Thread by @tanvi_madan

🧵 THREAD: There’s been a lot of debate re the impact of India-China devps on US-India rels. Debate seems to swing from non-alignment to alliance. Two points:
- Pay attention to the in-between "alignment" space
- Non-alignment ≠ no alignment 1/

2/ India’s history shows that while it might hv a “strategic inhibition” (h/t @thomaswright08) vs alignment, there hasn’t been a “strategic taboo” vs it.
My book indeed looks at the conditions under which India aligned vs China:
- w/ the US (from 1962)
- w/ the USSR (from 1971)

3/ India aligns or tilts when:
- faces a clear & present challenge
- unable to deal with it on its own
- desire to diversify dependence on multiple partners thwarted
- a willing partner/set of partners to tilt toward
- leadership has sufficient political capacity to tilt/align

4/ In 1962:
- Challenge: China, war raging
- India couldn’t tackle it solo
- Soviet Union took 🇨🇳’s side or stayed neutral; stalled mil supply, told 🇮🇳 to accept 🇨🇳 offer
- US (+ Aus, UK, WGer etc) willing to help
- Public support for tilting; any elite opposition ↓ by 🇨🇳 threat

5/ In 1971:
- Challenge: China’d enter a likely war on behalf of Pak
- India cldn’t tackle it solo
- US rapprochement w/ 🇨🇳 meant its implicit assurance vs 🇨🇳 off the table; 🇺🇸 aligned w 🇨🇳🇵🇰
- USSR willing to help
- Public support for tilting; elite oppo ↓ by 🇨🇳🇺🇸, poss 🇵🇰 war

6/ In present day context, when people are thinking about non-alignment, they’re still using US vs Soviet choice.

Keep in mind that for India, then & now it’s also abt China vs non-China choices. & when it comes to that, it has aligned with those willing to support it vs China

7/ Over the last two decades, arguably, on a strategic level, India has been moving towards aligning w/ countries that can help it tackle China challenge by helping:
- Give India leverage w/ China
- India build its own capability
- Balance China

8/ India’s partnership w/ the US, which it has pursued knowing it could have negative repercussions w/ China, is a key part of its strategy to manage China.

Consider that both India & the US pursued the nuclear deal, knowing that China wld be unhappy about it.

9/ India’s tilting has esp involved the US, but also Aus, France, Japan, Russia & others.

It’s the Russia part that complicates the US partnership & confuses people re “non-alignment”

India isn’t aligning vs Russia, but it *is* aligning vs China. Even 🇮🇳's 🇷🇺 rel has 🇨🇳 motives

10/ To understand India's approach, a better way of thinking about it is not non-alignment, but diversification.
That means multiple partners to:
- hedge vs unreliability of any one
- not be over-dependent on any one
- exploit multiple options

11/ Some hv said there's been no meaningful change in US-India rels. Perhaps they're unaware or comparing to US-UK/US-Japan, but if you see where 🇮🇳🇺🇸 were 5, 10, 15, 20 yrs ago (or even 3 yrs ago; see below), u’ll see major difference. Successive GoIs hv doubled down on the US

12/ So, this is not abt “non-alignment” (we’re past that) or “alliance” (not on the table in the trad NATO sense + India doesn’t want one), but about terms & extent of alignment w/ the US.

This alignment won’t be exclusive, but most of 🇮🇳’s other options are 🇺🇸 allies/partners.

13/ Finally, unsolicited advice for American officials & analysts: if u want further alignment w/ India, show responsiveness & support, but don’t try to push 🇮🇳 into a decision or let them think ur taking advantage of 🇨🇳 situation

That’ll be unhelpful, if not counterproductive.