TRAGIC LESSONS: A THREAD ON TASK FORCE SMITH
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70 years ago today, Task Force Smith was overrun by North Korean Forces. Let’s explore that event a little more closely.
70 years ago today, Task Force Smith was overrun by North Korean Forces. Let’s explore that event a little more closely.
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Throughout the Army “Task Force Smith” has become both a cautionary tale against complacency and shorthand for a lack of preparation for combat.
Throughout the Army “Task Force Smith” has become both a cautionary tale against complacency and shorthand for a lack of preparation for combat.
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“No More Task Force Smiths!” goes the warning cry; an admonition against complacent leadership.
“No More Task Force Smiths!” goes the warning cry; an admonition against complacent leadership.
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But what's the real story? Why was such a small force committed to such a large North Korean force? Why was FECOM (Far East Command) caught so off guard? We’re so glad you asked.
But what's the real story? Why was such a small force committed to such a large North Korean force? Why was FECOM (Far East Command) caught so off guard? We’re so glad you asked.
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Clearly, we had to downsize the Army’s presence in the Pacific. Clearly, we had to prioritize military resources in Europe, where the Soviet Union sought to expand its influence.
Clearly, we had to downsize the Army’s presence in the Pacific. Clearly, we had to prioritize military resources in Europe, where the Soviet Union sought to expand its influence.
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But Truman cut too deep in the Pacific.
But Truman cut too deep in the Pacific.
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General Douglas MacArthur, CINFE (Commander-in-Chief Far East), protested and pleaded for more troops and more money with which to train and equip them. But Truman wouldn’t hear it.
General Douglas MacArthur, CINFE (Commander-in-Chief Far East), protested and pleaded for more troops and more money with which to train and equip them. But Truman wouldn’t hear it.
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From 1947 - 1950 Far East Command was effectively rendered unable to fight. Troop strength was cut in half. What remained was cut by a third.
[pic = Truman + MacArthur]
From 1947 - 1950 Far East Command was effectively rendered unable to fight. Troop strength was cut in half. What remained was cut by a third.
[pic = Truman + MacArthur]
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Forget on-time services and motor pool stabilization: There was not enough equipment to fight and there were not enough people to keep that equipment serviceable. Many units just gave up trying.
Forget on-time services and motor pool stabilization: There was not enough equipment to fight and there were not enough people to keep that equipment serviceable. Many units just gave up trying.
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So at dawn on Sunday, 25 June 1950, when the North Korean Army (NKPA - North Korean People’s Army) crashed through the 38th Parallel into democratic South Korea behind artillery fire launching the Korean War, there wasn’t a heck of a lot MacArthur could do.
So at dawn on Sunday, 25 June 1950, when the North Korean Army (NKPA - North Korean People’s Army) crashed through the 38th Parallel into democratic South Korea behind artillery fire launching the Korean War, there wasn’t a heck of a lot MacArthur could do.
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The ROK Army fought with the equipment they had, but the @USArmy and the @DeptofDefense were unprepared.
The ROK Army fought with the equipment they had, but the @USArmy and the @DeptofDefense were unprepared.
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In the early days of the war, the NKPA seized the South Korean capital of Seoul, and was making its way south in a bid to take over the entire country.
In the early days of the war, the NKPA seized the South Korean capital of Seoul, and was making its way south in a bid to take over the entire country.
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MacArthur knew he had no large ground force established in Korea & not enough cargo planes in the region to quickly transport a large ground force to the fight. So he decided to make one.
MacArthur knew he had no large ground force established in Korea & not enough cargo planes in the region to quickly transport a large ground force to the fight. So he decided to make one.
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The best MacArthur and @EighthArmyKorea’s General Walton Walker could come up with was a delaying force to contact the enemy until the 24th Inf Div could come in from Japan by sea via the port of Pusan.
The best MacArthur and @EighthArmyKorea’s General Walton Walker could come up with was a delaying force to contact the enemy until the 24th Inf Div could come in from Japan by sea via the port of Pusan.
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They sent in ~ 400 soldiers led by 34-year-old WWII-vet Lieutenant Colonel Charles B Smith: ~ half of Smith’s 1 Battalion, 21 Infantry Reg + some artillery. No tanks. No forward air controllers. No combat engineers. No air defense. Not even recon platoons.
They sent in ~ 400 soldiers led by 34-year-old WWII-vet Lieutenant Colonel Charles B Smith: ~ half of Smith’s 1 Battalion, 21 Infantry Reg + some artillery. No tanks. No forward air controllers. No combat engineers. No air defense. Not even recon platoons.
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Most importantly, not nearly enough force to slow down the NKPA. This force, Task Force Smith, was to be the American combat unit to meet the enemy in the Korean War.
Most importantly, not nearly enough force to slow down the NKPA. This force, Task Force Smith, was to be the American combat unit to meet the enemy in the Korean War.
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Now, the odds were REALLY stacked against TF Smith. They did not have full platoons due to manpower shortages.
Now, the odds were REALLY stacked against TF Smith. They did not have full platoons due to manpower shortages.
