Thread by @CestMoiz

#2dayIn1948
.. leadership was anything but energetic, and situation was still confusing. No detailed account of what happened appears available, but it would be safe to say that Indian troops in the area got routed.
Tail of the column was near Bagicha under ..

#2dayIn1948
.. Lt Col Sampuran Bachan Singh. HQ 5 Kashmir Infantry & about two platoons with a section of MMGs & a detachment of 3-inch mortars were at aMirpigund near Tolti, about 22km from Bagicha, under Lt Col Kripal Singh.
Head of the column was near ..

#2dayIn1948
.. Parkutta, about 25km further on, where there were over three companies of troops and two dets of 3-inch mortars.
Raiders had infiltrated in between and opposed every movement of any part of the column.
Thus split up, immobilized and dispirited, the ..

#2dayIn1948
.. column fell an easy prey to the raiders, although in terms of manpower and equipment, it was still quite strong. It was the quality of leadership that made the difference between an evenly matched relief column being routed whereas the vastly ..

#2dayIn1948
.. outnumbered Skardu garrison held on despite all odds, for nearly a year.
It was indeed the most shameful chapter in the entire campaign.
Lt Col Sampuran Bachan Singh & Maj Coutts fell back hurriedly from Bagicha soon after the fall of Kargil.

#2dayIn1948
Then their troops were attacked & quickly dispersed, the two officers saving their lives by swimming across the ice cold Indus and fleeing up the valley.

#2dayIn1948
Afer the exit of Lt Col Sampuran Bachan Singh & his contingent, there were still about 600 men of 5 KI & 7 KI left under Lt Col Kripal Singh between Tolti & Parkutta.
On 12th May he sent a message that read, "Completely surrounded. Enemy attacking all sides.

#2dayIn1948
Cut off from all sides. Situation grave."
After thus repeating himself several times, he asked for immediate air strikes to extricate his force & for supply drops from the air.
Gen Thimayya passed on his request to Western Command, adding ..

#2dayIn1948
.. that unless the column was given immediate air support or permitted to withdraw, it was quite likely to surrender.

#2dayIn1948
Meanwhile Leh too was edgy. Fall of Kargil had completely transformed th situation in favour of raiders. Line of communication of the Leh garrison was now cut, and the raiders could march up on Leh from several directions.
They could come via Shyok ..

#2dayIn1948
.. Valley & over the Khardung La or Lasirmou La, or they could advance along the Indus Valley route via Grugurdo & Saspul Gompa.
Or they could follow the track South of the Indus via Bod Kharby.
They could thus converge on Leh from North, West & South.

#2dayIn1948
On the other hand, Leh was much too weak in numbers & armaments to offer effective resistance. Reinforcements could only reach Leh via the 400km long mountain track from Manali, or by airplanes, which till then, had never attempted a landing on an ..

#2dayIn1948
.. improvised landing ground over 3350m. Ancient and battered Dakotas Mk III were the only transport planes available, and it was doubtful if they would even be able to fly over the high Himalayas to reach Leh at all.
The prospects were certainly gloomy.

#2dayIn1948
Then on 11th May, the two platoons blocking the Shyok Valley route had a light skirmish with about one battalion of hostiles near Chumik La, where the track left the gorge of the Shyok and climbed across one of the ridges on the North bank of the river.

#2dayIn1948
Lt Col Sampuran Bachan Singh and Maj Coutts, who'd fled across the Indus, reached Khalatse bridge on the route to Leh.
They would reach Leh a few days later, further alarming an already edgy garrison.

#2dayIn1948
Meanwhile in Naushera, next offensive op undertaken by 19 Brigade, after clearance of line of communication a week earlier, was into its second day. Aim was to mop up the area of ridge Pandhar-Dhariot in cooperation with 50 Para Brigade in Jhangar, which ..

#2dayIn1948
.. which was to clear Pt. 3005-Pogla and thus thwart enemy intentions of blocking the road Naushera-Jhangar in that area.
It was a serious threat, for an enemy battalion was occupying ridge Pandhar-Dhariot & the hostiles were also holding area Ring Contour and Pogla.

#2dayIn1948
2 Raj Rif from Naushera had reached its concentration area at about 0700Hr on 12 May. The battalion was informed that the features adjacent to its objective were manned by friendly troops and, therefore, right flank protection ..

#2dayIn1948
.. was not necessary during the approach march. This info turned out to be false, with the result that the battalion fell into a trap laid for it by the enemy.
At about 1030Hr, when they were 900m short of the objective, enemy opened up with ..

#2dayIn1948
.. mortar, MMG, LMG and rifle fire from all sides.
Having observed the advance of the battalion from their forward posts & picquets, the enemy had cleverly allowed 2 Raj Rif to get into a Nala overlooked and dominated by two adjacent features held by him.

#2dayIn1948
For a moment, it looked as if the battalion had walked into a death trap. Enemy machine guns, rifles & mortars were sweeping devastatingly the forward company's position.
Arty support to own troops was not possible, for the leading Indian troops ..

#2dayIn1948
.. were very near the objective. However, under cover of their own 3-inch mortar fire, the boys of the forward company made a determined attack, routed the enemy & captured their first objective!
Simultaneously, the other companies also made bold ..

#2dayIn1948
.. attacks and secured the second objective. By securing these two features, 2 Raj Rif enabled rest of the Brigade to pass through.
(Interestingly, the same battalion would do much the same in the Kargil War 51 years later at the 'impregnable' Tololing Massif!)

#2dayIn1948
Meanwhile, in sync with 2 RajRif, 4 Dogra too were on a roll. They captured their assigned targets by 1530Hr and 1630Hr respectively.

#2dayIn1948
A Divisional Commanders' Conference was held this day. Gen Thimayya outlined his ideas on the proposed summer offensive. He gave his mind on what he was out to achieve and how he hoped to do it.
His main thrust was to go along the Uri-Domel road ..

#2dayIn1948
.. and he proposed to relieve for the purpose 161 Infantry Brigade which had been in the area from the very beginning of the campaign under Brig LP 'Bogey' Sen.
161 Brigade's commitments were to be taken over by the newly arrived 77 Para Brigade. Prior to ..

#2dayIn1948
.. the main thrust, 163 Brigade in Handwara area was to carry out a diversionary push in the direction of Tithwal, in order to draw out as much of the enemy reinforcements in Muzaffarabad as possible. There were to be 2-3 days' interval between ..

#2dayIn1948
.. the start of the two operations.
Brigadiers Sen (161 Brigade) & Nair (77 Para Brigade) & Col Harbaksh Singh, representing Brig Katoch (163 Brigade) who was ill, and all available Commanding Officers of the battalions taking part in the summer ..

#2dayIn1948
..offensive would be taken for an aerial reconnaissance over the area in a Dakota sometime in the second week of May.
The aircraft would fly along the main Srinagar-Domel road & return via Tithwal-Handwara axis, giving the commanding officers a very good ..

#2dayIn1948
.. idea of the ground over which they were to operate.
As part of reorganisation of command structure, Bandipur & Ladakh Sectors would be taken over by HQ Sri Div from 163 Brigade.
This left only two battalions under 163 Brigade in Handwara-Kupwara ..

#2dayIn1948
.. area - 1 Sikh and 7 Sikh.
7 Sikh were exchanged with 3 Royal Garhwal Rifles from 161 Brigade on 10 May and 1 Madras joined the Brigade at Handwara on 15 May, only two days prior to the 'D' Day.
Brig Harbaksh Singh would also take over command of ..

#2dayIn1948
.. 163 Infantry Brigade from Brig Katoch, who was indisposed.
On 13 May, 77 Para Brigade was detailed to take over all existing commitments of 161 Infantry Brigade.
The D-Day for the diversionary push by 163 Brigade was to be 18 May, and for the main ..

#2dayIn1948
.. thrust by 161 Brigade along Uri - Domel Road as 20 May.

#2dayIn1948
Even as the Indian Army was gearing up to launch its summer offensive, Pakistan Times published an amazingly well informed article. Even though the author had published grossly exaggerated reports of the strength of Indian troops in the Valley - 100,000 more men ..

#2dayIn1948
.. in over and above the actual winter strength of 11 Brigades in the theatre, his tactical appraisal was very analytical. He dwelt on Indian administrative difficulties over the 300 mile long line of communication from her railhead at ..

