1/ Started reading 'Hidden Hand' @HandCcp, which exposes the CCP's influence around the world.
Because this topics is so important to all of us and is something that @alliancecanhk is studying closely, I'll be maintaining this tweet thread throughout my reading
2/ I always wonder whether what I'm reading is made out of date due to events in our post-Covid world. This line from @HandCcp Chapter 2 certainly seems out of date:
"As a rule, the CCP tries not to antagonize too many people at one time"
3/ Also from Chapter 2, this line is more pertinent than ever, thanks to @joannachiu's excellent reporting:
"This principle [of winning over smaller, easily-convinced groups] helps explain the emphasis Beijing places on local councils"
5/ "Some suggested the ambassador sounded as if [Amb. McCallum] were speaking for the government of China rather than defending Canada's position ... Justin Trudeau was forced to sack him"
A Chinese paper declared in a headline that the Canadian ambassador had 'changed sides'
6/ Of course, ACHK is delighted that Amb McCallum has been summoned to testify in front of the CACN...
8/ Of course, @FP_Champagne is famously mute on Beijing's atrocities (though he is very 'concerned'), and can't even say 'Taiwan' in public.
This explains so well how desperately backwards Canada's China policy is, in response to the litany of Beijing's atrocities
9/ Of course, we can't forget that Ontario MPP Michael Chan was declared by CSIS to be a potential threat for being 'under the influence of a foreign government'
10/ Chapter 3 taught me a lot about Power Corp's role as 'the premier gatekeeper of Canada's formal relations with China'
Considering the influence of the Desmarais family on Liberal and Conservative politicians, it's amazing that we aren't even more backwards on China policy
11/ Chapter 4 is terrifying, and describes how beyond the pale many of our European allies are.
But this is also a chapter that would likely need a decent amount of updating in our post-Covid, post-HK crackdown world
12/ Start with Britain: "So entrenched are the CCP's influence networks among British elites that Britain has passed the point of no return, and any attempt to extricate itself from Beijing's orbit would probably fail"
13/ I would have thought the same thing pre-Covid / HK crackdown. But this seems to no longer be the case.
If anything, (1) Boris Johnson getting Covid + (2) Brexit = a robust rethink of UK-China relations: from Huawei to Hong Kong
14/ Italy is more of an unknown to me. Despite highly pro-Beijing officials like Michele Geraci writing that "China is the answer to all of Italy's major problems", I really don't know if the Italian view of China has changed since Covid.
15/ The story of France seems sadly like Canada's: A former PM (Raffarin) doing Beijing's bidding all around Paris.
It's Germany that worries me: Beijing has allies in every major party, which may explain how slow they've been at adapting to the new reality.
16/ A common thread is that political elites make a post-politics career lobbying for Beijing: using their political connections against the interests of their nation.
The Trump Administration banned lobbying for foreign governments for all of its employees. Others should follow
17/ I also just caught this timely piece on China-Germany relations:
18/ Chapter 5 explores why subnational governments (cities and states/provinces) are often targets of Beijing's influence: they serve as "useful idiots" that could be leveraged to expert pressure at the federal level
20/ Chapter 6 discusses the insiduous ways that Beijing uses to get foreign companies to do its bidding by censoring themselves and lobbying their governemnts on the behalf of the CCP
Germany is particularly problematic here, but they're not alone.
21/ In the US for example, Ray Dalio and Michael Bloomberg are quintessential examples of businessman sell-outs. As per the book: "Dalio has been shameless in hus cultuvation of political favour"
22/ This point is wrong though: "RMB is the second most used currency for trade"
Excluding China-HK payments, the RMB is nowhere near a global currency - used for fewer global payments than even the humble Canadian dollar. And the RMB's share is not growing.
