After two days of intensive patrolling post the unsuccessful attack on 13 Jun, 2 (Para) Madras launched another attack at dawn.
This time the assaulting companies were supported by more firepower, as a section of Patiala Mountain Battery was in support. Two ..
.. more of the battalion mortars moved up, thus making a total of four mortars. The op was to be carried out in two phases.
In the first phase, Ridge 'A' was to be captured, with 'C' Company advancing from the left flank & 'D' Company from the right.
In the..
.. second phase, attack was to be launched on Ridge 'B' from Ridge 'A', which was to be the firm base.
Preliminary to the attack, 'C' & 'D' Companies had moved into the jungle previous night. 'B' Company moved up & established itself in area Milestone 13 ..
.. to act as a firm base for first phase. Tactical HQ of the Battalion was also established there.
The mountain guns were in area Milestone 10. Targets had been registered the previous evening.
At 0430Hr, 'C' & 'D' Companies crossed their start lines.
Simultaneously, the guns too started blazing.
Under cover of arty & mortar fire, the troops advanced towards their objectives.
At the outset the enemy was taken by surprise when he saw the Madrasis climbing on to his feature from either flank.
But he soon rallied & subjected the Madrasis to a withering fire. There were innumerable bunkers right along the ridges. Such was ..
.. the terrific fire encountered by the Madrasis that it appeared as if there was an MMG in every alternate bunker. The fire was first directed on 'C' Company, which was on the left flank & not protected by any cover. The ground was all open.
'D' Company had, however, the advantage of having a covered approach right upto 225m of the enemy.
In spite of the lack of a covered approach, 'C' Company pushed over a few more metres, when to their surprise & consternation MMGs opened up from the ..
.. wooded hills on the left flank.
By this time 'D' Company, which was on the right flank, emerged out of the covered approach when it was heavily fired upon from Ridge 'B'. The front was covered by enemy MMGs from top of Ridge 'A'.
In this predicament ..
.. when the two forward companies were subjected to a withering fire & couldn't move ahead, the guns & mortars came to their rescue. They plastered the enemy held ridges, and scored direct hits on the bunkers.
In panic, some of the hostiles left ..
.. their bunkers & fled. Reinforcements were, however rushed from reverse slopes of the ridges. The bunkers were re-occupied & the enemy resumed heavy fire of MMGs.
Emboldened by the temporary success in evicting the enemy from his bunkers, the ..
.. assaulting troops made a bold bid to capture the positions. They succeeded in edging their way to within 45m from the top of the ridge. These last 45m were the most difficult because the climb became very steep abruptly.
In spite of their best ..
.. efforts the Madrasis failed to storm the heights & were compelled to withdraw to Uri.
Gen Thimayya's strenuous efforts thus met with only limited success, and Domel remained out of his reach. His right hook was blocked after Pandu; his left hook ..
..failed at Haji Pir, and his central thrust along the road also made little headway.
But the capture of Chhota Kazinag, Pandu, Pir Kanthi and Ledi Gali were brilliant achievements, and posed a considerable threat to the enemy.
Meanwhile in TIithwal, not content to remain on the defensive, 163 Infantry Brigade made a bold bid to liquidate opposition in the area of Kir Kalsi Ridge.
Two enemy companies were reported to be dug in in Mussargutte Ridge, with forward defended ..
.. localities extending to places opposite Mir Kalsi.
Approx five 3-inch mortars were also located in this area. Ridges Jabri, Pirhian & Kanur were also reported to be held by enemy. Some parties of enemy were still lurking North of the Kishenganga River ..
.. in area Pt. 9444 & Balgiran.
Brig Harbakhsh Singh, therefore, decided to reconnoitre in force Pt.7902, Mussargutte, Naoseri & ridges West of Khole, & destroy any enemy encountered.
As planned, 3 Royal Garhwal Rifles arrived at Pir Saheba at 1200Hr.
At 2030Hr, they moved forward to their objective, with 'A' Company leading, followed by Battalion Tactical HQ & 'B' & 'C' Companies bringing up the rear.
The plan was to establish a firm base with Tactical HQ & 'A' Company at Takia Seru ..
.. if no opposition was encountered and to let 'B' & 'C' Companies to pass thru and exploit to Pt. 8754, Pt. 7902 & Mussargutte.
The route to be followed was via Nara & Pt. 4400.
After a very difficult & steep climb, the Garhwalis arrived at Takia Seru at 0415Hr.
The enemy sentry challenged the leading scout, and was killed. The Garhwalis then hurled grenades into the houses in which one enemy platoon was sleeping. The grenades ..