#2dayIn1948
.. Pathankot, making maintenance of large forces in the Valley a difficult proposition. He brought out that we would accord priority to an advance from Uri to Domel so as to seal the border and at the same time drive a wedge between the Northern and ..

#2dayIn1948
.. Southern sectors of the so called 'Azad' territory. He also appreciated that this thrust from Uri to Domel would be accompanied by an outflanking movement from the North-West. He rightly observed that the nature of terrain between Uri and ..

#2dayIn1948
.. Domel, with the road going through a narrow defile flanked by high mountains on either side, was ideally suited for defence. He, therefore, expressed confidence in their ability to hold out in this sector but he advocated counter-measures by Pakistan to threaten ..

#2dayIn1948
.. Srinagar Valley in the North via Gurez and in the East via Kargil.
This article was published only a few days before own advance from Uri commenced but the surprising thing was how Pakistan had allowed publication of such an article in a newspaper!

#2dayIn1948
It read almost like a military appreciation prepared by the General Staff of Pak Army HQ, or for that matter, Indian Army HQ!

#2dayIn1948
Still more surprising was the fact that future course of ops followed by the enemy coincided with the pattern suggested in it!

#2dayIn1948
In Leh, the single platoon defending the vital Khalatse bridge reported the raiders operating in vicinity.

#2dayIn1948
In Gurez, 'A' Company of 2 Grenadiers reached Bandipur. 'B' Company was a day behind.

#2dayIn1948
In Naushera-Rajauri Sector, the next op was undertaken to clear enemy from Samani-Sadabad area, where he was holding the range of hills to the North from Pt. 3571 to Pt. 3705. A force, known as the Tiger Column, was organised for this operation.

#2dayIn1948
It comprised of 2 RajRif & 1 SikhLI from 19 Brigade, 1/2 Punjab & 4 Dogra ex 80 Brigade and 7 Mountain Battery, 45 Field Battery (one troop) and a troop ex Scindia Battery, along with a Platoon of 1 Mahar (Medium Machine Gun) were in support.

#2dayIn1948
Tiger column concentrated in area Katora Khori & 1 Sikh LI started from concentration area at 2130Hr, 'A' Company leading.

#2dayIn1948
The leading company encountered enemy at dawn.
This opposition was soon overcome and another enemy position was also cleared by 0700Hr. To secure the right flank, a company occupied Lambi Patti Ridge. But two 3-inch mortars, four MMGs & six LMGs were ..

#2dayIn1948
.. still firing incessantly from Chhawa Dhar.
The advance was slowed down when by 0800Hr the leading company was approx 550m from its objective. 2 Raj Rif, on the left, had also encountered heavy small arms and mortar fire & had been pinned down.

#2dayIn1948
Due to stiff enemy opposition, it was not possible to make further progress & the battalions were pulled back. 1 Sikh LI, which led the attack, suffered two fatal and 12 non fatal casualties.

#2dayIn1948
In Leh, news arrived of the capture of Bod Kharbu by the enemy. It was now apparent that the raiders were advancing towards Leh from all three available directions.

#2dayIn1948
But the defenders were too weak to counter these moves.

#2dayIn1948
Meanwhile in Gurez Sector, 'B' Company 1 Grenadiers also arrived in Bandipur, thereby completing the battalion's buildup there.

#2dayIn1948
Arrived at the scene of ops, the Grenadiers faced novel difficulties. Although they had the honour of belonging to one of the 'elite' units of the Indian Army, they were unused to the problems before them. They had been trained primarily as a ..

#2dayIn1948
.. 'Tank Support' unit, and till then had seen very little actual fighting. The battalion had been operating in Jammu area so far, where the terrain and climate were vastly different. Tragbal was still covered with snow, and above it lay a region of ..

#2dayIn1948
.. almost perpetual snow. Their sector was over 16km wide & full of ravines, thick forests & numerous tracks open to infiltration by enemy. Sonarwain was the limit of the jeep road, although the engineers were working feverishly to hew out a jeep track ..

#2dayIn1948
.. up to Tragbal by manual labour. Supplies, therefore, had to be carried on mules beyond Sonarwan, for which 50 mules and their drivers were hired locally. This added to the difficulties of maintaining secrecy about ops.
The 'security' problem..

#2dayIn1948
.. was already a headache, for the villagers moved freely between Bandipur & Gurez over little known goat tracks, disseminating info & rumours on either side.
To overcome these difficulties, Lt Col Rajendra Singh, the CO of 1 Grenadiers, took vigorous steps.

#2dayIn1948
A pgme of intensive patrolling was laid down to make the men really 'hill-fit' & to familiarize them with the ground.
Platoons manning the forward picquets were changed frequently, in order to give the men plenty of practice in hill climbing.

#2dayIn1948
Results of this soon became apparent. Whereas in beginning the men took about four hours to climb the 1220m (in 10km) to Tragbal, after three weeks they did it in just over an hour.
To maintain secrecy and confuse the enemy, officers of the battalion started ..

#2dayIn1948
.. using false names over telephone, usually the name of their opposite number in the enemy force. The wireless was used as little as possible, partly to maintain security & partly because of the heavy atmospherics of the hills which interfered ..

#2dayIn1948
.. with the reception of the wireless sets.
Stocking of Tragbal by mules continued apace.

All this would soon bear fruit as the battalion would cover itself in glory, besting not only the enemy but also difficult terrain.

#2dayIn1948
1 Madras joined 163 Infantry Brigade, finally making it a proper, three battalion brigade, just before it was to commence its advance towards Tithwal.
Brig Harbakhsh estimated the enemy facing him to be about 1650 strong - a mixture of Swatis, Mahsuds and ex ..

#2dayIn1948
.. Pak Army personnel & locals.
The enemy was divided roughly into two sectors - Trehgam & Handwara, with Sect HQs at Panzgam, and Dogarpur respectively. A portion was scattered along the line of communication to Tithwal, which was his main base.

#2dayIn1948
For an irregular force, the estimated strength of 1650 was quite considerable. The enemy was, however, known to be scattered in small parties and, provided a complete surprise was obtained, he was not expected to put up any organised or concerted opposition.

#2dayIn1948
Once he was on the run, it was speed, not strength, that would be required.
So it was not the numbers opposing Indian troops in that area that was important, but the strength that could be thrown against them in counter attacks after its capture.

#2dayIn1948
It was appreciated that atleast three battalions would be required to hold Tithwal and secure its immediate rear against any threat that might develop from the direction of Muzaffarabad. Another battalion was required to guard the North ..

#2dayIn1948
.. flank and protect the 40mile long line of communication. Considering this, Brig Harbaksh had requested for a fourth battalion.
He had hoped to achieve surprise by taking the most difficult, and thus to the enemy, the least expected, route for the main advance.

#2dayIn1948
He also intended to use the hours of darkness to help achieve surprise. The thrust along the main Trehgam track, under an obvious handicap of ground, was meant to lure the enemy to stick on & thus, be entrapped.

#2dayIn1948
Difficulty of terrain & line of communication dictated that troops carry all provisions they needed for a week on their person. The problem of nourishing and filling emergency rations was solved by ordering the Sikh troops to prepare 'Panjeeri' laddoos ..

#2dayIn1948
.. at the scale of three pieces for one day, to be taken three times a day with a mug of tea. This meant 21 laddoos per man.
What's more, once the men of 1 Madras & Garhwalis tasted Panjeeri, they too took to it!

#2dayIn1948
For tea, each section was ordered to carry tea leaves and condensed milk.

#2dayIn1948
Consequent to Gen Thimayya's recommendation, HQ Western Commad had given orders for withdrawal of Lt Col Kripal Singh's column on 15 May with a view to recapture Kargil, and Gen Thimayya in turn, ordered all troops in Skardu, Parkutta and Tolti to ..

#2dayIn1948
.. fight their way out & concentrate at Olthingthang near Marol.
On Lt Col Sher Jung Thapa's representation, Skardu was exempted.

#2dayIn1948
However, Lt Col Kripal Singh started pulling back. He had supplies weighing about 18750 kg & no porters. The raiders were constantly harassing his column from either bank of the Indus. Still he sent orders to his isolated parties of troops.

