Update in #TheGambia v Facebook litigation in the US, where @Gambia_MOJ seeks a court order compelling Facebook to disclose various materials re #Myanmar. The Court has allowed another round of briefing, and @Facebook has filed a sur-reply. Here's what's happening. #Rohingya 1/11
Facebook argues that The Gambia’s application under §1782 asks for a subpoena with which Facebook could not lawfully comply. Recall that The Gambia seeks disclosure of posts by Myanmar officials & affiliated groups that FB has removed, plus drafts & private communications. 2/11
Facebook receives 1000s of requests from foreign gov'ts seeking user communications & it relies on the Stored Communications Act (SCA) to process them. FB says The Gambia’s approach would allow foreign gov'ts to obtain information about users w/out any legal process at all. 3/11
Facebook also argues that all of The Gambia’s arguments would erode privacy protections for billions of internet users, based either on the nationality of the user or the party seeking disclosure, or on unrelated decisions by the entity storing the requested communications. 4/11
Importantly, Facebook says it’s working with the #IIMM to disclose materials in a manner consistent with US law, and it began voluntarily producing info to the IIMM last week. It also says that The Gambia can ask the IIMM to share those materials for use in the #ICJ case. 5/11
As I observed previously, The Gambia’s interpretation of the SCA and its exceptions felt ‘strained’ (see
). @Facebook has now taken a more forensic approach to explaining why those interpretations do not stand up in light of case law & plain language. 6/11
I won’t go through all of Facebook’s arguments about statutory interpretation here, but FB’s lawyers pick apart several of The Gambia’s arguments about the limited scope of the SCA and the breadth of its exceptions. On several fronts, these arguments are pretty effective. 7/11
However, Facebook’s response still leaves unclear, in my view, why disclosure of material that was previously posted on FB and viewable by the public, but which was then taken down and is now stored by Facebook, raises privacy concerns. 8/11
FB also argues that SCA exceptions refer to voluntary disclosure & aren't grounds on which the Court could compel disclosure. This arguably misses the point if The Gambia is urging the Court to instruct FB that it could, in fact, disclose material without violating the SCA. 9/11
Finally, it remains unclear why Facebook could not ask the Court, at a minimum, to limit the subpoena to cover the materials it's already providing to the IIMM, or by what SCA interpretation or exception it is making those disclosures. 10/11
The Gambia’s response to Facebook’s latest filing is due *tomorrow*. Stay tuned. -END- #Rohingya#Myanmar#ICJ
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There’s a lot of buzz about announced plans by Australia, Canada, Germany & Netherlands to jointly sue #Afghanistan at the International Court of Justice (@CIJ_ICJ) for alleged violations of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Woman (#CEDAW).
As far as I know, this would mark only the second time that a state has sought to base ICJ jurisdiction on CEDAW art 29. But the @guardian piece about the announcement appears to be a bit mixed up about how this will work. theguardian.com/world/2024/sep…
CEDAW art 29 requires the state bringing a case about a CEDAW dispute to first attempt to settle the dispute by negotiation. If negotiations fail, that state must request ad hoc arbitration (not by the ICJ). This triggers the six-month period referred to in the article.
This @BBCNews piece addresses recent confusion about the term ‘plausibility’ in ICJ decisions: . It mostly gets this right; the ICJ refers formally to plausibility of 'rights’ rather than ‘claims’. But there is some lingering confusion here. 1/8bbc.com/news/articles/…
The article discusses a debate within the UK about whether the ICJ's January order—in which the ICJ found the rights at issue to be plausible AND a real & imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to those rights—meant it was incorrect to refer to a ‘plausible risk of genocide’. 2/8
The article describes this as a debate about whether the ICJ ‘was convinced there was a risk of that happening’. But is THAT really what the debate was about? The January order made it very clear that the ICJ saw a real risk of Genocide Convention violations *going forward*. 3/8
South Africa returns to the #ICJ once again seeking urgent provisional measures against #Israel. The request asks the ICJ to order Israel to immediately withdraw and cease the offensive in Rafah and relinquish control of the Rafah & Kerem Shalom crossings to allow in aid. 1/14
Very strong language: SA describes the #Rafah assault as ‘killing the Palestinian people of Gaza, while Israel is simultaneously starving them, and deliberately denying them humanitarian aid and the basic necessities of life’ (¶19). 2/14
The focus of the request is on how new facts (namely the Rafah assault & shutting down humanitarian aid entry points) amounts to a new urgent risk of irreparable prejudice harm to the rights at issue in the case. 3/14
Re Judge Donoghue's @BBCHARDtalk interview: I realize this won't satisfy many people, but there is a difference between saying (1) that the ICJ did not decide that claims of genocide are plausible (what she said) and (2) that the Court decided that such claims are NOT plausible.
The ICJ did NOT reject South Africa's genocide claims or declare than implausible (this is consistent with Judge Donoghue's remarks). One could instead think about this (i.e., plausibility of the *claim*) as a question the Court did not need to decide in granting interim relief.
What gets lost is that the ICJ found a real & imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to the plausible rights of Palestinians in Gaza. This is forward looking. This can be reasonably construed as a finding that S. Africa established a plausible risk of genocide *going forward*.
Having now had the chance to read the Day 2 transcript in #Nicaragua v #Germany, I think Nicaragua may come up empty at the #ICJ. Not because the law means that Nicaragua’s claims are fundamentally flawed or inadmissible, but because the facts, it appears, are on Germany’s side.
Germany’s argument on prima facie jurisdiction (plus Monetary Gold) was not wholly convincing. The key difference b/w claims based on existence of a serious risk of IHL violations/genocide versus claims requiring prior establishment of violations was too easily brushed aside.
That said, I would not discount Germany’s arguments about Nicaragua’s alleged failure to have established the existence of a dispute prior to bringing the case. This case may (unhelpfully?) demonstrate why the dispute requirement (which I strongly dislike) has some merit.
In response to #SouthAfrica’s request of 6 March 2024 & the deteriorating situation in #Gaza, the #ICJ has modified the provisional measures that it indicated against #Israel on 26 January. Here are some key points and observations on the decision and the separate opinions.🧵1/20
What has the ICJ ordered Israel to do? By unanimous vote, the Court directed Israel to take all necessary and effective measures to ensure unhindered provision at scale of urgently needed aid and basic services, including by increasing the number of land crossing points. 2/20
By 15-1, the Court ordered Israel to ensure that its military does not commit acts which violate the rights of Palestinians in Gaza as a protected group under the Genocide Convention, including by preventing delivery of humanitarian aid. 3/20