.
Aug 29, 2021 • 9 tweets • 2 min read
Taliban statements on some of the regional countries:
CHINA - “A strong and power nation” “we thank them for their positive policy they have always played in Afghanistan” “We thank them for their humanitarian assistance to the country”
TAJIKISTAN - “We want good relations”, “We hope they will continue assistance with Afghanistan” “We will adopt policy of non-interference and ask they don’t interfere in our internal affairs”, “We want good neighbourly relations”.
Aug 28, 2021 • 5 tweets • 1 min read
Good thread.
I will add a bit of context on the 10% ushr (tithe) vs the 2.5% Zakat.
In Hanafi jurisprudence, the 1/10th Ushr is generally applied to all harvest provided these are naturally cultivated through rainwater.
Where farmers have to artificially water by creating artificial canals or artificial wells, these 1/10th are no longer applied.
Instead the harvest is then taxed at the generic 2.5% rate that applies to all business products.
Aug 15, 2021 • 15 tweets • 3 min read
I think if there is one lesson the political science/ foreign policy/ military thinkers’ communities should take from this #Afghanistan debacle is, it is that just how powerful our own figment of imaginations are.
Some short examples: THREAD
1. The political scientist, bought their own narrative that the Taliban were a fragmented group and just needed one more push to fracture.
They waited for years. Encouraged the splintering in 2015, and kept insisting despite all evidence that this was a correct assessment.
Aug 2, 2021 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
On this issue I will note firstly that Rasoul was arrested while while Mansour was still leading the mainstream.
Rasoul have been making anti-PK statements after he crossed over into Farah. He was apparently injured in a battle with mainstream TB and taken to PK b4 arrest
Given the scantness of evidence, one can make the argument that PK was assisting one faction or the other. Mainstream TB has also been complaining for years that PK assisted the splinter group.
Aug 2, 2021 • 14 tweets • 3 min read
I feel obligated to join this conversation and add my two cents’ worth.
It is worth pointing out the Haqqani’s were elevated to deputy status by Mansur (he elected two deputies - Akhundzada and Haqqani) and was an attempt to integrate the Haqqani’s more into mainstream TB
I would also dispute claims that ISI played a role in settling these disputes. PK applied a lot of pressure in 2015 to compel the TB to join the Murree talks then. This was part of the reason why TB leadership expanded contacts with Russia, Iran and others.
Jul 15, 2021 • 10 tweets • 2 min read
Excellent thread.
I add the following THREAD to add some of my own thoughts.
In addition to making its easier to capture cities, the Taliban’s focus on border crossing is due to two other reasons as well.
Militarily, I think the Taliban is seeking to deny the AFG govt an ability to receive aid from foreign states. If the Taliban can control all the trade routes, the only way the AFG govt can be supplied is through airlifts.
Jun 5, 2021 • 28 tweets • 7 min read
THREAD ON UN ANALYTICAL SUPPORT AND SANCTIONS MONITORING TEAM’S 12th REPORT ON #AFGHANISTAN
I found the latest UN report to be interesting for a number of reasons.
Some good, others not.
Report available 👇
undocs.org/Home/Mobile?Fi…
One thing that stood out about the report was that the flavour was very different to the previous one.
A few of the noticeable changes were:
Jun 4, 2021 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
Thread.
I will just note, there is substantial evidence that the influx of troops to Afghanistan actually contributed to the expansion of the insurgency.
The Taliban insurgency expanded to large portions of the north and west at the same time as the “surge”. Difficult to predict which precipitated which but the correlation is uncanny.
May 23, 2021 • 18 tweets • 4 min read
This is a must read on how the Taliban navigated the 2015 peace talks.
THREAD
During that period, Pres Ghani offered Pakistan an olive branch in return for bringing the Taliban to the table.
That year was a pivotal year for the Taliban for a number of reasons.
1. The movement was grappling with the news of Mullah Omar’s death and its aftermath; 2. The emergence of ISKP challenged the Taliban’s monopoly on anti-state activities; and 3. The splintering of the movement with the emergence of breakaway factions
Mar 8, 2021 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
VP Saleh's comments on US Sec Blinken's letter and Khalilzad's latest trip.
Implications for success of latest proposal.
SHORT THREAD
First VP Amrullah Saleh’s remarks on US Secretary Antony Blinken’s lette...
States letter was leaked to put pressure on the government.
Quotes US officials that Pakistan has not used any form of leverage on TB in the peace process. Only acted as a messenger.
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