THREAD. On the rhetoric we've seen - or not seen - from China & India during the ongoing boundary tensions.
Bottom line: thus far, both govts have largely been restrained in their rhetoric. This is a good thing & a contrast from Doklam/2017 when Beijing's stmts were v heated 1/
Bottom line: thus far, both govts have largely been restrained in their rhetoric. This is a good thing & a contrast from Doklam/2017 when Beijing's stmts were v heated 1/
1st, recapping what we've seen from the two sides. The Indian govt has said v little on the record about the 🇨🇳🇮🇳 boundary situation. What it has said has been either reiteration of India's stance & C-I mechanisms or downplaying the situation or even attempts to be even-handed 2/
Initially, there was this statement from the Indian army chief re the two earlier incidents in early May. It was striking cuz of its acknowledgment of "aggressive behavior" on both sides, & trying to keep it local (& de-link it w/ other China-rel steps) 3/
.@MEAIndia subsequently issued a stmt acknowledging some differences at the 🇨🇳🇮🇳Line of Actual Control & saying they were being resolved. (Hard to know if they were cleaning-up the COAS stmt but MEA did not repeat his "both sides" or "nthg to do w/ other things" sentiment) 4/ 
But then 2 things from Beijing suggested China was escalating rhetorically
- May 18 Global Times piece re Galwan Valley situation (had only been 1 piece in Indian media at that point re it) bit.ly/2TDOkpj
- May 19 stmt from PRC foreign ministry 5/
thehindu.com/news/national/…
- May 18 Global Times piece re Galwan Valley situation (had only been 1 piece in Indian media at that point re it) bit.ly/2TDOkpj
- May 19 stmt from PRC foreign ministry 5/
thehindu.com/news/national/…
Following PRC MFA's accusatory statement, @MEAIndia pushing back against the Chinese claims about India's actions -- but once again reiterating that India was committed to resolving the situation 6/
There was also an interview with the IAF chief, who acknowledged the incidents earlier in May, but he, too, urged calm and/or declined to comment on certain aspects 7/
After the 2 accusatory indications from China (1 GT, 1 MFA), Beijing seems to hv dialed back its rhetoric. Even the MFA stmt was in response to a question & not issued in English, not on the website & reportedly didn't receive much play in PRC (@ananthkrishnan will correct me) 8/
Wolf warrior central (aka Global Times) has also dialed down its rhetoric. One article noted "China and India will not engage in confrontation over the borders." But it has largely remained silent on the boundary incident since those few pieces around May 18/19. 9/
Chinese officials on Twitter -- in India & Beijing -- hv also largely remained silent (other than to tell the US to mind its own biz). PRC amb to India (not a wolf warrior) has indeed said it "will continue to" help India w/ COVID, incl via Jackie Chan 10/
As @ananthkrishnan observed, the 🇨🇳🇮🇳 boundary issue was not addressed in the annual press conference by Wang Yi (Chinese ForMin/State Councillor/Special Rep for boundary talks with India) 11/
From India, after the MEA pushback vs PRC MFA statement, we've also seen (a) relative silence or (b) denials/corrections from GoI sources of stories that hv emanated from other sources re developments at the boundary (e.g. bit.ly/2M9OUqV & bit.ly/2M2V4Zv 12/
India's wolf warrior channels, which always stand ready to beat up on Pakistan, have also been relatively silent on the boundary issue -- they've instead been picking on Nepal, or China re COVID. 13/
On Chinese side, so to speak, another interesting angle i.e. as @sushantsareen has noted, "little strange that the current 3-week long stand-off...has been virtually ignored by the Pakistani media." Though, as he says, this might v well hv local causes 14/ orfonline.org/expert-speak/p…
PRC stance is in contrast w/ Doklam in 2017. GoI public reticence today is same & is SOP. What was a departure then - & different from PRC approach today - was the heated rhetoric from China, which fmr GoI officials like @ShivshankaMenon had noted was surprising/a departure. 15/
During Doklam, there were multiple stmts full of warnings, even refusals to engage in dialogue, from the PRC foreign ministry, & state media outlets. As @EvanFeigenbaum said at the time, they were "not helpful." There was even the racist Xinhua video. 16/ washingtonpost.com/news/worldview…
What does the restrained (for now) rhetoric from China & India say? It likely signals they want to keep the situation from escalating. There's a debate abt influence of public opinion on decision-making on this issue, but it can become harder to take off-ramps public is 🔥 17/
Delhi's had experience w/ how going public can make issue w/ China tougher to resolve/control. Nehru's public stmts in the lead-up to the 1962 war are often mentioned. But, this from my book, also notes the impact of the '59 release of 🇨🇳🇮🇳 white paper bit.ly/2zjKFp 18/
I've seen a number of India tweeps quite unhappy with the Indian government's restrained rhetoric. But it's not a sign of kowtowing, it's a sign of smarts -- and one I wish was followed more w/r/t India's problems w/ other (smaller) countries. 19/
There is the question of democratic accountability. This is v important, but there is a way for the Indian government to achieve this goal while keeping its public stmts minimal: brief & keep in the loop the opposition, which, in turn, should play a responsible role publicly 20/
There's also the issue of how sustainable GoI's restraint is in this era, w/ satellite imagery public, social media, & the drip-drip-drip of leaks from its own house.
This doesn't mean GoI needs to drop restraint. It does mean it has to find a way to deal w these elements 21/
This doesn't mean GoI needs to drop restraint. It does mean it has to find a way to deal w these elements 21/
I should add that whatever the Indian govt's approach, journalists have the right to ask the govt questions & report what they're hearing from reliable sources. And people have a right to offer dissenting & different opinions.
This is what makes India different from China. 22/
This is what makes India different from China. 22/
Worth noting that while China & India's rhetorical restraint might signal desire to maintain more control of the situation & keep statements (at least) from escalating it, it does not suggest that either side is backing down from their positions. 23/
We've seen a few articles today quoting sources likely in PMO/MEA pushing back on contentions in earlier articles citing other sources (possibly mil), but not on the record. Seem designed to pushback on scale & location ("invasion") claims, & indicate resolve + dialogue combo 24/
This from @ananthkrishnan recaps the relative rhetorical restraint from China & India. 2 interesting tidbits:
- PRC MFA stmts of May 19, 22 not circulated to the Chinese media
- GT claim of Galwan Valley “as China’s territory" was missing in MFA stmts 25/
thehindu.com/news/national/…
- PRC MFA stmts of May 19, 22 not circulated to the Chinese media
- GT claim of Galwan Valley “as China’s territory" was missing in MFA stmts 25/
thehindu.com/news/national/…