.. and small arms fire took a heavy toll - 20 hostiles were killed & two captured. Of the latter, one died later of his wounds.
Hardly had the enemy opposition in Takia Seru been liquidated that the forward Garhwali company came under heavy MMG and LMG fire from enemy who had taken up strong positions at Pt.8754, Pt. 7902 & Mussargutte.
At the same time the Sikh position was ..
.. subjected to heavy concentration of gun & mortar fire.
The forward Garhwali company charged & drove the enemy out of Bani.
Piles of arms & ammo found in one house indicated Bani to be the enemy's company HQ. The hostiles rallied & counter-attacked ..
.. three times, but failed to recapture Bani.
But on account of the prolonged struggle, ammo carried by the Garhwalis was soon exhausted. Replenishment was not possible as the porters carrying reserve ammo had run away, leaving their load far behind.
The forward company was, therefore, ordered to withdraw to base, lay-back positions being formed by 'C' Company. It was a difficult task, especially to remove own casualties.
But in spite of enemy's efforts to cut off withdrawal by shelling and ..
.. mortaring, the task was accomplished.
The Garhwalis returned to Pir Saheba by 1500Hr.
However, Southern sweep of 161 Infantry Brigade, met with success, with the battalions building up on past progress.
After consolidating the position captured two days ago, 'A' & 'B' Companies 6 RajRif moved forward at 0830Hr. The objectives chosen ..
.. were captured without much opposition by 1000Hr. The enemy had pulled back to his main defensive position at Ledi Gali and Pir Kanthi.
Meanwhile, Sawai Mann Guards too carried on beyond Pt. 10658 and captured the track junction beyond it without much opposition.
Thus all three battalions of 161 Brigade were now facing the enemy positions at Pir Kanthi. The role of 6 RajRif was to pass thru the Gorkhas at Pir Kanthi and launch an attack on enemy positions at Ledi Gali.
Not very far away, 2 (Para) Madras returned to Uri at 1300Hr after their unsuccessful attempt to force the Haji Pir Pass.
In another part of the battlefield, it was an 'interesting' day for Lt Col Sher Jung Thapa, Commander of the besieged Skardu Garrison. The enemy sent a messenger into Skardu under a flag of truce.
It was Sepoy Amar Nath of 5 Jammu & Kashmir Infantry, who had been captured earlier at Parkutta. He carried a letter from Col Shahzada Mata-ul-Mulk, son of Mehtar of Chitral, addressed to Lt Col Sher Jung Thapa.
This is a copy of the letter sent to Skardu Garrison Commander by the enemy.
Source: Official History of 47-48 War, MoD.
Enemy promised good treatment if the garrison surrendered the fort immediately.
Thapa sent the messenger back with a refusal.
Siege of Skardu continued.
The garrison would hold on for another couple of months before surrendering on 14 Aug.
There would be no 'good' treatment to the PoWs as promised earlier.
Lt Col Rajendra Singh selected the Viji Gali route for the advance to Gurez.
The route was unfamiliar, was sure to be difficult, and was impossible for sending supplies. But on the other hand, it would give the Grenadiers the advantage of surprise, and ..
.. it would be weakly held by the enemy.
The locals said that it would be free of snow after 1 June, and they ought to know!
Although there had been heavy snow at the Rajdhani Pass as late as 11 June, it didn't affect the plan.
Lt Col Rajendra Singh named the operation, 'Operation Eraze'.
Maj Gen KS Thimayya, DSO, GOC Sri Div visited Tragbal & discussed the operation ..
.. with Lt Col Rajendra Singh.
At the end of the conference, he set 25 June as the D-Day for the advance. It was accepted that atleast two full strength battalions would be required for the operation.
Another battalion, therefore, had to be sent up to ..
.. join the 1st Indian Grenadiers. 2nd Battalion 4th Prince of Wales' Own Gorkha Rifles (2/4 GR) was chosen for this purpose.
With Dras already gone, offensive ops by 1 Patiala had lost their main purpose. However, it was still desirable to hold the positions ahead of ZojiLa, to facilitate the advance to Dras & Kargil expected later.
So 1 Patiala and platoons of 5 Kashmir Infantry ..
.. maintained their picquets, the forward most of which was about 5km beyond Machhoi, some others being around Gumri & on Pt. 15305 overlooking the ZojiLa.
Brisk patrolling & short, sharp attacks against the Indian picquets continued in June.
But the hostiles were gaining in strength everyday.
About the middle of June, survivors from Dras reported seeing about 500 raiders near Dras & about 300 more near Matayan. They were equipped with 3-inch mortars, MMGs & LMGs, and had ample ammo, which ..