23/ Chapter 7 describes Beijing's efforts to influence the large overseas Chinese community - particularly by setting up front organizations (ie "unification" groups) and dominating discource about Beijing in Chinese-language media
24/ This includes, of course, state-coordinated harassmenet of overseas Falun Gong practitioners, Uyghurs, and other groups
25/ Unfortuantely the piece about getting allies elected to office in democratic nations misses some notable Canadian examples. Michael Chan comes to mind:
26/ Chapter 8 discusses espionage. The CCP recruits foreign spies through sex, money, blackmail, and more.
MI5 even issued a warning: "be especially alert for flattery and over-generous hospitality ... the aim of these tactics is to create a debt of obligation"
27/ Just look at how many prominent Western academics have been under fire lately for smuggling technology, not disclosing funding received from China, and other allegations - often related to the "thousand talents program"
"The fact that the CCP has been using these platforms while simultaneously blocking them in China is another example of how it exploits the openness of democracies"
Kudos to @TwitterSupport other platforms for slowing awakening to the problem
And exploits western papers' financial difficulties by having them to run paid-propaganda pieces, such as China Watch - though some are pushing back: theguardian.com/media/2020/apr…
34/ More insidious is the covert influence that Beijing has on English-language coverage
35/ Chapter 10 describes the CCP’s efforts to monopolize all Chinese culture – including outside its borders
As we Canadians know, “Vancouver has been a hotbed of united front activity” – including during the establishment of @ccmuseumbc, which whitewashes Chinese history
36/ @ShenYun dances have been targeted, though often unsuccessfully. In Canada, Falun Gong practitioners have been turned away at events
38/ Chapter 11 explores how so many think tanks, including the @BrookingsInst🇺🇸 and @ChathamHouse🇬🇧, are funded by CCP organs (incl Huawei) and run by “friends of China”
Beijing has “neutralized or captured substantial parts of think tanks” and has set up its own, like @icasDC
39/ Opinion leaders like Jeffrey Sachs have parroted Beijing's language on the Belt and Road, and have close ties with CCP organs like Huawei.
He was mauled on Twitter (@JeffDSachs) and abandoned his account (good riddance)
40/ Chapter 12 dives into the CCP’s co-opting of Western universities. Everyone knows about Confucius Institutes, which fortunately have been rapidly closing. @athenaiinst has done some great advocacy to end CIs in the US
41/ CIs’ United Front work and interference with academic freedom / freedom of expression have been well-documented (cbc.ca/news/canada/ne…) - less known are their illegal hiring practices.
42/ CSSAs are often directly funded by Chinese embassies and are mobilized to demonstrate ‘patriotic support.’ They have harassed students like @chemilhamoooo, who has braved death and rape threats. Separately, @McMasterU was forced to disband its CSSA
43/ Western universities are overly financially dependent on Chinese international students – The University of Illinois @Illinois_Alma actually took out insurance against a decline in Chinese enrollments
44/ This pressure encourages schools to toe the party line – ie by cancelling events by the Dalai Lama or Tibetan activists. Unfortunately, universities are insufficiently committed to defend academic freedom
This is particularly the case when schools establish campuses in China
45/ “Western university executives knowingly agree to sacrifice the principle of academic freedom.”
The U of Groningen @univgroningen is a rare counterexample. They cancelled a new campus when it was announced that a CCP official must sit on its board
46/ Journals and publications routinely censor themselves by removing articles critical of the CCP – often affecting their global distributions (not just in China).
Fortunately, some are pushing back – including of course, Optimum Publishing @opibooks. Support them! :)
47/ Chapter 13 reflects the CCP’s desire to shape global governments by undermining existing organizations like the UN and setting up its own parallel institutions
Beijing uses its influence to pressure NGOs into removing content and to sideline Taiwanese nationals and diplomats
48/ China's influence in the WHO and the exclusion of Taiwan has had real public health implications during the Covid crisis.
49/ The cooptation of UN organizations matters: Beijing has been able to silence criticism of its human rights records and export its nonsensical definition of “terrorism” to, among other things, silence groups like @UyghurCongress
50/ We all know how about China’s influence in the UN Human Rights Council and about how several specialized UN organizations are head by Chinese nationals.
