THREAD. This is an important issue to tackle because I see variations of this argument out there. It basically concedes that the US *does* have the legal right to snapback based on the reading of UNSCR 2231 but that the snapback will be meaningless because Russia will ignore it.
First, procedure matters a great deal because the question of enforcement and legitimacy will have a lot to do with what has happened (or hasn't happened) at the end of the 30-day snapback period. Did the UNSC take a vote on a resolution to ignore a complaint as required by 2231?
In a scenario where no vote is held and the Council is divided on the legitimacy of a US complaint, I think this argument could be valid. But procedure dictates whether that scenario can occur. And due to the "double veto" power of a P5 member, I don't see how it can.
Unless there is a movement to end the P5 veto and blow up the Council, the US holds the cards to force the Council to convene and vote as compelled to do so by UNSCR 2231. Recall the resolution must pass to stop snapback. Boycotting the vote won't help it pass. And US can veto.
So really, after we've unpacked the premise, you are saying that after the UNSC has held a vote, the vote has failed and the snapback has legally occurred, will Russia and/or China openly violated then-restored and binding UNSCRs, including UNSCR 1929?
But couldn't either party violate a binding UNSCR now? Have they in the past? Does their misconduct make a binding UNSCR no longer binding? Indeed, the US and all UN member states will benefit from the restored UNSCRs by having additional legal options to stop such transfers.
Second, there's a more fundamental flaw in this argument: the arms embargo expires in October if the US takes no action. The options before us now are to do nothing and let it expire or to snapback and restore prior UNSCRs.
If we do nothing, Russia and China freely sell arms to Iran claiming 100% international legitimacy. If we do something, Russia and China could try to sell arms I suppose but without 100% international legitimacy. If those are the two choices, why wouldn't we opt for the latter?
Finally, I've written about the merits of snapback beyond the embargo over last few months: it would benefit President Trump and also benefit Biden if he wins (though @ABlinken seems to want China/Russia selling arms to Iran, which is beyond me). fdd.org/in-the-news/20… END
