Some commentators of today's #BVerfG decision argue that it shows an #ordoliberal bias. Here are some first thoughts about this 1/
From a certain perspective, the #BVerfG decision ticks some key ordoliberal boxes: a) purporting to maintain a constitutional order that limits discretionary economic policy; 2/
b) advising the ECB to remain within its mandate, i.e. a rules-based approach; c) by forcing the ECB to consider the wider economic effects of #PPSP, it is signalling concern about potential “market-distorting” consequences 3/
It thus appears, at first sight, as a *Wirtschaftsordnung* approach, loyal to Walter Eucken’s prescriptions; 4/
But in a whole other number of ways, the #BVerfG decision strays quite far from ordoliberal positions, unless “ordoliberalism” is narrowly understood as a “what is good for Germany”, in which case we have an issue with the term ‘ordoliberalism’ 5/
First note to make is the tension between central bank independence (CBI) and judicial review: 6/
in ordoliberal thinking these two are meant to be supplementary, not working against each other. The #BVerfG decision however challenges the independence of the ECB by questioning its capacity to understand the implications of its own monetary policy; 7/
on the same note, it challenges the judicial independence of the CJEU by claiming that its rulings are ‘incomprehensible’; by doing so, the implication is that the BVerfG is in a better position to judge EU law; 8/
then, it seems to suggest the breaking some legal rules: for one, it orders the #Bundesbank to stop making purchases (in 3 months), although the #Bundesbank is legally obliged to follow ECB policy; 9/
further, there is the ambiguous ground on whether it was the #CJEU’s judgement that was *ultra vires* or the BVerfG itself, given that it has no actual jurisdiction over EU/EMU policy; 11/
the BVerfG decision states that member states do not, and should not, have the authority to decide on the validity of EU law, only to take that back and claim that if they don’t, EU organs would have complete authority over EU law 12/
which is, by the way, precisely what the Treaties say; 13/
again, a rather peculiar way of interpreting a rules-based approach; 14/
the #BVerfG argument that the #ECB does not thoroughly explain its rationale ignores the fact that it actually does (ecb.europa.eu/press/accounts…) and lends weight to the suspicion that their problem is not that the policy lacks *explanation* 14/
but that it runs counter to German interests 15/
on a similar note, the decision claims that #CJEU decision “manifestly disregarded” general legal principles of Member States’ common law; 16/
moreover, it “completely disregards the actual economic policy effects of the programme”, thus rendering the #BVerfG intervention necessary; 17/
claiming that a “methodologically ambiguous” approach by the #CJEU is reason enough to question #PPSP and to order the #Bundesbank to withdraw from it is also rather peculiar and doesn't really sound ordoliberal-influenced; 18/
some have made a note of the fact that among the experts consulted by the BVerfG are known ordoliberal figures, such as Lars P Feld, something that proves the ordoliberal bias; 19/
But, as @zeithistoriker noticed, Feld was not among those who opposed the ECB, declaring that bond purchasing is “part of the traditional instruments used by central banks” and no indication of a “mandate breach” 20/
short conclusion: the #BVerfG ruling surely reflects a German conservative bias but it is also laced with a Eurosceptic approach that puts (whatever they understand as) German interests above all; 21/
this is hardly identical with an ordoliberal position, especially when considering that such dangerous territory could well lead the way for the breakup of the EMU and to a farewell to any sense of stability, let alone the cherished price stability; 22/ *end*