.. they had probably captured at Kargil & Parkutta. Mortars & autos were used freely against 1 Patiala almost everyday.
The attacks of the raiders steadily increased in intensity, although every attack was beaten back with losses.
In a major attack on Gumri on 18 Jun, about 20 raiders were killed & some 30 wounded.
The day brought some cheer to the besieged garrison of Skardu.
2 Tempests of the RIAF came over and attacked Olting & Sondus, which was reported to be the raiders' HQ. Rockets & shells from the 20mm cannons crashed home into the targets, inflicting ..
.. heavy casualties & giving a tremendous fillip to the garrison's morale.
The air attack was again repeated, with the beleaguered defenders of Skardu getting a grand-stand view of the spectacular sight.
Their weariness seemed to disappear, and they manned their posts with renewed confidence.
And the siege of Skardu continued.
With the fall of Kargil & Dras, the entire Northern front of the J&K theatre of ops appeared gravely threatened. The hostiles were menacing Bandipur from Gurez, were hammering at the door of Sind Valley at ZojiLa, and had cut off the main route to Leh.
The long and difficult Manali route as well as air supply being still untried, the garrison of Leh appeared doomed.
The political effects of raiders' looting & burning of Leh & the rich Buddhist monasteries of Ladakh couldn't be exaggerated, and it was ..
..vitally necessary to prevent such a major disaster.
As early as 04 Jun 1948, therefore, Maj Gen Thimayya was instructed to prepare plans for recapturing Dras & Kargil, and for relieving the besieged garrison of Skardu. These instructions were repeated on 15 June.
The general policy of the Govt of India was to stabilize & consolidate areas already liberated, & to try to continue the advance to Muzaffarabad.
But if this advance proved impossible in the circumstances, priority was to be given to the ..
.. recapture of Dras & Kargil & the relief of Skardu, for which plans & additional requirements of troops, if necessary, were to be urgently intimated.
In response, this day in 1948, Gen Thimayya submitted a plan for recapture of Gurez & relief of Skardu.
No details of this plane, codenamed 'Operation Snipe' are available. It appears the plan envisaged an early capture of Gurez followed by an advance across the Burzil Pass & Deosai Plateau to Skardu.
This ambitious plan would have not only ..
.. removed the threat to Bandipur and raised the siege of Skardu, but would also have cut off enemy's line of communication to Kargil, Dras & Leh area.
Alas, no advance to Burzil Pass & beyond was attempted, or even approved by HQ Western Command.
The administrative difficulties of moving &maintaining a large force across that barren & icy region would have been well-nigh insurmountable, and after crossing the Burzil Pass, the operation might not have even had the advantage of surprise.
'A' Company 2/4 GR took over positions at Atthawattu from 'B' Company 1 Indian Grenadiers, as a precursor to advance to Gurez.
By end of May, Poonch Brigade had succeeded in consolidating its position. Stage was now set for 'Operation Gulab' for the link up with 19 Brigade's advance from Rajauri to Thana Mandi & Surankot.
Only weak enemy forces barred the advance of ..
.. 19 Infantry Brigade column from Rajauri to Thana Mandi.
One weak enemy battalion was reported to be on the hills on both sides of the road.
Accordingly, 1 Kumaon Rifles left Rajauri at 0530Hr on 15 Jun as advance guard of the column, which also ..
.. comprised 1/2 Punjab, Troop Central India Horse, Engineers, 5 Mountain Battery, platoon MMG (Mahar), animal transport and porters.
This column successfully reacehd Surankot at 1300Hr on 17 Jun and went into harbour.
At the same time, the column ..
.. advancing from Poonch too had done equally well. On 15 Jun, 1 (Para) Kumaon had started from Poonch to link up with the Rajauri Column. The column reached Potha at 0700Hr on 16Jun.
While advancing further to Surankot, they encountered ..
.. opposition from enemy holding several hill features.
'B' Company advanced & captured Saamkot after a spirited attack. Then 'A' & 'C' Companis advanced & cleared the other hills one by one against minor opposition.
At 0500Hr on 17 Jun, the enemy ..
..started sniping at 'A' & 'B' Company positions.
Even as the troops busied themselves overcoming this new threat, 'D' Company, which was in reserve protecting the Regimental Aid Post & animal base were employed in constructing an 'Airstrip' for RIAF ..
.. Austers to land in order to evacuate casualties. By 1145Hr, the landing strip was ready for the light planes. At 1145Hr, the whole battalion moved to the spring near Samkot, leaving a platoon of 'D' Company & Regimental Aid Post, as an Auster from ..
