2/n
The defeat of France within a few weeks in 1940 has remained one of the most astonishing and seemingly revolutionary events in the twentieth-century military history. A whole host of explanations were offered: communist treason, unwillingness to fight, fifth columnists.
The defeat of France within a few weeks in 1940 has remained one of the most astonishing and seemingly revolutionary events in the twentieth-century military history. A whole host of explanations were offered: communist treason, unwillingness to fight, fifth columnists.
3/n
Eight decades later, events and their causes appear clearer. The French did fight in 1940: their armed forces lost 1, 23,426 dead, 5,213 missing in action, and 2,00,000 wounded.
Eight decades later, events and their causes appear clearer. The French did fight in 1940: their armed forces lost 1, 23,426 dead, 5,213 missing in action, and 2,00,000 wounded.
4/n
It is little acknowledged that the brilliant thrust from Dinant to Sedan hung on a few fragile threads: the suicidal combativeness of the German infantry on the heights overlooking Sedan,
It is little acknowledged that the brilliant thrust from Dinant to Sedan hung on a few fragile threads: the suicidal combativeness of the German infantry on the heights overlooking Sedan,
5/n
the then-junior Major-General Erwin Rommel’s brilliant personal leadership in forcing the crossing at Dinant, and a bridgehead across the Meuse secured by a single panzer division of General Heinz Guderian’s XIX Corps.
the then-junior Major-General Erwin Rommel’s brilliant personal leadership in forcing the crossing at Dinant, and a bridgehead across the Meuse secured by a single panzer division of General Heinz Guderian’s XIX Corps.
6/n
However, the battle for France reflected in greater measure the best qualities of German military culture and institutions.
However, the battle for France reflected in greater measure the best qualities of German military culture and institutions.
7/n
Developed over a century from the Prussian reforms of 1807-14, it was a culture that demanded effectiveness and “joy in responsibility” of everyone, rifleman to general.
Developed over a century from the Prussian reforms of 1807-14, it was a culture that demanded effectiveness and “joy in responsibility” of everyone, rifleman to general.
8/n
It commanded constant training and practice, encouraged experience and innovation, inculcated honesty and truth across ranks, units and branches. This was a culture that nurtured its leaders and punished failure only at its second or third occurrence.
It commanded constant training and practice, encouraged experience and innovation, inculcated honesty and truth across ranks, units and branches. This was a culture that nurtured its leaders and punished failure only at its second or third occurrence.
9/n
The slow steady systemic improvements of the Reichswehr and the Wehrmacht became a revolution on the banks of the River Meuse.
The slow steady systemic improvements of the Reichswehr and the Wehrmacht became a revolution on the banks of the River Meuse.
10/n
The German army had studied the last war closely under its Chief of Staff General Hans Von Seeckt. The doctrinal changes were reworked and crystallised by Generals Werner Von Fritsch and Ludwig Beck after analysing the British experiments on Salisbury Plain.
The German army had studied the last war closely under its Chief of Staff General Hans Von Seeckt. The doctrinal changes were reworked and crystallised by Generals Werner Von Fritsch and Ludwig Beck after analysing the British experiments on Salisbury Plain.
N/n
Showing a willingness to learn from combat and realistic experiments, the German army was able to harness armour, airpower, radios and the internal combustion engine into a revolutionary conception of war.
Showing a willingness to learn from combat and realistic experiments, the German army was able to harness armour, airpower, radios and the internal combustion engine into a revolutionary conception of war.
