The McTague article in the Atlantic on UK state failure read to me more like an introduction to an article on UK state failure ['maybe the UK state has failed, a lot of important people think so'] than an analysis of UK state failure.
It didn't get to the heart of what caused the late lockdown - the interplay between scientists relying on dubious behavioural insight that lockdown tolerance would not last long, and our politicians who could see all around them most governments acting on different advice.
There is now a mini industry trying to identify the effects of the lockdown, on the epidemic and the economy, disentangling luck from policy. My take on it is that we did lock down too late, and paid the price. But there is a debate to be had and recounted.
The piece didn't cover the on the face of it cavalier process management by Johnson in overseeing Cobra [missing the meetings, holidaying, etc], nor the govt's failure to socially distance themselves.
Inferences I have come across on here are that 1) even to the extent we prepared for a pandemic, it was the wrong one, a pandemic with few asymptomatics. 2) preparedness was hampered by focusing on the disruption of a no deal Brexit.
A proper account of why / if we did so badly needs to tell the tale of test and trace. Why the decision was taken to give up so early. Whether there was an alternative. The successive failures [still unfolding] to generate digital technology and and effective manual labour.
Such an account would have key detail about PPE. Storing the wrong PPE. Scrambling to procure new stuff in a hostile environment, seemingly as @JolyonMaugham is uncovering, with scant regard for ethical and technical standards.
The respirators debacle is also surely insightful. The nationalism involved in not participating in the EU scheme. Then lying about it. The weird hubris of commissioning inventing new machines from scratch. Then giving up.
The nature of the Johnson ascension in the context of Brexit does not get a mention. It is a bit boring to harp on about it. But it is indicative of whose interests the Johnson govt might have at heart, and what weight it attaches to expert evidence and truth telling about it.
2 important features of the govt as far as this crisis goes is 1) picking cabinet members for loyalty, not capability, 2) the lack of interest/capability of Johnson himself on policy and his reliance on Cummings.
The second of these was surely brought home by the refusal to sack Cummings over his breach of the lockdown rules, at the time a catastrophic risk to the public health strategy [albeit one that did not crystallize as one might have feared].
An aspect of the UK's peformance is the extent to which social distancing and recognizing the covid19 problem did or did not become politicized.
Relevant here is 1) the small but significant strain of denialism in the Tory party [eg Rees Mogg, physical voting in Parliament], 2) the lockdown 'hawks' pushing back on the lockdown and stimulus program, who [wrongly IMO] think of public health and the economy in conflict..
3) the highly proscribed, technocratic, 'nit-picking' approach by @Keir_Starmer 's opposition initially, 4) whether laissez-fairism was part of the late lockdown decision, 5) whether liberarianism had anything to do with the slow change in the advice on mask wearing.
The most topical aspect of UK state failure [or not] is the decision to release the lockdown early [or was it]. And where this leaves us with the intention to open schools [particularly secondary schools where the evidence of transmission is stronger].
Does this manifest the fact that a significant faction in the govt don't accept the complimentary nature of fighting the virus and the economy, so the lockdown release was to placate them?
In that sense is the 'early' lockdown release a reflection of the fact that we locked down too late, [so it took an economically painful long period of applying a low R to a high case load to reach acceptable numbers]?
The article talks about failures of the civil service, but not really what these were. Nor the fact that the current govt has been at war with it over its senior members tactic of explaining the costs and benefits of Brexit [and its variants] to it.
There is a strain of journalism which doesn't want to taint itself with partisan conclusion drawing. I don't know if this piece falls foul of that. But it leaves the reader with far too much otimism about the real intentions/competence of the govt to address our state failures.
You cannot be optimistic about those intentions after Cummings/Johnson have set about inflicting such harm on business in bringing about and designing Brexit, and told so many porkies about it in the process.
There is a deeper state failure for debate, too. How is it that the political process allowed such people, and such ideas, frankly, to prevail? Combination of first past the post, strong brand incumbency, not fit for purpose selection rules for both major parties.
It may also seem like a technical post script for the non economist, but an aspect of UK state function regarding covid that has worked v well so far is finance ministry - central bank coordination, and the BoE's extraordinary financing of the govt support program.
Contrast with the Euro Area, which has made progress, but does not enjoy the same coordination. There, ideological bias in the North, and fiscal space and the stability and growth pact in the poorer regions, have tilted fiscal policy pro-cyclically.
Fiscal policy, of course, being vital to underpin compliance with the lockdown policy, which would otherwise starve those potentially infected but healthy enough to work.
It's early days to be entirely confident that the BoE's response was either necessary, or, if it was, a success with no future negative consequences. Perhaps we will find out that the BoE buckled, and future monetary policy will be compromised. But I doubt it.
This should be a lesson for the next #indyref, it being proposed by some that they should remain in the monteary union but get fiscal autonomy. But it probably won't be.
As a final point, an element of good state function is the ability to openly to do the euphamistic sandwich feedback exercise. What went well and what could have gone better?
The evidence is not good. Refusal to admit that we locked down too late. Even lying about when we locked down [remember Hancock's remark]. Dissembling about the hospital to care home evacuation. Manipulating the testing process and the data to achieve targets....
...lying about who did or did not in govt break the lockdown rules [Cummings]. Lying [probably] about Cummings' role in the policy formulation process in the early stage of the pandemic. [Observer, not an observer].
Not claiming that this is uniquely British; and I'm not sure whether it's more acute now, or its effects just revealed as more harmful by the stakes being raised by Brexit and the pandemic.
But, as remarked by others, [stressed first, over austerity by @sjwrenlewis ] the benevelent feedback loop between policy-outcomes-analysis and critique-new policy is not working, and this is bad, and is probably killing people.
As pointed out by @brucemcd23 and @cjayanetti another important dimension of UK state performance is the legacy of 'contracting out' state services. Felt in social care failure, and experienced anew with test and trace. [mea culpa as a former fan].