.. Jammu was expected to land at any time. Supplies were dropped by two Dakotas.
At 1730Hr, an Auster light aircraft piloted by Flying Officer Barty made a landing with consummate skill & daring & evacuated two seriously wounded casualties to Srinagar.
This extraordinary feat saved the wounded soldiers from the terrible prospect of being left behind & falling into the hands of a brutal enemy.
Finally, this day in 1948, own troops were just a day's march short of Mendhar, having secured a hill to the right of it before daylight. They then treid to reach Dharamsal but the enemy had covered all approaches & brought ..
.. MMGs on the high hills overlooking the feature secured by own troops.
Buildup in Gurez continued.
Tactical HQ, 'B' & 'C' Companies of 2/4 GR climbed up to Tragbal.
In addition, Gen Thimayya held another conference at Tragbal to finalise plans & fix all details. 25 Jun was confirmed as 'D' Day for the op.
Plan was for 2/4 GR to attack Charpathar on the left on D Minus 1, in order to pin down the enemy and confirm his suspicion that the attack was coming along the Kanzalwan route. Then, on D Day, 1 Indian Grenadiers were to strike to the right along the Viji Gali track.
Airstrikes were arranged for D Minus 1 and D Day, and were to be available on call during next three days.
Mountain guns, of course, would accompany & support the advance.
Gumri was still recovering from a strong attack a day ago, when the raiders again attacked the forward post, firing 68 mortar bombs at it from 3-inch mortars.
Pony convoys between Zoji La & Gumri were also fired upon, and the line of communication ..
.. was in danger of being intercepted.
In Uri,, after a personal reconnaissance, the commander of 2/3 GR concluded that it would not be possible to launch an attack at Pir Kanthi from the left or centre. Therefore, as a deception plan, a two company attack was launched from the left this morning.
Henceforth, till the final assault on night 27/28 Jun,all movements & activities were concentrated on the left flank.
Meanwhile in the portals of UN, things were moving at a leisurely pace. The 5 member Commission set up in terms of UNSC resolution of 21 Apr consisted of Czechoslovakia (nominated by India), Argentina (nominated by Pakistan), Belgium & Colombia (selected by the ..
.. UNSC) and USA (nominated by the President of UNSC). Though the resolution required it to proceed 'at once' to the Indian Sub Continent, the Commission - UN Commission for India & Pakistan (UNCIP), as it later styled itself - was ..
.. in no haste to commence its labours. Seven weeks lapsed before it made its first move - to summertime Geneva. There, it convened on 15 June, to contemplate the tasks that lay ahead & to familiarize itself with the intricacies of the Kashmir problem.
In the meantime, ground realities in Kashmir had undergone a dramatic transformation. In violation of the 17 Jan resolution, Pakistan had clandestinely sent in her regular army into the State. Both London & Washington were aware of this development.
In Washington, Secretary of State Marshall felt that precipitate action by Pakistan or India prior to the Commission's arrival might jeopardize the chances of its success. He was concerned that the entry of Pakistani troops into Kashmir would have this effect.
The State Department initially thought of drawing Pakistan's (and possibly also India's) attention to the provisions of the Security Council resolution of 17 Jan, but was dissuaded by its British allies from taking this step.
Noel-Baker had regained control over British policy after the temporary setback resulting from the Cabinet's intervention in Mar - Apr.
He had tried hard at the UN to secure a resolution allowing entry of Pak troops into Kashmir but had been ..
.. thwarted by his Cabinet colleagues. Now that Pakistan had gone ahead with the dispatch of troops, he made no move to restrain them. Instead, he urged that the UN Commission should proceed urgently to the subcontinent. The imminent clash between ..
.. the advancing Indian Army & the newly arrived Pakistani regular forces would inevitably expose Pakistan's violation of the 17 January resolution & the Commission's timely arrival could avoid 'further recriminations and discussions in New York or ..
.. elsewhere, which might only aggravate the attitude of the two parties.'
In Britain's view, the Commission's objectives should be to:
'(a) by their presence, to moderate the political effects of any such clash & generally to lower the temperature; and ..
.. (b) to negotiate a ceasefire.'
London was particularly anxious that the Commission be in position before 13 Jun, the date of Mountbatten's departure from India.
In the absence of his restraining influence, London feared that the 'Indians may be ..
.. looking to the last half of June, on the assumption that the Commission will not be upon them until July as a chance for drastic action in Kashmir or elsewhere.'
Hence it objected to the Commission's rendezvous in Geneva, which 'especially at ..
.. this time of the year, is too conducive to leisurely discussion.'
