A few quick and dirty #CPSMicrodataDay charts, as I ponder other ones.
According to the household survey, broad labor market disruption fell by 8 million people in May, but there are still 32 million people who have left jobs or had their hours involuntarily cut since February. /1
We need to be very cautious about CPS data right now, but one interesting result: median same-worker wage growth hasn't slowed significantly yet, either on an hourly or weekly basis.
That's not what we would expect in such a sharp downturn, though perhaps this takes time. /2
That said, non-raise rates are rising, though note this series is noisy and the 12-month moving average I use will necessarily only change slowly. /3
But--and this is why we need to be more cautious these days--response rates are plunging, widening the uncertainty bands around the data. /4
Moreover, in-person interviews are plunging too (for utterly defensible reasons!), but in-person interviews consistently yield higher unemployment rates for some reason, so this shift may be having a compositional effect on the CPS, though I'm sure BLS has tried to adjust. /FIN
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Yesterday's US Court of International Trade decision invalidates the recent tariffs imposed under IEEPA, including the "reciprocal" tariffs & most tariffs on China, Canada, & Mexico, leaving only the Section 232 commodity tariffs in place. What are the economic implications?
1/8
• The average effective US tariff rate falls to 6.9% pre-substitution without the IEEPA tariffs, the highest since 1969, down from 17.8% prior. Even after consumption shifts, the average tariff rate will be 7.0%, also the highest since 1969. 2/8
• The price level from all non-IEEPA 2025 tariffs rises by 0.6% in the short-run, the equivalent of an average per household consumer loss of $950 in 2024$.
• The 2025 tariffs raise $686 billion over 2026-35, with $101 billion in negative dynamic revenue effects. 3/8
Assuming that the US raised the "reciprocal" tariff rate on the EU from 10% to 50%, what would be the economic effect?
The 1st table takes current tariffs & illustratively raises the EU reciprocal rate to 50% total. For comparison, the 2nd shows w/o the extra EU tariff. 1/7
* The pre-substitution average effective US tariff rate rises from 15.4% now to 19.5%
* Post-substitution, the average rate rises from 14.0% to 18.3%
* Short-run PCE price-level pressures rise by another 0.5pp, from 1.7% to 2.2%.
2/7
* Short-run purchasing power loss rises to $3,600 per household in 2024$ from $2,800 now.
* Conventional 10Y revenue rises by $130 billion, to $2.8T, but the 10Y dynamic revenue hit increases by $150bn, to -$549bn.
3/7
New tariff update today from @The_Budget_Lab incorporating
1. Today's announcement of lower US-China tariffs (10% instead of 125% reciprocal tariffs); 2. The May 8 US-UK trade deal; and, 3. The April 29 auto tariff rebate announcement.
Some high level takeaways:
1/13
@The_Budget_Lab • In broad strokes, the lower China tariffs announced today have 2 main effects, assuming they stay in place:
1. They reduce the economic damage of 2025 tariffs by 40% (judged by price & GDP);
2. They raise $300bn *more* over 10Y, showing how suboptimal 145% was.
2/13
@The_Budget_Lab • The current US average effective tariff rate is now 17.8% pre-substitution, highest since 1934. Post-substitution, it's 16.4%, the highest since 1937. Virtually all of the fall since our April 15 report is due to the lower China tariffs; the US-UK deal has little effect.
3/13
@jasonfurman & @ZLiscow have responded to the piece on real infrastructure investment @vannostrand & I wrote in @Briefing_Book. We always learn a ton from J&Z, & this is no exception. They engage w/ thoughtful, data-driven pts. You should read their threads & then come back here (links at end).
1/23
Our bottom line: the official BEA deflator & the NHCCI that J&Z defend tell different stories. But most measures say infra investment has risen. Each real validator we could find (# of h’way contracts, h’way employment, change in lane-miles of h’ways from 2 sources) all grew under Biden.
2/23
@jasonfurman @ZLiscow @vannostrand @Briefing_Book Let me start by stating 4 points we all agree on: 1. Nominal highway spending rose under Biden. 2. Highway costs also rose under Biden. 3. Inflation erodes the real value of infrastructure spending. 4. There is uncertainty about how #1 & #2 net out.
3/23
Hot off the presses, @The_Budget_Lab just published a preliminary estimate of the economic & fiscal effects of the Trump Admin's 25/25/10 Mexico/Canada/China tariff proposal, with a special lower 10% rate on Canadian crude oil imports. Some high-level conclusions follow... 1/4
1. The proposal raises PCE prices by 0.76% pre-substitution (full retaliation & no Fed offset). That's the equivalent of a $1,250 per household loss in purchasing power on average in 2024$.
2. The proposal raises $1.4-1.5T over 2026-35 conventionally scored, & ~$150B less dynamically scored.
2/4
3. US real GDP is 0.2% smaller in the medium-run.
4. The effective tariff rate rises ~6 perc pts to the highest since 1946.
5. We map average price effect across different commodities. For many goods, domestic prices rise too. Natural gas prices are 8.4% higher, autos 4%, produce ~2%.
3/4
This is a treading water jobs report at 114K, which is almost exactly the number of jobs we mechanically need to add to keep up with the labor force.
But it's probably weaker than that since there will likely be future downward benchmark revisions. /1
First the good news. We should never focus on a single month. The 3MMA is +170K/month, which is solid and nonrecesssionary. And an unemployment rate at 4.3% is consistent with estimates of medium-and-long-run trend. An economy that landed here would be fine. /2