#2dayIn1948
17 May
Maj Coutts and Lt Col Sampuran Bachan Singh, and first elements of the dispirited remnants of their force started trickling into Leh after their rout near Marol. Their story further discouraged the nervous troops & civilians at Leh, causing more panic.

#2dayIn1948
17 May
Kargil lost, efforts were now on to relieved Dras. Own troops were then located as under:-
1. Two Platoons of 5 Kashmir Infantry at Dras;
2. A company of 5 Kashmir Infantry at Gumri;
3. A company of 5 Kashmir Infantry at Baltal; and
4. A platoon of ..

#2dayIn1948
17 May
..Kashmir Infantry at Sonamarg.
These troops were obviously insufficient for clearing the vital track upto Dras. So 1 Patiala, less two companies, was ordered to concentrate at Sonamarg from 17 May 1948, & to relieve the little detachments strung out upto Dras.

#2dayIn1948
17 May
Main features of the terrain along the track may be recapitulated. Upto Baltal it was a good road, running along the gorge of Sind river in Kashmir proper. This section of the route was firmly held by troops of Sri Div, although ..

#2dayIn1948
17 May
.. the raiders could, and did, make occasional harassing attacks on it in small parties crossing the Tilel Valley. At Baltal, the track left the valley of the Sind and climbed up steeply to the Zoji La, about 915m above Baltal and only 5km away. Beyond ..

#2dayIn1948
17 May
.. the pass, the track continued on almost the same elevation. On either side of it rose steep shoulders of the great mountain from which snow slopes came down almost to the track even in summer. About 6km from the ZojiLa, the narrow defile broadened ..

#2dayIn1948
17 May
.. out into the little Gumri plain where a goat track from Bot Kulan Gali joined it. About 3Km beyond Gumri was Machhoi, with its little Rest House and dak-runners' hut surrounded by ice and rocks. Matayan, about 13Km from Machhoi, was the first ..

#2dayIn1948
.. village after leaving Baltal. From Matayan, the caravan route went on about 10Km to Pindras and a further 16Km to Dras. The entire route was flanked and dominated by tall cliffs & ridges on either side, rising 1500m to 1800m above the track. It ..

#2dayIn1948
17 May
.. was indeed a difficult terrain for regular troops to operate in. The altitude of ZojiLa was 3528m, that of Dras, 3250m.

#2dayIn1948
17May
Porters & ponies, requisitioned for advance to Tithwal, mostly from Sopore - 32km away - for reasons of secrecy, arrived at Handwara.
In view of the distance involved for the night advance, Handwara column started half an hour before last light, i.e, at 1830Hr..

#2dayIn1948
.. on 17 May (D Minus 1).
After the column left for Dogarpur Ridge, Brig Harbakhsh Singh drove in his jeep to the Nagi picquet, where his Tactical HQ was established by 1900Hr. Col Kaul, Commander J&K Militia, had come over to watch the progress of ..

#2dayIn1948
.. the ops during the night & accompanied Brig Harbakhsh Singh to the Nagi picquet. This picquet was heavily sniped from a small feature 450m to the East. It did not, however, worry the picquet, nor did it in any way interfere with the advance of ..

#2dayIn1948
.. the column on the road below, of which the enemy was not even aware!

#2dayIn1948
This day in 1948, the enemy was taken completely by surprise and fled in confusion in small parties without offering any resistance whatsoever!
1 Madras successfully carried out its task of securing the Dogarpur ridge after mid-day. Search of Dogarpur village ..

#2dayIn1948
.. revealed signs of a hasty withdrawal by the enemy.
1 Sikh, who now passed through 1 Madras, found their way to the objective, Kahmil Nala.
Only a cuople of small enemy parties were encountered on the way and suitably dealt with. Towards the evening, the Sikhs ..

#2dayIn1948
.. bivouacked for the night somewhere on their way to the objective, Panzgam. The company of 1 Sikh established on the track coming from Tratpura, nearly brought off a very good ambush.
A party of fleeing enemy walked into the company position when ..

#2dayIn1948
.. they were not quite ready to receive them. The enemy turned back and escaped rather lightly, but terribly scared!

#2dayIn1948
At about 1930Hr, two RIAF fighter aircraft came over the area & engaged parties of enemy withdrawing from Shulur Valley, trying to escape towards Pharkian-ki-Gali. Much use of air support could not, however, be made owing to the absence of a ..

#2dayIn1948
.. 'Contact Car Air' which, although promised before the start of the op, didn't turn up until after 19th.
However, even as the Handwara column secured the Dogarpur ridge, the Kupwara column was less fortunate and was ambushed by the enemy. Things weren't half ..

#2dayIn1948
.. as rosy with this column.
The 3 Royal Garhwal Rifles, two company columns, bound for the feature behind Trehgam, who were scheduled to leave Kupwara at 2300Hr on 17 May, were delayed by an hour owing to delinquency of the civilian guide. Their ..

#2dayIn1948
.. route also lay cross-country. Nothing was heard of them till noon this day, when the forward element of 3 Garhwal, advancing along the Trehgam road from Pethahir, established wireless contact with them.

#2dayIn1948
This is what had befallen the column - Having been delayed by an hour & finding the going much more difficult than expected, the column found itself at first light, approx one mile short of the objective, when they should have actually been assaulting it at that time.

#2dayIn1948
All had gone well with them till then. This was, perhaps, responsible for lulling the Commander of the column into a false sense of security & for causing him to commit a tactical error by failing to take the necessary precautions.
He tried to rush thru, headlong ..

#2dayIn1948
.. to the objective, taking a short cut through the village of Guglus, without at first searching the village, and literally "woke up" the enemy camping there.
The enemy allowed the first wave to go through unmolested and ambushed the second wave inside ..

#2dayIn1948
.. the village, and simultaneously opened up from behind on the first wave which was by now climbing up to its objective on the ridge.
However, this didn't deter the first wave who continued to press on, if anything, at a faster pace, until a section of ..

#2dayIn1948
.. MMGs opened up on them at close range from Shulur, from a flank, taking them in enfilade and causing heavy casualties, which included their commander, Capt Kang. The fire was so effective that it restricted all movement and the advance was held up.

#2dayIn1948
It was a pity, for the objective was only a short distance away and there was not a soul there at that time.
Down in the village, the Garhwalis fought valiantly and drove the enemy out of the houses from where he was firing. Enemy reinforcements ..

#2dayIn1948
.. had arrived by now & taken up positions all around the village. By the the ridge had also been occupied by the enemy. The column commander, thereupon, decided to withdraw all troops and casualties into the village and take up a perimeter defence ..

#2dayIn1948
.. around it. The enemy made many attempts to rush the position, but own troops, even though outnumbered, held out against all odds. Although the column had failed to capture its objective, the presence of this force behind the enemy position had, without ..

#2dayIn1948
.. doubt, contributed a great deal in turning the enemy out of his very strong defensive position on the Tregham ridge.
A company of 3 Royal Garhwal Rifles supported by two troops of armoured cars & a section of weapon carriers, was moving from ..

#2dayIn1948
.. Pethahir along the Trehgam road, according to plan, commencing their move at first light. The move was under direct command of the CO, Lt Col Kaman Singh.
Pethahir, it may be remembered, had been more or less in a state of siege for some time, with ..

#2dayIn1948
.. enemy positions very close & all round it. A very stiff opposition was, therefore, encountered from the very start. The enemy was in well-dug positions, and every inch of ground had to be fought for. Progress was slow. It was further retarded ..

#2dayIn1948
.. by the need to make diversions at all bridges / culverts on the road which had been destroyed by the enemy. The guns in Pethahir came in for much plastering by enemy mortars, causing casualties. In spite of their very accurate fire, the crew of ..

#2dayIn1948
.. of the guns did not leave even for a moment & lent most consistent, effective & valuable support throughout the operation.

#2dayIn1948
In fact, Lt Col Kaman Singh, CO 3 Garhwal Rifles, would end up earning a Maha Vir Chakra for his inspiring leadership, while leading his battalion from the front and exemplary courage that he displayed this day.

#2dayIn1948
As it happened, Gen Thimayya also happened to visit the Garhwalis at the time, and came under mortar fire. As Brig Harbakhsh was going to this sector in his jeep, he passed Gen Thimayya who shouted out to him: "A HOT RECEPTION IS AWAITING YOU!"