The British failed to persuade the Commission to sacrifice its planned halt in Geneva, where it unhurriedly prepared its rules of procedure and waded through a sea of documents.
Members sought protection against hazards of tropical travel thru a comprehensive course of inoculations against typhus, cholera, diphtheria, small-pox, plague & yellow fever.
Not content to remain on the defensive,enemy in Ledi Gali area launched counter attacks on 2/3 GR positions a night prior.
All of these were beaten back.
Following a deliberate buildup of forces during which own troops destroyed all bridges between Keran & Tithwal were destroyed to prevent the enemy crossing from West of the Kishanganga, enemy became more and more aggressive.
This day, two enemy ..
.. parties of approx 100 each attacked Indian positions across the Kishanganga - Pt. 7229 & Ring Contour - under cover of heavy high explosive & smoke mortar fire. At the same time, enemy heavily mortared Tithwal & directed small arms fire on ..
.. the position at Reali from Chilehana.
This attack was repulsed with the support of arty and mortar fire. The intensity of the attack can be gathered from the fact that, in one and a half hours, the enemy mortars fired 120+ bombs.
Henceforth, the..
.. shelling of Tithwal increased in intensity. Consequently, the Brigade HQ moved behind the Tithwal Ridge to Dringla area.
Patrol clashes would now become almost an everyday affair. Machine gunning & direct shelling with anti tank guns on the Ring Contour picquet from Pt. 9444, and mortaring & shelling of 1 Madras Tactical HQ would continue throughout the next week.
Poonch garrison was now strengthened with the link up force comprising 1 (Para) Kumaon and 1/2 Punjab reached it 24 hours ago.
The threat to security of Poonch was now removed.
Morale of the garrison was high, and although later on the hostiles tightened he ring around Poonch, it didn't dishearten the garrison.
2/4 GR (less two companies that were at Leh & Atthawattu) had completed its concentration for advance to Gurez.
The section of Patiala Mountain Battery had been registering targets since last 24hrs. However, in order to secure surprise, no gun was allowed to ..
.. fire towards Kuljan Gali. Low clouds prevented the RIAF also from taking a hand in these preparations.
24 Jun broke dreary and cold, with fleecy clouds resting on tops of the mountains. A thin drizzle was falling.
Despite this miserable weather ..
.. 'C' Company 2/4 GR started its advance towards Villlage Dand behan at 0410Hr, just as dawn was breaking.
Soon the enemy opened up on it from a ring of positions across the Bodra Nala. But the Gorkhas pushed on & captured the enemy position at ..
.. Dand Behan without difficulty. They suffered only one casualty, and their booty included one rifle, seven bayonets, 1000 rounds of rifle ammo & 18 blankets.
To keep up the momentum of attack, 'C' Company of 1 Indian Grenadiers was then pushed thru the..
..Gorkhas at Dand Behan. It succeeded in advancing another 5km, and captured Charpathar.
The mountain guns kept up an accurate fire to support the advance & knocked out atleast two enemy MMGs. In the afternoon, clouds lifted a little, enabling RIAF Tempests ..
.. to rocket and strafe enemy positions to the right. These airstrikes were delivered with consummate skill & pin point accuracy, particularly against Pt. 12897.
This peak, named Menon Hill, was the tactical key to the Kuljan Gali route along which the ..
.. main attack was to be launched. It was a steep-sided hill commanding a good stretch of the track, and so its early capture was vital to the success of the operation. The only practicable approach to this peak was up the Southern slope, which was ..
.. open to the fire of enemy MMGs on a 3690m high hill now named 'Shete Hill'.
The capture of Shete Hill also was essential before the Grenadiers could advance to Kuljan Gali II. It had been decided, therefore, to capture these hills on D-Day (25 Jun).
Accordingly, 'A' Company of 1 Indian Grenadiers formed up & started moving towards their objective around midnight of 24/25 Jun.
As the Grenadiers started their move, it started raining. The night was pitch dark, & the track incredibly difficult. Footing was slippery on wet rocks, and below the narrow, tortuous track gaped a deep ravine.
But the men pushed on at good pace, went ..
.. past Kuljan Gali I, & assaulted the hill as dawn broke.
Enemy was about a company in strength with MMGs & mortars in support. But he was taken completely by surprise.
A brief struggle, and the vital Menon Peak was in Indian hands, with the raiders fleeing ..
.. East down the snow covered slope.
Shete Hill too was captured without difficulty. 'B' Company of 1 Grenadiers started its advance at 0200Hr under Capt Shete, and was in possession of the hill by 1100Hr.
The defenders were on the run & obviously ..
