There are lots of topics potentially of interest of course. I created my normal batch of charts during very different, happier economic times.
So for the moment, I thought I'd cull down the list and focus on just a handful that are relevant. Suggestions for others welcome. /1
First off, 40 million Americans have seen a major work disruption since February: either losing/leaving their jobs, being put on furlough, or having their hours cut involuntarily.
*Less than half* of these disruptions are accounted for by the rise in the unemployed. /2
I've tried to account for all these extended margins of disruption in a measure I call "NPOP". NPOP is the share of the US population not at work in either a full- or voluntary part-time job. It rose 12.5 percentage points in April alone. /3
The fact that the single largest category of disruption is unemployed on temporary layoff has been a source of comfort for some observers, since ostensibly this is a category with very high labor market attachment: around 50% of layoffs go back into work the next month. But... /4
...unsurprisingly, this time looks like it will be different. Transition rates from layoff back to employment plunged to almost 30% in April alone. /5
It bears reminding that "temporary layoff" is entirely in the eye of the respondent. They may think their layoff will be temporary, but it's not clear that in the current situation they have a material information advantage. /6
On wages, we saw a huge spike in average hourly earnings in the April jobs report due to compositional effects: since the pandemic is disproportionately hitting low wage workers, the rump average wage soared. /7
The CPS allows us to overcome compositional effect by looking at median wage growth among same-workers employed 12 months apart.
April was a bit soggy when looking at hourly wages, but this is a noisy series and there wasn't an obvious break in the data /8
To account for the possibility that firms are cutting labor costs through fewer hours, I also looked at median *weekly* wage growth. But the qualitative story is not dramatically different. /9
When you compare the hourly and weekly median wage series, it's not obvious the typical firm is resorting to cuts in hours among *existing* employees yet. /10
I won't break down wages by industry/occupation, as those are particularly noisy & applying an e.g. 12M moving average is not likely to tell us much meaningful about April alone.
I will note though that the non-raise rate continued to rise, which it's been doing for a few months
That's all for now, but more to come in the days and weeks ahead. Let me know your thoughts. /FIN
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This is a treading water jobs report at 114K, which is almost exactly the number of jobs we mechanically need to add to keep up with the labor force.
But it's probably weaker than that since there will likely be future downward benchmark revisions. /1
First the good news. We should never focus on a single month. The 3MMA is +170K/month, which is solid and nonrecesssionary. And an unemployment rate at 4.3% is consistent with estimates of medium-and-long-run trend. An economy that landed here would be fine. /2
Today, I have a short @The_Budget_Lab piece on the "No Tax on Tips Act" that puts the bill in the context of today's labor market and tax system. There are three important takeaways. /1 budgetlab.yale.edu/news/240624/no…
First, tipped work is not very common, even among low wage workers. There were 4 million workers in tipped occupations in 2023. That's 2 1/2 % of all employment, 4% of workers in the bottom half of hourly wages, and 5% of workers in the bottom quartile. /2
Second, tipped workers skew young: 1/3 of tipped workers are under 25, compared to only 12% of non-tipped workers. 13% of tipped workers are teenagers (versus only 3% for non-tipped). /3
Real GDP growth came in at 1.6% in Q1, softer than expected. But that appears to be driven by weakness in volatile components, especially net exports. Private domestic final purchases--"core GDP" made up of consumption & fixed investment--grew 3.1%, a very strong print.
The chart below shows how much broad components of GDP contributed to grown in Q1, 2023 Q4, and on average over 2017-19. You can see the significant swing in exports. Goods consumption also cooled a bit. Services consumption and residential investment firmed.
The reason economists look at PDFP in tandem with overall GDP is that PDFP is actually better at predicting next quarter's GDP than GDP itself. Inventories and trade are volatile and add noise to forecasts. So PDFP is not "actual GDP" but it's a better measure of underlying trend
This was a strong report, and both surveys were aligned. Payroll employment grew 303K in March, with +22K net revisions. The 3M mov avg is now +276K.
Household employment grew 498K, and by 352K on a payroll basis (the household survey has far wider error bands).
Meanwhile, year-on-year nominal hourly wage growth is cooling: it came in at 4.1%; incidentally, exactly what March's 3-month annualized growth was too.
We don't have inflation data for March yet, but March YY wage growth was almost certainly positive in real terms.
The Producer Price Index (PPI) is always a difficult release to interpret. CPI and PCE are better measures of consumer prices, (though the latter takes some subindices from PPI); for example, CPI and PCE include imports and housing, both of which PPI exclude. /1
That said, PPI is no slouch on interesting data.
Contrary to the way it's often described, the headline PPI measure (PPI Final Demand) is *not* an input cost index. It's an index of seller's final prices. But PPI *does* have input cost indices, called "Intermediate Demand":
That chart shows input costs by the type of input: unprocessed goods (eg fresh fruit meant to be canned, crude petroleum meant to be processed), processed goods (eg wood pulp, cotton yarn), services (eg renting a warehouse), & construction. /3