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Much of TF Smith’s equipment didn’t work; in Japan they were never able to maintain most of the trucks because they didn’t have enough mechanics or enough $$$ for parts.
Much of TF Smith’s equipment didn’t work; in Japan they were never able to maintain most of the trucks because they didn’t have enough mechanics or enough $$$ for parts.
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TF Smith was mostly 18 - 20-year-old draftees who did not fight in WWII and were never trained in realistic combat scenarios.
TF Smith was mostly 18 - 20-year-old draftees who did not fight in WWII and were never trained in realistic combat scenarios.
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TF Smith would basically have to do the best it could and stop the North Koreans as far from Pusan as possible to give the 24th In Div enough time to get set in theater w/ combat power.
TF Smith would basically have to do the best it could and stop the North Koreans as far from Pusan as possible to give the 24th In Div enough time to get set in theater w/ combat power.
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MacArthur and Walker hoped that if the ROK units saw TF Smith stand and fight against a MUCH larger NKPA force in Osan, their ROK counterparts would be so inspired that they would rally and hold off their North Korean adversaries.
MacArthur and Walker hoped that if the ROK units saw TF Smith stand and fight against a MUCH larger NKPA force in Osan, their ROK counterparts would be so inspired that they would rally and hold off their North Korean adversaries.
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Task Force Smith assembled and moved out really, really quickly. The unit had never trained or prepared to move out on such short notice and in the chaotic hustle, the men left a lot of necessary combat equipment in Japan.
Task Force Smith assembled and moved out really, really quickly. The unit had never trained or prepared to move out on such short notice and in the chaotic hustle, the men left a lot of necessary combat equipment in Japan.
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They got into ships in Japan and headed for South Korea.
They got into ships in Japan and headed for South Korea.
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TF Smith arrived in the port of Pusan on the morning of July 1. The next morning, July 2, the men arrived in Taejon, S. Korea by train.
TF Smith arrived in the port of Pusan on the morning of July 1. The next morning, July 2, the men arrived in Taejon, S. Korea by train.
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MacArthur could only monitor.....and hope.
MacArthur could only monitor.....and hope.
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On July 4, Charles Smith set up his command post in Pyeongtaek, some 15 miles southeast of Osan, with a plan to develop a defensive position in Osan the next day and wait there for the enemy.
On July 4, Charles Smith set up his command post in Pyeongtaek, some 15 miles southeast of Osan, with a plan to develop a defensive position in Osan the next day and wait there for the enemy.
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In the early, early morning of July 5, Task Force Smith moved out of Pyeongtaek in dozens of trucks in blackout condition in a pouring rain, reaching their position at 3 a.m. By daylight, TF Smith was dug in.
In the early, early morning of July 5, Task Force Smith moved out of Pyeongtaek in dozens of trucks in blackout condition in a pouring rain, reaching their position at 3 a.m. By daylight, TF Smith was dug in.
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Smith and his men did not have to wait long for the enemy. At around 7:30 a.m. observers spotted eight Soviet-made T-34 tanks of the NKPA’s 107th Tank Regiment rolling directly toward them.
Smith and his men did not have to wait long for the enemy. At around 7:30 a.m. observers spotted eight Soviet-made T-34 tanks of the NKPA’s 107th Tank Regiment rolling directly toward them.
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By 8:30 AM, Smith’s tiny force was as isolated and outnumbered as the Texians at the Alamo.
By 8:30 AM, Smith’s tiny force was as isolated and outnumbered as the Texians at the Alamo.
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2 regiments of the NKPA’s 4th Inf. Div., supported by a tank regiment—some 5,000 well-trained, well-resourced soldiers and three dozen tanks - closed with the tiny tankless Task Force.
2 regiments of the NKPA’s 4th Inf. Div., supported by a tank regiment—some 5,000 well-trained, well-resourced soldiers and three dozen tanks - closed with the tiny tankless Task Force.
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The @USArmy had no anti-tank mines in Korea, & in the rush to get to the fight, TF Smith brought none with them from Japan.
The @USArmy had no anti-tank mines in Korea, & in the rush to get to the fight, TF Smith brought none with them from Japan.
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The T-34s soon opened fire on the Americans with their turret-mounted 85mm guns and 7.62 machine guns. The North Koreans melted through TF Smith’s initial defense.
The T-34s soon opened fire on the Americans with their turret-mounted 85mm guns and 7.62 machine guns. The North Koreans melted through TF Smith’s initial defense.
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19 year old Kenny Shadrick from Harlan County, Kentucky, a member of the bazooka team, was the first American Soldier killed in the Korean War.
19 year old Kenny Shadrick from Harlan County, Kentucky, a member of the bazooka team, was the first American Soldier killed in the Korean War.
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For much of the early afternoon, TF Smith held valiantly. Despite all the odds stacked against them, they actually delayed the North Koreans for a few hours.
For much of the early afternoon, TF Smith held valiantly. Despite all the odds stacked against them, they actually delayed the North Koreans for a few hours.
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By 2:30 PM, TF Smith was basically completely defenseless. The men had no comms (NKPA tanks cut the comms wires).