.. demoralized, so 'D' Company under Capt Hira Singh was at once pushed forward.
The next tactical feature was Ferris Hill, 3610m high. The troops had to plod through 1.5km of soft snow in full view of the enemy. But fortunately, a thick mist blinded ..
.. the defenders, reducing visibiity to a few metres.
By 1600Hr, own troops were on top of Ferris Hill. Then suddenly the mist lifted, & they were subjected to intense MMG fire by the defenders from the Pass area. But the Grenadiers hastily dug in on the hill.
Tactical HQ of the battalion & other companies moved up to the foot of Menon Hill near Kuljan Gali II.
At the same, a company of 2/4 GR climbed up to this point from Atthawattu. Its move had been intended to assist the Grenadiers' attack ..
.. on Shete Hill & Menon Hill, but it found the cliffs extremely steep at many places, and reached the top of the mountain after Shete Hill had been captured. it was then ordered to hold these two hills while the Grenadiers moved ahead.
The night was spent consolidating on the ground gained.
HQ 1 Patiala moved up from Sonamarg to Baltal, & 'B' Company of the battalion was sent ahead to replace men of 5 Kashmir Infantry at Machhoi.]
The raiders had further stepped up their attacks, using innumerable small parties to infiltrate around the ..
.. Patialas' positions & to maintain fire against them with their autos.
In Uri Sector, 'D' Company & Main HQ 2/3 GR were moved to area Village Banj. Further reorganisation took place preliminary to the main attack on Ledi Gali. 'A', 'B' & 'D' Companies were assembled on the spur behind 'C' Company. Battalion HQ platoon ..
..was sent to 'A' & 'C' Companies' positions on the spur.
Battalion Tactical HQ was established on the forward position of 'C' Company.
The commander of 2/3 Gorkha Rifles planned to capture Pir Kanthi by 0500Hr 28 Jun. Arty & mortars were to engage the targets as and when required, on orders of commander 2/3 GR.
The attack went according to plan. The deception plan was a success. The enemy ..
.. continued his normal activities, i.e. sniping & mortaring the left Indian position. He was quite unaware of the real move, and was surprised when the leading platoon of 'D' Company reached about 90m from the objective. Then he opened up with all that he had.
But the unexpected arrival of the Gorkhas had demoralised him, and after a short struggle, the Gorkhas secured and consolidated th objective by 0530Hr.
Own casualties were 11 killed and 51 wounded.
Enemy suffered considerably more casualties.
Two PoWs were captured alive. A large quantity of equipment/stores/ammo were captured.
The enemy, comprising 'A' & 'C' Companies of 3rd Battalion, the Bagh Brigade, two platoons of Reg Pak Army & 100 Pathans had taken up position on a commanding feature, and ..
.. if they had not been taken in by the feint attack they would've put up a stubborn defence.
Luckily, the deception plan worked & the Gorkhas secured the vital feature.
As soon as Pir Kanthi was captured, the Sawai Mann Guards were pushed through ..
.. to capture Ledi Gali, which they did the same day.
Meanwhile at Poonch, encouraged by the increase in the strength of his garrison, Brig Pritam Singh decided to undertake an operation - codenamed 'Shamsher' - for the capture of Toli Pir in order to relieve the enemy pressure on Indian troops at ..
.. Chakothi in Uri area.
A column consisting of 1 (Para) Kumaon, two companies 1 Kashmir Infantry, one company 8 J&K Militia, 3/9 Gorkha Rifles and and section of mountain guns on a pack basis moved out & reached Village Kosaliya at 0500Hr on 26 Jun; the column ..
.. stayed there till 2000Hr & then resumed the advance, with 3/9 GR leading.
The original objective of this column was now changed to Pt. 5015. The leading troops reached Troti Dharamsal at 0100Hr on 27Jun.
Reconnaissance patrols brought the news ..
.. that enemy was in position on Pt. 4910.
Hence a new plan was made by which 3/9 GR were to capture Pt.4910 while 1(Para) Kumaon and elements of 1 Kashmir Infantry would protect the flanks.
The Gorkhas moved out at 0300Hr on 27 June across the Nala to ..
.. make a spirited attack on Pt.4910.
The objective was secured by 0500Hr.
At 0730Hr enemy launched a powerful counter attack.
The Gorkhas repulsed this with support of artillery. The enemy, however, was determined to wrest this vital feature from own boys and launched a formidable attack by a battalion at 1000Hr.
The Gorkhas fought valiantly but were hardpressed. At 1100Hr ..
.. 'C' Company 1 (Para) Kumaon was sent to assist them.