#2dayIn1948
The Garhwalis pressed on against stiffening opposition with great determination. The knowledge that their night column had been surrounded by the enemy, egged the 'Bhullas' on to many an act of collective & individual gallantry. They neutralised the enemy ..

#2dayIn1948
.. opposition, post by post. The feature overlooking Trehgam was captured by them just after midday. This completely broke the back of enemy defences on the ridge & further advance by own troops was carried out thereon without much opposition.

#2dayIn1948
The beleaguered troops at Guglus were finally contacted at about 1500Hr.

#2dayIn1948
In Uri, 4 Kumaon had moved from Mahura at 0900Hr on 18 May with seven days' rations in pack. They crossed over the suspension bridge and concentrated in area Baila Dori.
In order to surprise the enemy, two measures were adopted - the battalion moved in ..

#2dayIn1948
.. small parties to the concentration areas; further during the move and in concentration area no fires were lit & everyone kept under cover so that movements should not be observed by enemy occupying dominating positions nearby.
On reaching the ..

#2dayIn1948
.. concentration area, registration by arty was started at 1700Hr and was carried out on all dominating features. A company of Sawai Mann Guards was in position at Pt. 9062 to carry out the deception plan towards Nangatak.

#2dayIn1948
Alongwith Handwara, Kupwara & Mahura, Poonch Garrison too moved out on 18 May. Positions of enemy West of Poonch were known to be mostly in vicinity of Tetrinot.
Approx two companies were holding the spur East of the ridge, and it was imperative to ..

#2dayIn1948
.. clear them. It was planned to make a double attack-on the right 3/9 Gorkha Rifles were to advance & capture the hill feature, while on left, 1(Para) Kumaon were to infiltrate into Tetrinot silently.
'A' & 'B' Companies of the Gorkhas moved forward to ..

#2dayIn1948
.. capture the ridge, 'B' Company on the right & 'A' Company to the left. When they reached halfway to the objective, enemy opened up with LMGs and one MMG. Grenades also came hurtling down the ridge. Undaunted, the Gorkhas continued their advance ..

#2dayIn1948
.. and when only 55m from the objective, made a spirited charge & drove the enemy from the ridge after hand to hand fighting.
In this engagement, Indian casualties were 11 killed & 29 injured, including the CO, Lt Col Palit, who was wounded with a ..

#2dayIn1948
.. grenade bursting quite close to him.
47 bodies of the enemy dead were counted. It was estimated that many more were either killed or wounded. A permanent picquet was established in this area to check any further threat. Two more picquets would be ..

#2dayIn1948
.. established after similar attacks on 30 May.

#2dayIn1948
Situation in Leh, however, wasn't getting any better. In Shyok Valley, the tiny force of two platoons had to fall back to Pachatang on the South bank of the river, leaving the route along the opposite bank open to the enemy.
They thus moved on to the Nubra Valley.

#2dayIn1948
The enemy in the area appeared to be trained troops, and used Helio lamps to signal across the ravines.

#2dayIn1948
In the Khalatse Sector, 500 raiders including some regular Pakistani troops were concentrated near Dah & were armed with 2-inch & 3-inch mortars, MMGs & LMGs.
Further South across the Indus, raiders coming from Kargil were sending strong patrols to ..

#2dayIn1948
.. Lamayuru, which soon left that place behind and pushed on to Wanlah & Drogulika on the Southern track.

#2dayIn1948
In Uri, at 1600Hr, 'B', 'C' and 'D' Companies of Sawai Mann Guards moved off from their concentration area in order to attack Nan from North, using an extremely difficult route over a range of hills more than 3950m high. The area which was out of ..

#2dayIn1948
.. enemy view was covered during the day and remainder by night. A platoon was sent ahead to make a footpath over the knife edged rock and to use ropes if necessary.
According to the info available, Nan 4 & Nan 3 were not held but Nan 2 was held ..

#2dayIn1948
.. in strength. Plan of op was:-
1. The leading 'B' Company was to capture Nan 4 & Nan 3 before midnight on D-Day & establish firm base.
2. Then 'D' Company was to pass through & establish firm base on Nan 2 by 0400Hr. Then 'C' Company was to capture ..

#2dayIn1948
.. Nan 1 on dawn. Thereafter the company from Nan 3 and Nan 4 was to take over Nan 2 also & the company from Nan 2 was to capture Nan 1 after dawn.
As per plan, 'B' Company after an extremely difficult march secured Nan 4 and Nan 3 without firing a shot.

#2dayIn1948
On the Handwara front, another sortie of RIAF made an appearance, but couldn't be effectively utilised for want of appropriate communication equipment.
Regardless, blocking of the two exits from the Shulur Valley and elimination of the enemy base at ..

#2dayIn1948
.. Panzgam commenced in the morning. An armoured column, consisting of two troop armoured cars, a section of weapon carriers and a platoon of 3 Royal Garhwal Rifles in APVs, set out from Pethahir at 0800Hr. They travelled on the Trehgam road, which ..

#2dayIn1948
.. ran along the bottom of the ridge, which was now in own hands. Shumanag bridge was found to have been completely destroyed by the enemy.
There was a fairly deep and fast stream of water flowing thru the Nala and making a diversion through it took nearly ..

#2dayIn1948
.. three hrs to complete. Another hour was taken by all vehicles to pass through.
Advance was resumed at about 1300Hr.
The position at Shulur was found to be deserted, except for a lone old man, who, upon arrival of the column, tried to escape.
He was captured ..

#2dayIn1948
.. and upon interrogation, told that he had been tasked to keep watch on movement of own troops.
The advance was kept up along the road to Panzgam. Progress continued to be rather slow, owing to the narrow road and weak bridges on the way, as well as ..

#2dayIn1948
.. the need to search all villages and houses on the way, especially after the experience of those who had fought in Guglus a day prior.

#2dayIn1948
During one of the searches, a 3-inch mortar, with large quantity of ammo and large stocks of small arms, ammo & signal stores, were recovered from a house in Shulur village.
As own troops neared Panzgam, a number of small enemy parties were seen to be ..

#2dayIn1948
.. fleeing over the ridge behind the village, and were effectively engaged by the armoured cars. The enemy made no serious attempt to interfere with own advance, except for a certain amount of sniping from a ridge on the right flank.
Panzgam was ..

#2dayIn1948
.. reached at 1600Hr, and found to be completely deserted. A large dump of enemy supplies was captured in a house in the village.

#2dayIn1948
Contact with 1 Sikh from the other direction was established at 1700Hr, and the valley of Shulur was now completely surrounded, although most of the enemy had managed to escape. He was, however, reported to be completely disorganised and fleeing in great ..

#2dayIn1948
.. disorder. His forces were split into two - with some escaping via Pharkian-ki-Gali to Keran and others via Kahmil Nala & Nastachun Pass to Tithwal.
Chowkibal was reached by 1 Sikh without any further opposition.

#2dayIn1948
1 Madras started the day with a push thru 1 Sikh for an attack on Nasthachur Pass. Working out arty support for them on the map, it was discovered that from Chowkibal, even if the guns could reach there on a non existent track, the target was out ..

#2dayIn1948
.. out of range of the 25 Pounder Field Guns by about 400 - 500 yards.
The battery commander, Major Bawa, suddenly remembered that he had two brand new guns in his battery which were overshooting by 400-500 yards!
And that was just the extra distance ..

#2dayIn1948
.. needed, benignly arranged by providence!
Even the Gods were rooting for India in that campaign!
Thus, the guns were ordered up to Chowkibal to be in position by first light on 21st May 1948.

#2dayIn1948
Meanwhile Maj Prithi Chand had been sending urgent requests to HQ Sri Div for immediate reinforcements by air. The airfield was ready and the Leh garrison wanted planes to land on it immediately.
But flying Dakotas to Leh involved many technical difficulties ..

#2dayIn1948
.. and unknown stresses on the planes, including the risk of ice forming on the wings of the planes while flying over the mountains. Gen Thimayya, therefore, first thought in terms of sending reinforcements via the Manali route. On 17 May, he'd ..

#2dayIn1948
.. written to HQ Western Command, pointing out the danger to Leh & suggesting that a strong column of 500-600 men, made up of ex soldiers in Kulu & volunteers from the Dogra Regimental Centre, be sent from Manali to Leh.
On 18th May, he informed ..

