1. For all its talk about replacing the JCPOA with a better deal, the reality is that the Admin's policy has resulted in Iran's nuclear program once more on the brink of being able to produce a nuclear weapon in weeks and no real plan to prevent it. #blunderingtowardnuclearchaos
2. This is a primary conclusion of a recent article I wrote to support the American Nuclear Policy Initiative (ANPI) and its report on the Trump Administration's Blundering Toward Nuclear Chaos, available here: globalzero.org/blundering-tow…
3. Under the JCPOA, Iran's nuclear program was approximately a year away from being able to produce nuclear weapons and subject to the kinds of monitoring that would provide maximum time for the United States to react if Iran went for the bomb. This situation would last for years
4. Trump's May 2018 decision to walk away from the JCPOA not only irritated much of the world (especially as U.S. sanctions came thundering back into place), but also eliminated much of Iran's incentive to restrain its nuclear program.
5. Iran held off on responding for over a year until, with oil exports cratering, they started to halt their implementation of parts of the JCPOA, including limits on their enriched uranium stockpile. The result has been a steady erosion of Iran's breakout time and our security.
6. Trump Admin officials and external advocates have acknowledged this, arguing variously that they are only bringing forward a crisis that was to happen eventually and that Iran remains deterred from taking matters forward on the strength of the Trump Admin's policy.
7. But, the crisis now developing was not inevitable, had the Trump Administration instead pursued negotiations with Iran that built on the JCPOA to address its concerns. Nor was it proximate, with Iran's nuclear expansion under the JCPOA prohibited until 2030.
8. As the coronavirus shows, even a few months is a long time to wait...a decade's worth of delay in Iran's nuclear program is a considerable length of time and one that could have afforded time for diplomacy on the nuclear issue as well as the host of other concerns with Iran.
9. As for deterrence, Iran's attacks on oil tankers in the Persian Gulf, the Abqaiq facility in Saudi Arabia, and bases in Iraq and Syria housing U.S. forces suggests Iran is far from intimidated. Or perhaps Iran feels that it needs to demonstrate its own strength in response.
10. Recent IRGC naval operations in the Persian Gulf and Trump's tweeted threats in response suggest less a stable security situation resting on U.S. deterrence and more a slowly emerging regional crisis to match the nuclear one. The risks of escalation and conflict now are high.
11. The Trump administration’s Iran policy is suited really only for one outcome: a dramatic, “all-in” victory in which Iran either concedes via negotiations or via government capitulation to US demands (possibly involving regime change).
12. It was a high risk, potentially high reward strategy (though the implicit risks of regime collapse/change merit more scrutiny than they often receive). If this outcome is not achieved, then there is a significant risk of a far more complicated situation emerging.
13. Policy makers should consider now the Iran situation that they may be leaving for their successors, either in a future Biden Administration or under a re-elected Donald Trump.
14. The nuclear situation is both serious and steadily degrading. It is a renewed nuclear danger that could have been avoided but which has been recklessly embraced by an overly confident and optimistic Trump Administration.
15. There are potential paths to avoid a future crisis. But, to avoid #blunderingtowardnuclearchaos, different approaches must be developed and pursued, using diplomacy, engagement, and international cooperation.
16. You can read more here: globalzero.org/blundering-tow…
