Some thoughts on al-Qaida and international terror in light of Attorney General Barr announcing AQAP behind Pensacola Naval Air Station attack: 1/n
1. Al-Qaida analysts have been debating the group's health, pol direction, intent & capability to attack US. Spectrum of debate captured in pieces by @hoffman_bruce & Ware: warontherocks.com/2020/03/al-qae…; by @annestenersen: terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/p…; by @dbyman: tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.10…
In March, Sec Pompeo declared al-Qaeda was a "shell of its former self": foxnews.com/media/sec-pomp…. Maybe al-Qaida role in Pensacola attack was not definitive when he spoke; still, his judgment on a group suspected to be involved in an attack 3 months earlier is striking.
Fwiw, I argue al-Qaida is intent on int'l terror even if ambivalent on time. In Sept, wrote: "[AQAP] leader, Qassem al-Raymi, has advocated lone-wolf attacks in the United States and operates a wing dedicated to targeting “Western and regional interests.”" lawfareblog.com/al-qaedas-cont…
Barr's announcement should lead to update in priors on some dimensions of al-Qaida's health, as well as intent+capability to reach the US. I am not able to glean a specific strategy of int'l terror but struck by AQAP's adaptation -- infiltration of "allied" military to reach US.
2. Some AQAP watchers have been writing about challenges facing & degradation of AQAP due to US CT. For example: lawfareblog.com/khalid-batarfi…. My work suggests degradation is possible, see AQAP under pressure through similar dynamics: mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.116…
That said, I am unpersuaded on extent of degradation argued in light of UN sanction committee reporting on AQAP: undocs.org/S/2020/53. It points to challenges faced by the group but not enough to infer "AQAP is on the verge of defeat." (Happy to change my mind with more data)
But lets work with AQAP is degraded to a point of defeat premise. The fact that AQAP is able to direct(?) an attack suggests AQAP's obituary is somewhat premature. And there are limits of degradation; it perhaps rules out certain *types* of attacks, not attacks themselves.
This has implications for AQAP threat, beyond. On Afghanistan, there is an assumption in some analyses that al-Qaida in South Asia's overall degradation/weakness will prevent it from staging int'l terror. For eg, this DIA assessment:
All of this is to say that basing al-Qaida's threat to US territory based on an assessment of a given franchise's organizational capability in its haven, or vice versa, is not ideal.
3. I have been trying to get at evidence of deterrence/coerced away from int'l terror due to US CT pressure in Af-Pak. Logic would be that fearing damage from US CT on discovery of plotting, group steers clear of int'l terror/shifts strategy & focuses on more local priorities.
I think there is some type of strategic calibration on part of al-Qaida in South Asia to adjust to US CT pressure; though nothing definitive, yet. But clearly, given Barr's announcement + other reporting from Yemen, AQAP isn't deterred in this fashion.
4. Final point: The points above are not an argument for "forever wars" due to terror threats. In this exercise, I want to decouple the analytical assessment of where al-Qaida is from US policy on the Middle East and Afghanistan. n/n