This timely reinforcement, coupled with arty support, enabled the Gorkhas to withdraw to Poonch by 1700Hr.
Enemy pressure on Gumri was increasing by the minute.
A day prior, Lt Col Sukhdev Singh, CO 1 Patiala had informed Gen Thimayya that the long line of communication was likely to be cut unless more troops were sent for the operation.
Within a few hours ..
.. this foreboding was justified, for during the night of 27/28 Jun, the raiders attacked Kangan & tried to burn down a bridge on the road, only 37km from Srinagar. They were dispersed quickly by Indian troops there, but the danger stood revealed.
The Skardu garrison receive supply drops from Tempests, but it was far from adequate.
At 1200Hr on 26 Jun, 1st Indian Grenadiers had both flanking hills dominating Viji Gali. The Pass itself was secured soon thereafter, 'D' Company advancing up the slope to the top.
The Grenadiers had reached the highest point on Viji Gali at 3832 metres.
The cold was intense.A bitingly cold wind howled through the Pass. To add to their misery, it started to snow soon thereafter.
Tactical HQ of the battalion along with 'D' Company ..
.. advanced to Viji Hut, which would provide atleast some token shelter. The men slid and slithered down the steep slope from the Pass & cautiously approached the Hut.
When very near the Hut, 'D' Company found signs that it was still occupied.
Just as ..
.. they were preparing to charge the Hut, one of them saw on the snow a steel helmet which he recognized as belonging to a buddy of his from 'B' Company.
An ugly incident was averted & 'D' Company boys joined 'B' Company who had pushed on after ..
.. capturing Camel Ridge. Soon battalion tactical HQ also reached & took shelter there.
The blizzard continued. The wide, snowy expanse was now dotted with black specks where men & animals had dropped dead in snow. No less than 45 mules were dead in a ..
.. short time. The muleteers, hired from Bandipur, slipped away in twos and threes.
Some were picked up by the enemy, who thus learnt full details of the Grenadiers' predicament.
The night of 26/27 Jun saw them face the full fury of arctic weather ..
.. with two companies in the open & only one blanket between two men.
Huddled together & shivering behind rocky outcrops in the darkness, these men from desert regions of India barely managed to keep their blood circulation going.
Morning brought ..
.. no relief. The Sun as hidden behind clouds & wind continued to pierce thru their sodden clothes.
The outlook was hopeless, but the commander ordered advance to be resumed. 'C' Company from Sausage Hill skirted the Viji meadow & moved North. There ..
.. it came under heavy MMG fire from enemy positions on the ridge above the track to Darikhun Gali.
Caught on low ground in a narrow valley, the men couldn't advance any further. At 1400Hr, 'D' Company was sent forward but it too was pinned down 900m ..
.. ahead by heavy enemy fire.
Situation was getting desperate. Advance was barred by enemy in well sited & commanding positions.
Supplies & rations were already getting low.
No troops could withstand indefinitely the hardships of weather & enemy at that altitude. Something had to be done immediately or the whole battalion would be lost.
But the guns were still at Kuljan Gali II, with mules unable to draw them up.
As a last resort, it was decided to get them hauled up by sheer human labour. 'A' Company, which had just arrived at Viji Gali was ordered to retrace its steps & bring the guns as best as ..
.. it could.
The men patiently trudged back some 10km in the deep snow, reaching the guns around midnight. Two teams of 20 men each were detailed to pull on the ropes tied to the guns.
The night was dark & the track narrow & slippery. Yet the men pushed & pulled the guns through deep snow, climbing up the steep slopes to the Pass & beyond, reaching Viji Hut with their precious cargo at 1600 Hr this day.
The men had gone without shelter, rest or sleep & were completely exhausted, but they'd assured the success of 'Op Eraze'.
Meanwhile, the position at Viji was transformed by another feat of endurance & skill.
On 27 Jun, both 'C' & 'D' Companies were pinned just beyond Viji Gali. As evening fell, enemy started moving up round their right flank, and they had to withdraw to ..
.. Viji Meadow. It was still unsure whether 'A' Company would be able to get the guns up, so Lt Col Rajendra Singh decided upon a bold and desperate maneuvre.
He ordered 'B' Company to outflank the enemy from right by climbing up the high hills to ..
.. the East of Viij Gali. There was no time to lose & 'B' Company started on its arduous march at 2100Hr. They went stumbling and plodding through the snow without guides, with the towering peak of Kisor (4334m) as their beacon.
They climbed up, then went ..
.. down & crossed the Gagan Nala, then climbed again. When near the peak, they turned North, then West again, recrossed the Gagan Nala & climbed up towards Pt. 13295.
