Thread by @tanvi_madan

THREAD: On the US govt's response to the China-India boundary incidents & how India will see it.

In some ways, US is faced w/ a Catch-22:
- say nothing & Indians (esp US sceptics) say, "what kind of partner are you?"
- say something & GoI worries abt its escalatory potential 1/

We've seen 2 comments thus far from Amb. Alice Wells, PDAS @State_SCA re the PRC-IN situation. One was yesterday morning, where she called China's behavior "disturbing" & representative of its broader actions (SCS) & how it uses its power 2/
news18.com/news/world/us-…

The second (lengthier) comment from Amb. Wells came in a conversation with @RichardRVerma yday afternoon. 3/

As I've mentioned elsewhere, these statements are likely to be welcomed as "backing" by many in the Indian public. Indeed we've already seen some commentary calling the USG stmts as "siding with India" 4/
timesnownews.com/international/…

But, however much Indian public will 👏🏽 US response, the Indian govt will likely be quite uncomfortable abt it (reasons in thread).

e.g. @nitingokhale: "establishment in New Delhi is not looking at the US to weigh in on any dispute resolution w China" 5/

https://twitter.com/StratNewsGlobal/status/1263359520127873024?s=20

So why wld GoI prefer private support but public discretion from USG re PRC-IN incidents? A few reasons... 6/

Reason 1a: India wants to de-escalate the situation w/ PRC. Hence its own restrained stmts. GoI will see USG stmts as potentially hindering this effort to deescalate. Given increased US-China tension, GoI esp doesn't want boundary issue to become a geopolitical football. 7/

Reason 1b: US stmts abt the boundary & linking it to SCS will concern GoI, even if they agree its reflective of broader PRC assertiveness. It could get the issue caught up in US-China competition, & make it harder for Beijing to take the off-ramp. 8/

Reason 2: Chinese analysts & officials hv often taken line that PRC-IN don't hv problems; they're created by US. Also, that India is acting at US behest (says this abt many - e.g. Aus - since PRC doesnt seem to give other countries much agency)

GoI wants the focus to be bilat 9/

Reason 3: GoI's been portraying India as a major power, capable of handling its own problems & helping others with theirs. In dealing w. the situation, Delhi will want to demonstrate its ability to tackle this situation & show resolve 10/

GoI will particularly be concerned abt the timing of the remarks given that, despite their attempt to be restrained, a couple of days ago, PRC upped the ante.

Today, PRC reacted to the USG comments, saying the situation has nothing to do with the US. 11/

3 caveats here to GoI preference re USG public stmts: It does not mean GoI:
- doesn't want US support & help privately
- might not change its mind abt US stmts down the line
- won't want US to hold Indian "resolve" up as an example/model after the situation has been resolved 12/

US support doesn't hv to be public. US can - & has in the past - helped India behind-the-scenes with these incidents w/ China (more in my Doklam-era article below).

Since Doklam, the ability of US & India to cooperate has deepened thx to COMCASA etc. 13/
brookings.edu/blog/order-fro…

GoI discomfort w/ public USG stmts doesn't signal shying away from partnering w/ US & others more broadly. Keep in mind, Doklam might hv led to "Wuhan spirit" w/ China, but it also led to India deepening bilat, trilat, quad, minilat ties w/ US, Australia, Japan. W/ US alone.. 14/