#2dayIn1948
.. HQ Leh Garrison that help was being sent from Kulu & that de-icing equipment was being obtained so that the Dakotas could fly to Leh with reinforcements.
But situation was getting critical and on 19 May, HQ Western Command informed Army HQ of the ..

#2dayIn1948
.. imminent danger to Leh and requested arms and supplies to be air dropped there urgently. It was suggested that these should include 500 rifles, two 3-inch mortars, four 2-inch mortars, three Bren Guns, 25,000 rounds of small arms ammo, 600 mortar bombs ..

#2dayIn1948
.. and a No 22 wireless set, apart from sugar, ghee etc.

#2dayIn1948
Meanwhile, Lt Col Kripal Singh's column retreated from Parkutta.

#2dayIn1948
In Uri, 'D' Company Sawai Mann Guards passed through the 'B' Company and at about 0400Hr its leading platoon, when within 45m of the top of Nan 2, they got entangled in thick bushes & were subjected to heavy LMG and rifle fire.
Both the leading sections were ..

#2dayIn1948
.. pinned to the ground.
Realizing that only a bold & impetuous attack would save his leading platoons from destruction, the company commander ordered rest of the company to push on to the attack. At the same time he asked for arty support, which ..

#2dayIn1948
.. unfortunately was delayed for half an hour due to the breaking down of the wireless set.
Not discouraged, the company made an audacious attack on the enemy position. The commander of the leading platoon (which had got pinned down) rushed forward ..

#2dayIn1948
.. with the reserve section from the left flank and captured an enemy post. From here he directed the LMG & the 2-inch mortar fire on the enemy posts, which were firing on his other sections.
'C' Company commander, who was following with his company ..

#2dayIn1948
.. closely behind got in touch with the Tactical HQ and was ordered to help 'D' Company from the left flank and attack the enemy as quickly as possible. The 3-inch mortars & MMGs turned their fire on to Nan 1 to prevent enemy from reinforcing Nan 2.

#2dayIn1948
Both the company commanders worked in close cooperation and directed a spirited charge on the enemy positions.
Such was the impetuosity of the charge that the enemy after a faint-hearted opposition fled in wild confusion.
Enemy casualties were 30 fatal & 50 non fatal.

#2dayIn1948
Enroute to Nastachun Pass, the new guns were moved in time to support the attack. How the gunners managed the feat was nothing short of miraculous. It showcased keenness of the gunners to support their infantry brethren in their endeavours.
In fact ..

#2dayIn1948
.. their commander, Maj Bawa would ask the Brigade Commander again and again if he could dismantle the guns & take them to Nastachun Pass, in order to support the Brigade all the way upto Tithwal!
The advance to Nastachur by 1 Madras was resumed ..

#2dayIn1948
.. at 1000Hr. Time was taken in the morning to tie up arty support & other details. Arty support by field guns at Chowkibal, owing to the uncertainty of wireless communications, was arranged on a timed programme, while the Mountain Battery with ..

#2dayIn1948
.. 1 Madras was tasked to take on impromptu targets.
The attack on the Pass started at about 1300Hr & it was in own hands by 1400Hr. The enemy put up only a token resistance.
He was believed to have been completely surprised & demoralised by Bawa's ..

#2dayIn1948
.. shells, which were later found to have landed plonk on enemy positions on the Pass!
1 Sikh was now pushed through, while 1 Madras held the Pass, and before last light, secured the village of Naichiah, situated at the end of the Nastachun defile, ..

#2dayIn1948
.. 6 miles beyond.
The night was spent without incident.

#2dayIn1948
In Uri, 'A' Company Sawai Mann Guards moved off at 0200Hr to attack Nan,while 'C' Company advanced to attack Nan1.
The attacks were launched simultaneously & both objectives were secured without opposition by 0530Hr. Then 'B' Company pushed on and ..

#2dayIn1948
.. captured Chinal Dori at 1645Hr.
At 2200Hr, 'A' Company moved thru 'B' Company to attack enemy held feature Chhota Kazinag.

#2dayIn1948
Even as the thrust of 161 Brigade towards Chhota Kazinag was advancing satisfactorily, the column advancing on road Uri-Domel was less fortunate, for it encountered stiff resistance.
On 18th May, enemy had burnt the bridge near Mile 66 & also established ..

#2dayIn1948
.. a roadblock in the area of Mile 64. He had also increased his activity from the direction of Haji Pir Pass, thus keeping 77 Brigade engaged in area South of Uri.
Pt. 7300 was held by approx two companies, supported by MMGs & Mortars. Salamabad ..

#2dayIn1948
.. feature was also held by the enemy.
2 Dogra were therefore ordered to capture Salamabad feature prior to attack on Pt.7300.
At 2130Hr on 19 May, 'A', 'B' & 'C' Companies moved out to capture Salamabad feature & Pt 7300; 'D' Company being in reserve.

#2dayIn1948
However, the battalion lost its way in the dark.
Since the capture of Salamabad feature was absolutely essential before any advance from Uri along the road could be attempted, orders were issued to 2 Dogra to capture the feature immediately.
Surprise had, however, ..

#2dayIn1948
.. been lost & small parties of enemy commenced shooting on to the Salamabad feature from nearby hills. At 0600Hr on 20th May, 'A' Company tried to capture its objective, Pt. 7300 before 'C' Company had captured its own objective.
The two leading platoons..

#2dayIn1948
.. of 'A' Company were encircled by enemy. The reserve platoon which moved forward to rescue was also encircled. Company HQ too ended up getting encircled soon thereafter.
It was a serious situation.
The Company HQ fought its way out. Remainder company had to put in..

#2dayIn1948
.. THREE bayonet charges to break through the enemy cordon, but break through they did. It was the third attempt was eventually successful.
'A' Company fought its way out & fell back to 'B' Company position for reorganisation.

#2dayIn1948
Enemy casualties were 25 killed & 40 wounded, while own troops lost 10 killed & 20 wounded. However, the day was hardly over!
At 1100Hr, enemy attacked 'A', 'B' & 'C' Companies, which were all concentrated at 'B' Company's objective. He ..

#2dayIn1948
.. put in three counter attacks & came within 135m of own troops at one point. However, the brave Dogras of the Indian Army were in no mood to oblige him any further that day.
The enemy was repulsed each and every time with heavy losses.

#2dayIn1948
As the Dogras were held up at Salamabad feature, 'A', 'B' & 'C' Companies 6 RajRif were sent to reinforce them & protect the left flank of the column advancing along the main road.
The enemy, however, retired & the second phase of ..

#2dayIn1948
.. ops began on 21 May when the armoured column advanced along road Uri-Domel. It came across two roadblocks at Milestone 65.
The roadblocks were cleared by the engineer detachment, but the column couldn't advance further as two bridges between ..

#2dayIn1948
.. Milestones 65 & 64 had been blown up by the enemy.
The column halted during the night 21/22 May between them & resumed advance on 22 May after the engineers had repaired the bridges.
No opposition was encountered and they halted for the night ..

#2dayIn1948
.. at Milestone 61.

#2dayIn1948
Meanwhile, enroute to Tithwal, 1 Sikh was ordered to resume advance at first light, with 1 Madras less a company left on the Pass, was to follow behind as reserve. Nastachun Pass is over 10,000 feet high & even in May, extremely ..

#2dayIn1948
.. cold. It is further notorious for a piercing & ceaseless wind. The discomfort to own men operating there, mostly Madrasis at that, had to put up with that night, without any great coats & blankets, is hard to imagine!
The Sikhs slightly lower ..

#2dayIn1948
.. down, the other side of the Pass, spent a comparatively comfortable night.
On 22 May, 1 Sikh led the advance with 1 Madras following them as reserve. Opposition throughout the day was almost negligible, except for sniping here & there.
Precautions, ..

#2dayIn1948
.. however, couldn't be relaxed & the advance was carried out tactically. An hour before last light, forward elements secured Chhamkot, still about 5 miles from Tithwal along the track. Chhamkot was considered to be a good place for rest before carrying ..

#2dayIn1948
.. a night advance to Tithwal.

#2dayIn1948
In Kargil, Lt Col Kripal Singh's column was near Kharmang bridge by 1200Hr when it was suddenly attacked by raiders from all sides.
It had walked into an ambush again.
Local coolies immediately threw down their loads & fled. The column suffered ..