Unfortunately, this has been exacerbated by an American retreat from multilateralism.
51/ Beijing routinely tries to extend its long arm through Interpol, extrajudicial intimidation, and extradition treaties – which Hong Kongers understand well.
Fortunately, countries are increasingly declining to cooperate with Chinese authorities.
52/ This article from 2017 descrbies how Beijing's goons were allowed to enter the US to pursue Guo Wengui (Miles Kwok) in NYC. Astounding how the @StateDept allowed it back then
54/ The Chinese diaspora has a vital role to play. They are often the biggest targets of CCP disinformation and intimidation, and deserve our protection.
Let’s not fall into the trap of conflating the actions and beliefs of the CCP with those of the Chinese people.
55/ We need to legislate for transparency in lobbying and campaign financing. Tighter campaign finance and foreign interference laws are crucial (@alliancecanhk is advocating for this), and we should better fund academic & media institutions – particularly Chinese language media
56/ All industries must realize the risks of being overly reliant on the Chinese market. “Short-term profit-making exposes them to long-term damage.”
Luckily Covid is making these risks as clear as day.
57/ Finally, the US can’t counter the CCP alone. All Western nations must join the global fight – this means you, @JustinTrudeau@FP_Champagne.
“Democratic nations must unite to protect universal human rights and democratic principles”
58/ An uplifting ending: “Opposition to the CCP’s influence, interference, and intimidation crosses traditional political boundaries … party bosses in Beijing are worried.”
Xi Jinping is uniting the world in opposition to his authoritarianism.
1/ In the final (11th) chapter of aftershock.hk, @sumlokkei discusses covering the Battle of CUHK - which I witnessed myself about one year ago.
The citywide solidarity was breathtaking, and is something which I struggle to put into words.
2/ "Following a call to protect the campus, hundreds of people showed up with resources for protesters. Water, petrol bombs, and other supplies were passed from one hand to another, downhill to the frontline."
3/ Some of us were keeping the police busy in other parts of Hong Kong, so they could not focus their resources on CUHK.
It was absolutely a citywide effort to support the students at CUHK, who became the inspiration for my friends at HKU and other schools.
1/ Canada will ensure that "China’s approach of coercive diplomacy, its arbitrary detention of two Canadian citizens ... is not viewed as a successful tactic" - @JustinTrudeau
2/ What actions? Sanctions against rights violators , an immigration lifeboat for Hong Kongers and Uyghurs, and protecting ourselves from coercive foreign interference.
3/ Credit where credit's due, the latest statements by @JustinTrudeau, @HarjitSajjan, @BobRae48, and others have been wonderful. It's a step in the right direction.
Canada is beginning to grow a spine with respect to China, which is delightful to see.
1/ Beijing sees an opportunity for global hegemony, admist a US that is "less engaged abroad, more divided at home, and uninterested in pandemic management or economic competitiveness"
2/ Doshi reports that Beijing sees Trumpism and Brexit as accelerating the decline of the west:
"Beijing was shocked that the world’s most powerful democracies were withdrawing from the international order they had helped erect."
3/ US failures with Covid have "reinforced preexisting Chinese views on American dysfunction and decline" and have given Beijing convidence to be "less concerned about the implications of its repression in HK and the damage done by its increasingly off-putting public diplomacy."
1/ In an essay for @ForeignAffairs, @HillaryClinton argues that the US must not only invest in military modernization, but also "renew the foundations of its national power" through domestic renewal.
2/ First, she acknowledges that both major parties have "long underappreciated the security implications of economic policies that weakened strategically important industries and sent vital supply chains overseas"
Indeed, Covid has made this painfully clear, as ...
3/ "the pandemic has underscored how much the US relies on China and other countries for vital imports—not just lifesaving medical supplies but also raw materials such as rare-earth minerals and electronic equipment"