By 2:30 PM, TF Smith was basically completely defenseless. The men had no comms (NKPA tanks cut the comms wires).
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Large numbers of the enemy were now on both flanks and moving toward their rear; a huge enemy reserve waited in front of them.
Large numbers of the enemy were now on both flanks and moving toward their rear; a huge enemy reserve waited in front of them.
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Most of their limited amount of ammunition was gone.
Most of their limited amount of ammunition was gone.
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There were no reinforcements anywhere around to help.
There were no reinforcements anywhere around to help.
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Pouring rain prevented friendly air from arriving at the scene.
Pouring rain prevented friendly air from arriving at the scene.
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Charles Smith did the only thing he could: ordered a retreat. [blue line on map]
Charles Smith did the only thing he could: ordered a retreat. [blue line on map]
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The retreat quickly broke down into a confused and disorganized rout. With virtually no comms, the retreat order was passed by shouts. Things became chaotic and most of the TF wasn’t sure what was happening or where to go.
The retreat quickly broke down into a confused and disorganized rout. With virtually no comms, the retreat order was passed by shouts. Things became chaotic and most of the TF wasn’t sure what was happening or where to go.
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Task Force Smith suffered its highest casualties during this withdrawal as its soldiers were most exposed to enemy fire.
Task Force Smith suffered its highest casualties during this withdrawal as its soldiers were most exposed to enemy fire.
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Most equipment was left in place by retreating American Soldiers, to be captured by North Koreans.
Most equipment was left in place by retreating American Soldiers, to be captured by North Koreans.
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It was the first American battle of the Korean War and it was a humiliating defeat.
It was the first American battle of the Korean War and it was a humiliating defeat.
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TF Smith lost 60 dead, 21 wounded and 82 captured. ~ 40% of the TF was a casualty in the fight. Most of the equipment was destroyed or captured by North Koreans.
TF Smith lost 60 dead, 21 wounded and 82 captured. ~ 40% of the TF was a casualty in the fight. Most of the equipment was destroyed or captured by North Koreans.
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So, what does it all mean? What is the real moral of Task Force Smith?
So, what does it all mean? What is the real moral of Task Force Smith?
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Certainly there is a lesson in there about the inability to predict when and where the next war will begin. Truman hedged his bets that North Korea would not attack the South and did not allocate enough men and materiel there.
Certainly there is a lesson in there about the inability to predict when and where the next war will begin. Truman hedged his bets that North Korea would not attack the South and did not allocate enough men and materiel there.
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There’s a lesson about the need to train in realistic, tough, combat-focused scenarios and environments.
There’s a lesson about the need to train in realistic, tough, combat-focused scenarios and environments.
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However, the most important lesson is the most complicated: Army leaders must scan the global environment for gaps and opportunities for our enemies. The truth is, we should have known North Korean was going to attack.
However, the most important lesson is the most complicated: Army leaders must scan the global environment for gaps and opportunities for our enemies. The truth is, we should have known North Korean was going to attack.
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The South Korean defenses were practically BEGGING to be attacked.
The South Korean defenses were practically BEGGING to be attacked.
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Army analysts were wrong because they were not paying attention to global trends. The cost of erroneous environmental scanning and prognosticating is potentially catastrophic.
Army analysts were wrong because they were not paying attention to global trends. The cost of erroneous environmental scanning and prognosticating is potentially catastrophic.
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There’s another important message in here about the role journalists play in combat. We know much of what we know about the story we just told because the NY Herald Tribune’s Marguerite Higgins bravely traveled w/ TF Smith & masterfully reported on this event.
There’s another important message in here about the role journalists play in combat. We know much of what we know about the story we just told because the NY Herald Tribune’s Marguerite Higgins bravely traveled w/ TF Smith & masterfully reported on this event.
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Independent combat correspondence is important for the country. It’s also important for our understanding and for the development of lessons learned.
Independent combat correspondence is important for the country. It’s also important for our understanding and for the development of lessons learned.
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Also, sometimes when the history of TF Smith is recounted, the wrong story is told.
Also, sometimes when the history of TF Smith is recounted, the wrong story is told.
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Some books on this subject focus on a gutsy, under-equipped, undermanned force that valiantly held off a larger North Korean force. That is true but can paper over the more important conclusion.
Some books on this subject focus on a gutsy, under-equipped, undermanned force that valiantly held off a larger North Korean force. That is true but can paper over the more important conclusion.
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Leaders failed the men of Task Force Smith.
Leaders failed the men of Task Force Smith.
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And while MacArthur and the Army adjusted over the course of the next 4 months and eventually fought to a draw, today's technological advancements (AI, cyber, missiles) may no longer allow such adjustments.
And while MacArthur and the Army adjusted over the course of the next 4 months and eventually fought to a draw, today's technological advancements (AI, cyber, missiles) may no longer allow such adjustments.
END:
The next war’s opening salvo may prove to be the Nation's final if the Army is not prepared.
The next war’s opening salvo may prove to be the Nation's final if the Army is not prepared.