#2dayIn1948
200 casualties, lost its baggage & heavy equipment. It practically ceased to be an operational force.
But it still retained some cohesion, & since Kargil had already fallen, it struck out South West into the hills. After terrible privations over ..

#2dayIn1948
.. trackless waste of snow, the men reached Faranshat in the valley of Shingo River.
Misfortune again overtook them there.
While crossing the river using an old rope bridge, enemy suddenly appeared. In the confusion, the rope bridge broke & the ..

#2dayIn1948
.. survivors split up into two parties, fleeing westwards along either bank of the Shingo.

#2dayIn1948
Situation in nearby areas too was getting critical.
A company of 1 Patiala had taken positions in a defile beyond ZojiLa Pass on 21 May.
On 22 May, one of its platoons, holding a position at Gumri, was attacked by the hostiles using two MMGs, four LMGs ..

#2dayIn1948
.. and 2-inch mortars. The platoon replied, but superior volume of enemy fire continued unabated.
Then the company of 1 Patiala launched an attack, supported by MMGs & 3-inch mortars. Fresh snow lay deep on the ground, and the raiders, flushed with

#2dayIn1948
.. their recent successes, fought hard. But their positions were captured after a hand to hand fight & they retreated to Matayan.

#2dayIn1948
1 Patiala suffered heavy casualties, including 12 men killed & 5 Kashmir Infantry also lost 5 dead & 5 wounded. The enemy left behind 21 dead.

#2dayIn1948
Meanwhile, situation in Leh too was getting critical. On 22 May, the vital bridge at Khalatse was assaulted, with heavy fire support. The weak detachment of State Force troops was thrown back, and most of them melted away in the hills, not seeing ..

#2dayIn1948
.. any more of the war. Fortunately, the bridge was destroyed before it could fall into enemy hands.

#2dayIn1948
Situation in Leh continued to worsen, more so after the fall of Khalatse a day prior. Frantic messages arrived at Sri Div from Leh saying that the position was critical & all would be lost unless reinforcements arrived the very next day.
On 23 May, Maj Prithi Chand ..

#2dayIn1948
.. reported that the situation had been discussed between himself, Lt Col SB Singh & Maj Coutts, & they all agreed that Leh would have to be evacuated unless reinforcements reached there by 1200Hr on 24 May. A large number of raiders ..

#2dayIn1948
.. were concentrated near Khalatse & they could brush aside the feeble opposition & capture Leh within 24hrs.

#2dayIn1948
In Gurez, Tactical HQ of 1 Indian Grenadiers was established at Tragbal, two days after the engineers had completed constructing the jeep track connecting it.
Meanwhile, 163 Brigade was on the verge of capturing Tithwal. 1 Sikh was less than a day's ..

#2dayIn1948
.. march from the objective, and it was within easy range of the mountain guns too. The plan for capture of Tithwal was simple:-
1. 1 Sikh were to carry out a night advance along the track Chhamkot Saltal - North of Dhana, mostly running along the watershed, so as ..

#2dayIn1948
.. to secure the spur overlooking Tithwal by first light 23 May.
2. 1 Madras was to advance along the main track and secure, after first light, the high points South of Tithwal, assisted by 1 Sikh from across the nala.
3. Guns were to ..

#2dayIn1948
.. support the operation from their position at Chhamkot.

The op went as per plan. The Sikhs, after a hazardous march over a steep, narrow & most difficult track, which caused some delay, secured the ridge overlooking Tithwal by 0900Hr. The enemy was ..

#2dayIn1948
.. caught totally by surprise.
Upon appearance of our troops from this unexpected direction, he evacuated his positions around Tithwal without a fight, except for some sniping, & withdrew across the river. 1 Sikh entered Tithwal at 0930Hr.
Soon after, 1 Madras boys ..

#2dayIn1948
.. also arrived & occupied, according to plan, features South of the village.
With this, the Indian Army had reached where, more or less, it stands even this day, 72 yrs later. There would be fierce fights, but positions in this area would more or..

#2dayIn1948
.. less stay the same despite savage attacks & counter attacks over the coming days.

#2dayIn1948
On the road Uri-Domel, the armoured column recommenced its advance in morning, No 2 Troop leading.
They came to another halt as the bridge at Milestone 58 was found blown up. Enemy then subjected the troop to 3-inch mortar fire.
The troop withdrew ..

#2dayIn1948
.. at 1230Hr & joined with the rest of the column, which had advanced upto Milestone 60.

#2dayIn1948
No 1 & No 2 Troops advanced upto Milestone 58 but again came under heavy mortar fire. The enemy fired more than 120 bombs.
At 1500Hr a column of twelve 3 ton vehicles (Shaktiman) loaded with Bailey bridge equipment came very close to the troops.

#2dayIn1948
The enemy now switched his mortar fire to engage this vehicle column, killing one NCO and two sepoys & damaging one vehicle. As it was found impossible to construct the bridge in face of heavy enemy fire, the engineers withdrew at 1700Hr & the two ..

#2dayIn1948
.. troops of armour then withdrew at 1930Hr.

#2dayIn1948
Meanwhile in Tithwal, own troops found the village to be in ruins,as a result of sacking & burning by raiders in their initial invasion. Huge stores of hostiles' foodstuff, including canned supplies were captured. This was a Godsend for Indian troops ..

#2dayIn1948
.. who had been almost starving for the past two days, having outstripped their sustenance supplies carried on ponies.
The enemy was reported to have thrown all his reserves of arms, ammo and equipment into the fast flowing Kishanganga river before fleeing.

#2dayIn1948
Some important documents were, however, captured, including an 'Intelligence Summary' dated 13 May 1948 which gave correct details of the change of command carried out recently & grouping of Indian forces in J&K.

#2dayIn1948
In Gurez, even as own troops built up in strength, the other side was no less active in its preparations for the coming ops.
After losing Tragbal, the raiders reorganised their forces in Gurez Sector. The area was put under command of Col Aslam Pasha, a renegade ..

#2dayIn1948
.. officer of the old State Forces. His HQ was at Chilam Chowki. According to reports, he had under him a force of about three battalions, including about 300 men of Gilgit Scouts commanded by Maj Hassan.
These troops couldn't be compared ..

#2dayIn1948
.. to Indian Army men in terms of training or discipline, but were adequately supplied with LMGs, MMGs & 3-inch mortars, and had two 4.2-inch mortars as well. For transport, they freely resorted to forced labour, and commandeered every local mule ..

#2dayIn1948
.. and man till their needs were met. And they had an advantage over the Indian Grenadiers in knowing the terrain intimately & being quite at home among the icy slopes & rarified air of the mountains.
From middle of May, rumours began to circulate ..

#2dayIn1948
.. about the impending enemy attack on Bandipur.
Other reports indicated that Aslam Pasha was trying to send small parties of his men up the Tilel Valley to cut the vital line of communication to Skardu at Sonamarg or Gumri.
To forestall such designs ..

#2dayIn1948
.. and with a view to eventual recapture of Gurez, the Grenadiers then received orders to capture & consolidate the Rajdhani Pass.

#2dayIn1948
In his appreciation dated 24 May 1948, Lt Col Rajendra Singh, CO of the battalion, mentioned that the pass was still under 1.5m of snow. Neither side had any occupied position near the pass, though patrols from both used to visit it.

#2dayIn1948
Indian Grenadiers had their HQ & two companies at Tragbal, one company less one platoon at Atthawattu & one platoon & the administrative company at Bandipur. The raiders in that area were disposed as follows:-
1. One platoon & a detachment mortars at Malak Kadal to ..

#2dayIn1948
.. watch the Dodakbatun track;
2. One platoon & detachment mortars at Pt. 75645 to block the Kanzalwan route;
3. 15 men at Pt. 8048.
4. Two platoons & detachment mortars at Darikhun to watch the Viji Gali route;
5. HQ, one platoon & one det mortars at Badwan;

#2dayIn1948
6. A section of 10 men to guard a bridge;
7. A platoon of 40 men at Dawar as reserve;
8. One platoon and one section MMG at a 'fort' to protect the main bridge; and
9. One platoon of 40 men at Godor to guard their line of communication.

#2dayIn1948
These added up to a total of about 400 men; the rest of the raiders in that sector were dispersed further afield. The nearest raiders' outpost was at Darikhun, and they used to patrol regularly at Viji Gali.
On the basis of this ..