At last the Grenadiers' ordeal was over.
The dawn of 28 Jun broke clear & bright, and ..
.. and the men near Viji Hut could see the platoons of 'B' Company dotted about high on the spurs of Kisor & Pt13295.
The enemy saw them too and knew that the game was up. His strong defensive position were completely outflanked & commanded by 'B' Company.
Then began a race for Darukhun Gali & Gurez!
The enemy, however, had a ready-made track to run along, and kept ahead of the pursuit.
At 0900Hr an airstrike was made by the RIAF at Darikhun Gali, which only served to hurry up the fleeing raiders.
At 0930Hr, 'B' Company was on top of Pt. 13295, & by 1200Hr, Tac HQ itself reached Darikhun Gali.
The enemy was even then hurriedly withdrawing from Gures, for at 1335Hr he was observed blowing up the bridge over the Kishenganga.
At 2000Hr, 'A' Company ..
.. under Maj Menon, accompanied by Maj SS Maitra, 2IC of the battalion, left Darikhun Gali & went spinning down the steep & bush-chocked ravine towards Wampor.
Meanwhile, 2/4 GR captured Kanzalwan at about 2030Hr.
Meanwhile in Leh, the confident, long term plans after the reinforcements received a rude shock on 26 Jun when suddenly a body of approx 600 raiders attacked the forward troops near Dumkhar in the Indus Valley.
The attack was supported by heavy fire ..
.. from mortars, MMGs & LMGs.
The few platoons of 2/4 GR faced off the attack with cool courage, and threw it back. At the cost of only one Gorkha casualty, 30 enemy were killed / wounded. Among the killed were two officers, who were described as ..
.. Maj Abdul Hamid & Maj Agha, but it is not clear whether they belonged to the Gilgit Scouts or Pak Army; they were in any case, not part of the ranks of State Force who'd deserted.
In spite of their success, however, troops of 2/4 GR withdrew after ..
.. the battle from Dumkhar to Nurla, a distance of 24km. The raiders pressed forward after them, & sporadic attacks continued in the days following. The raiders were numerically far superior, and ammo stocks at Leh were getting low again.
The officer commanding Leh again signalled HQ Sri Div to send 50,000 rounds of small arms ammo, 500 bombs for 3-inch mortars & one battalion or atleast three companies of troops as reinforcement, as early as possible.
In morning, patrols of 2/4 GR and 1 Indian Grenadiers linked up with each other & exchanged info about capture of Gurez as well as Kanzalwan.
With this 'Op Eraze' was over, and Gurez was once more in Indian hands.
In Uri, Sawai Mann Guards & 2/3 GR spent the day consolidating their newly captured positions in Pir Kanthi & Ledi Gali.
In Poonch - Rajauri sector, the 'Gulab Column' started its return journey to Rajauri. The column comprising 1/2 Punjab, 1(Para) Kumaon & 1 Kumaon Rifles was to advance to Rajauri thru Mendhar-Bhimbar Gali.
The column left Poonch at 10pm under command of Lt Col Dhillon
According to plan, this colmn was to reach Mendhar by 0800Hr this day, but it was not till 1400Hr that they reached.
Main reason for this delay was the narrow track in Panjal Gali,which slowed down the progress of the mules accompanying the column.
Two arty mules, in fact, slipped down a Nala and were lost. After a halt of two, hrs the column resumed the march & by 1900Hr the forward troops of 1/2 Punjab, had reached near Bhimbar Gali.
Skardu garrison received more supplies by air, but it was again far from adequate. They used their ammo sparingly, but even then the stocks were running dangerously low.
In Gurez Sector, Achura was occupied without opposition 24 hrs ago and patrols began to probe up the valley of the Burzil Nala.
A patrol entered Chorwan & collected several boxes of 3-inch & 2-inch mortar ammo, telephone equipment & some other stores left behind by the fleeing enemy. The South bank of Kishanganga was free of the raiders by now, but their bunkers & patrols were ..
.. observed just North of Khapuri, at Dudgai & behind the Habkhatun Hill.
In the Poonch sector, 1/2 Punjab resumed its advance at 0800Hr on 02 July. Anticipating stiff enemy resistance, the column commander had apprised the Brigade Commander at Rajauri of the situation & requested him to detail troops to secure Pt. 4936 ..
.. and Pt. 4956 to open a gate for the column to come via Makot.
The Brigade Commander had ordered a company of 2 RajRif to capture Pt. 4936 & two companies (one each from 2/2 Punjab & 5 Jat) to capture Pt. 4956 by morning of 02 July. The Rajputs ..