#2dayIn1948
.. appreciation, it was decided that Rajdhani Pass would be occupied by one company of 1 Indian Grenadiers, supported by mortars, on 26 May.

#2dayIn1948
It was a red letter day for Leh - Indian Army finally got airborne to Leh despite doubts on the capability of the old Dakotas to cross the Himalayas & thereafter land at the airstrip 10,682 feet.

#2dayIn1948
The first flight of six Dakotas was led by Air Cmdre Meher Singh, with Maj Gen Thimayya as a passenger - two highest ranking officers in charge of air & ground ops in the sector flying together in the first aircraft - leading from the front, given the fact that ..

#2dayIn1948
.. they were to fly in an old aircraft over uncharted territory to an airfield surrounded by hills!

#2dayIn1948
In fact, Gen Thimayya had convinced a skeptical Meher Singh by promising to accompany him in the first aircraft. It was a leap in the dark, but the distinguished pilot's skill & courage were rewarded by a successful flight & safe landing at Leh, and opening an ..

#2dayIn1948
.. air bridge to the beleaguered garrison.

#2dayIn1948
In the process, they also set a record by landing at the world's highest airfield.
On this day, a company of 2/4 Gorkha Rifles commenced its buildup in Leh. Another company ex 2/8 Gorkha Rifles too would build up in the weeks to come.
Leh was now safe.

#2dayIn1948
An interesting offshoot of this episode was the response of the local population to the arrival of the metallic birds .. they in fact, brought offerings of food for it!

#2dayIn1948
Photo: The First Jeep landing in Leh - Thanks to titans like Meher Singh and Thimayya!

#2dayIn1948
Photo: A Dakota at Leh, 1948

#2dayIn1948
Photo: Air Cdre Mehar Singh (second from right) with Flt Lt Lal Singh Grewal at the Leh airfield, May 1948

#2dayIn1948
Amidst all this madness, Jhangar garrison under Brig Usman too had had a busy month, fighting off vicious attacks on their defensive positions, followed by an (unsuccessful) attempt to clear the enemy from Sabzkot & MG Hill.
At 0145Hr on 10 May, the ..

#2dayIn1948
.. enemy commenced heavy fire from autos on Jhangar, followed by mortar fire.
The defensive battle of Jhangar had commenced.

#2dayIn1948
The 'Azad Kashmir' Brigade, with 2battalions attacked picquets No 1,3 & 16. Tow other battalions attacked picquets 7,8,9 while another battalion attacked picquets 11,12 & 13.
A regular Pak Army battalion(4/13 Frontier Force Rifles) attacked Picquet 14.

#2dayIn1948
The attacks were brutal, in massive waves greatly outnumbering the defenders. However, own troops refused to oblige the enemy, or die!
The boys dug in and gave back as good as they got, and then some!
Arty and tanks of Central India Horse played a big role too.

#2dayIn1948
Finally, all attacks petered out by 0600Hr, but not before some anxious moments. However, men of 3 (Para) Maratha LI put paid to enemy designs and came out victorious.
Another attack by approx 250 enemy developed at 0440Hr on 11 May from the enemy ..

#2dayIn1948
.. firm base at Pandhar Ridge. This too was beaten back.
Then the GOC, Maj Gen Atma Singh ordered 19 Brigade to carry out an operation behind the Pandhar Ridge. Accordingly, two companies of 4 Dogra captured two hills by 1530Hr after heavy opposition.

#2dayIn1948
Outflanked, the enemy was forced to withdraw. As the setting Sun cast its last lingering light over Jhangar Camp on 12 May, the valiant defenders relaxed for a peaceful night. They had won the defensive battle of Jhangar with sheer determination and ..

#2dayIn1948
.. willpower against tremendous odds, strengthened by rock solid leadership.

#2dayIn1948
That done, Brig Usman turned his attention on clearing the hostiles from Sabzkot.
The op commenced on 21 May, but had to be called off due to stiff enemy opposition & heavy casualties suffered by own troops.
With this, the Jhangar Garrison settled down ..

#2dayIn1948
.. to strengthening its own positions without much bother by enemy.
June would be a quiet month.

#2dayIn1948
In Uri, the advance on Domel road came to an abrupt halt when another attempt to overcome the roadblock at Milestone 58 failed.
However, some progress had been made in clearing enemy South of Jhelum River. 7 Sikh had reached the lower slopes of Pt.7315 ..

#2dayIn1948
.. and captured it this day after a two company attack.

#2dayIn1948
However, since the advance to Domel had been considerably slowed down by damaged bridges, the enemy was, therefore, able to strengthen his positions astride the road to Chakothi. It was estimated that approx ..

#2dayIn1948
.. one Brigade group of Pak Army in addition to hordes of tribesmen & Poonchies of 'Azad Kashmir', supported by arty & machine guns, was operating in the area. Following units of Pak Army were identified in the area:-
1. 1 FF Rifles
2. 4 FF Rifles ..

#2dayIn1948
3. 4/16 Punjab; and
4. 15 Punjab

Known enemy dispositions along the road Uri-Domel were:-
1. 4/16 Punjab on a feature South of Chinari.
2. 1 FF Rifles with one company on feature near Simmar Kopra, a company on Pt. 7228; a company near that and ..

#2dayIn1948
.. Battalion HQ in Bundi forest.
3. 4 FF Rifles with a company each at Pt. 6813,Pt. 3903 & Pt 9213 and Battalion HQ at Kathai.
4. 15 Punjab in area Pt. 9210.
Enemy was also located at Pt. 10027 & Pt. 6065, but his exact strength at these places was unknown.

#2dayIn1948
In view of the buildup of enemy forces in Chakothi Sector, Gen Thimayya decided to move 77 Para Brigade (which was primarily responsible for holding a firm base at Uri & looking after the Southern flank & line of communication between Uri-Baramula) to Pandu ..

#2dayIn1948
.. area in order to harass the enemy from the rear and cut his line of communication West of Chakothi by operating North of Jhelum.
By advancing West of Pandu, it would be possible to dominate the road right up to Chinari. Of course, there were..

#2dayIn1948
.. administrative difficulties in carrying out this op.
There were two main tracks to Pandu from Uri. The first led from Mahura via Dhanni Saiyidan. The track from across the suspension bridge over the Jhelum near Milestone 78 ran East to West along ..

#2dayIn1948
.. the river bank & then North-West through Dhanni Saiyidan to Zambur Pattan. Up to this place the track was fairly good.
From here onwards it was very narrow & merely a footpath to Pt. 7154. It then wound North to Tragan. Then it turned South through a ..

#2dayIn1948
.. Mountain Pass to Chinal Dori, from where it turned South-West to Chhota Kazinag along the ridge.
The second track led from the rope bridge across the River Jhelum near Milestone 65 opposite Daphni to Chhota Kazinag. The mules couldn't cross the ..

#2dayIn1948
.. bridge however; instead, only 3 men at a time could use the bridge. From this bridge to Sultan Dhakki there was a good mule track, but there onwards only a footpath went North along the edge of the ridge to Gundi Faqiran.
Then it went Westwards along the lower ..

#2dayIn1948
.. ridges of Chhota Kazinag upto Safaida.
Thus it was obvious that the maintenance of a large number of troops in Pandu area by these tracks would be difficult.
Thimayya, however, decided to take the risk. It was better to face these administrative..

#2dayIn1948
.. difficulties & launch the attack from Pandu rather than let the op of 161 Brigade be checked by stiffening resistance on road Uri-Domel.
It was a bold decision by a decisive commander.
77 Para Brigade was assigned the task of launching the attack from Pandu.

#2dayIn1948
2 Dogra, 4 Kumaon, 1 section Patiala Mountain Battery & all available animal transport from 161 Brigade were placed under command 77Para Brigade. This regrouping would be completed on 27 May.
On 25 May, though, 4 Kumaon successfully captured ..

#2dayIn1948
.. Pandu at 0700Hr, & its tactical HQ was established there.
With this, Indian troops now dominated road Uri-Domel at Chakothi.

#2dayIn1948
Gen Thimayya was a man in a rush!
After 163 Brigade reached Tithwal, he ordered Brig Harbakhsh to plan 'Op Surya' for a thrust from Tithwal towards Muzaffarabad & Domel, with a view to denying the enemy use of bridges on rivers Kishanganga & Jhelum.

#2dayIn1948
To accomplish the task, 2/4 GR & a troop anti tank regiment were placed under command 163 Brigade at Chowkibal.
The task of 163 Brigade was to capture the high ground West of Muzaffarabad & Domel with a view to deny enemy use of the bridges as well ..

#2dayIn1948
.. line of communication Uri-Domel.
A double thrust was to be made from the firm base at Tithwal - the main column was to advance along track Tithwal - Naoseri - Khiddar - Pt. 10131 - Muzaffarabad while the diversionary column was to advance ..

#2dayIn1948
.. along the river Kishanganga in order to attract max enemy force.

#2dayIn1948
In reply to continuous requests by Lt Col Sher Jung Thapa for air attacks against raiders in light of critical situation in Skardu, and requests for air supplies due to ammo & ration stocks causing acute anxiety, HQ Sri Div explained to him that ..

#2dayIn1948
.. the available Dakotas of RIAF couldn't fly over 4570m & couldn't reach him. He was assured that a few Dakotas were being specially fitted up for flying at greater altitudes & that supplies would be dropped to him before long.

#2dayIn1948
Meanwhile, despite initial supplies flown in on 24th May, no sign of promised reinforcements was visible. The situation was still grave.
The raiders, unaccountably, still remained where they were; but how long could they be expected to stay immobile?

#2dayIn1948
When no reinforcements arrived even on this day, panic reappeared at Leh. The raiders had roused themselves at last & were reported advancing slowly from Khalatse along either bank of the Indus.
Troops at Leh had also learnt about the desertion ..

#2dayIn1948
.. by men of State Forces guarding the Khalatse bridge & were naturally feeling downcast.

#2dayIn1948
Maj Prithi Chand learnt that reinforcements couldn't be expected for another 4-5 days. He sent a strongly worded signal to HQ Sri Div. He pointed out that the previous day he'd been promised reinforcements in two days; but the latest info had put ..

#2dayIn1948
.. back the date of their arrival by 4-5 days. The troops had lost all confidence in their officers' promises & were ripe for desertion due to their hopelessness.
"Had no promises been made & forgotten, morale wouldn't have suffered so."

#2dayIn1948
Under the circumstances, there was every likelihood of the dispirited troops deserting from Leh, & Maj Prithi Chand proposed to pull back the detachment in Nubra to defend Leh itself.
This grave message was followed immediately by another from the President ..

#2dayIn1948
.. of the Buddhist Association at Leh to Gen Thimayya, saying that the raiders were barely 27km from Leh. The promises of immediate help had "deceived" ppl, otherwise they would have fled and saved atleast their lives & honour of their womenfolk.

#2dayIn1948
Unless troops were sent by air the same day, all would be lost & "no cries of distress will reach your ears from tomorrow."

#2dayIn1948
The situation was extremely critical indeed, but HQ Sri Div found it impossible to move troops by air immediately. Perhaps planes weren't available, and not even one company of troops could be spared that day from imp operational commitments in Poonch, Tithwal etc.

#2dayIn1948
In any case, the weather alone made it impossible to fly over to Leh in the afternoon as desired by the Buddhist Association President, and almost all flights to Leh had to start early in the morning, before clouds could form up & hide the jagged peaks about mid-day.

#2dayIn1948
This signal from Maj Prithi Chand wasn't the only strongly worded signal received by HQ Sri Div this day. Another signal was received from Lt Col Sher Jung Thapa, pointing out that supplies had been promised to his men repeatedly, but had not been ..

#2dayIn1948
.. provided, and the men, therefore, were losing faith in the promises of their commanders. He also wanted to know why fighter aircraft were not being sent to help Skardu - surely they were able to fly above 4570m, as opposed to Dakotas.

#2dayIn1948
Meanwhile in Gurez, an incident happened which forced the commander's hand regarding occupation of Rajdhani Pass.
At Tragbal, last night was dark & stormy. A bitterly cold wind came down from the snowy slopes of Rajdhani Pass & went howling & moaning thru the pines.

#2dayIn1948
There was neither sound nor movement in the Grenadiers' camp. Only the sentries stood watchful & alert at their posts.
At about midnight, a sentry saw two muffled figures approaching, & challenged them. On being discovered, they ..

#2dayIn1948
.. fired two shots & the sentry fell, wounded. By the time others rushed out & reached the place, both enemy scouts had disappeared into the forested darkness.
Such affront couldn't be allowed to pass unnoticed, and CO 1 Indian Grenadiers ..

#2dayIn1948
.. immediately decided to occupy the Rajdhani Pass. Accordingly, 'D' Company occupied the Pass by first light this day. The Grenadiers were just in time for the enemy too, it seems, had decided to occupy the Pass the same day, now that snow was about to melt.

#2dayIn1948
In Chakothi, 4 Kumaon had been probing enemy defences. A fighting patrol to Pt. 6873 a day prior encountered enemy, one company strong. After a brush with the enemy, the patrol withdrew.
This day, the enemy held position was mortared & vigorous patrolling carried out.

#2dayIn1948
In Gurez, after occupation of Rajdhani Pass by 1st Indian Grenadiers a day ago, a company of raiders was seen digging in on the hill near Kuljan Gali on 28 May.
All were seen to be clad in regular battle-dress and had great-coats on, akin to ..

#2dayIn1948
.. regular Pak Army troops. Another party of enemy, about 150 strong was observed on the Kanzalwan track, moving up with a lot of supplies. However, when they tried to advance towards the Indian position on top of the Pass with two MMGs in support, Indian mortars ..

#2dayIn1948
.. opened up with devastating effect. A direct hit was scored on the advance section of the enemy, and his supply and ammo dumps were also plastered. Atleast 15 raiders were killed in this engagement, and about 20 wounded, including Major Hassan.

#2dayIn1948
The enemy made desperate efforts to recover the bodies of his dead comrades, but was beaten back every time.
Finally, he retired towards Kanzalwan.
The same day, a party of enemy, about 50 strong, armed with rifles & LMGs attacked Atthawattu as well.

#2dayIn1948
More than 2000 rounds of small arms ammo were fired at the defenders from a range of 900m - 1350m, but no casualties were suffered.
When a strong patrol was send out by the Grenadiers, the enemy fell back and melted away.
With the ..

#2dayIn1948
.. capture of Rajdhani Pass by 1 Indian Grenadiers, the way was now clear for an attack on Gurez proper. Indian troops were at the crest of the mountains dividing the Kishanganga Valley from the main Kashmir Valley and could look down into the gorge of ..

#2dayIn1948
.. the Jatkusu Nala that led into enemy held territory.
But the next three weeks saw only minor engagements between fighting patrols.

#2dayIn1948
Meanwhile, 163 Brigade was busy consolidating, ahead of Op Surya. As part of defence of Tithwal, the ridge across Kishanganga River was occupied and picquets established at Pt. 7229 & Ring Contour. The latter was overlooked by Pt. 9444, but since the ..

#2dayIn1948
.. number of troops was inadequate for manning many picquets, Pt. 9444 was not occupied. Besides, occupying the ridge across the Kishanganga, which dominated Tithwal, an attempt was made to secure Richhmar Gali & Mir Kalsi Ridge to serve as a ..

#2dayIn1948
.. springboard for the advance towards Muzaffarabad.
The enemy reacted sharply to this move and offered stubborn resistance to 1 Sikh in their advance towards Mir Kalsi.
On 28 May, 'B' & 'C' Companies 1 Sikh moved forward to occupy Richhmar Gali, or ..

#2dayIn1948
.. Pt. 7895 as it said on the maps. The companies met heavy opposition & due to very difficult terrain, couldn't reach their objective.

#2dayIn1948
HQ Sri Div replied to HQ Leh Garrison, according permission for withdrawal of troops from Nubra Sector for close defence of Leh.
Same day, a column left Ferozepur for Manali, to march to Leh over the mountains. This column was ..

#2dayIn1948
.. commanded by Maj Hari Chand & composed of men of 'D' Company of 2/8 GR. Its strength was 2 Officers, 4 Gorkha Officers and 151 other ranks, with a section of 3-inch mortars, a signal detachment, 600 rifles and 60,000 rounds of small arms ammo.

#2dayIn1948
However, it wouldn't reach Leh for several weeks.