Thread by @MikeyKayFilms

1/ I’ve spent nearly a year operating in Afghan. There are major lessons here. Thoughts in this thread:

• The U.S & Partners have been rebuilding Afghan National Security forces (ANSF) for over 15yrs. Everything from ANA (Army), ANP (police) & counter terrorism/narcotics

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https://twitter.com/nytimesworld/status/1302904563549249536

2/ An assessment by U.S/Partners of the ANSF’s ability to take on the Taliban is critical. After 15years of massive costs, lives, time & commitment, there has to be a reality check. Is it possible to train another countries security forces give huge cultural disparities?

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3/ Afghanistan for example comprises tribal entities. So an individual of a certain tribe identifies w/ the customs & judicial processes of their tribe. They don’t identify primarily as an Afghan. So how do you build a sovereign force based on sovereignty?

4/ then there’s corruption that feeds off narcotics production like a cancer. During our initial war planning in 2003, narcotics was a key line of development. The original idea was a force dedicated to destroying the poppy fields. The Taliban use opium to bankroll themselves 4/

5/ and too many local farmers enjoy the significant cash that comes w/ producing opium. Alternate livelihoods was a big theme for Coalition planners. How do you persuade a farmer owner big money to take a pay cut and grow agriculture or embark on textiles? 6/

6/ I’m not sure where we are today? How opium production has been disrupted? I do know it’s why the fertile province of Helmand was so fiercely fought for by the Taliban.

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7/ and what about the long term effects of clandestine operations by the West? The reason you see a highly tuned opium operation today by the Talibs, is due to CIA black ops in the 80s. The CIA funnelled billions through the PAK ISI (Intel) to Mujahideen fighting the Soviets 8/

8/ the CIA’s idea was to give the Muj a heroine producing capability that would a) provide finances and b) get the Soviet soldiers addicted and slowly erode their fighting capability & motivation.

9/ Mujahideen like Hekmatyar then used those skill sets to form resistance groups attacking ISAF and Afghan Govt forces. Then there’s the role of Pakistan. 10/

10/ Pakistan’s covert mission in Afghanistan has in the main been to instal a Pashtun-centred government in Kabul. Which is why the Pakistanis shifted aid to the Taliban in the mid-90s. The PAK/Afghan border is porous, enabling free movement of AQ/IS/anti-ISAF forces. 11/

11/ The U.S has always thought it could play PAK and the ISI, but it cannot. And as such, success in Afghanistan was never really possible. There’s a lot to digest here. @SIGARHQ, and independent assessment authority has captured in great depth and detail some of the issues.

12/ U.S govts coming & going w/ different policy shifts & competence, combined w/ longterm work & billions $$$, makes moving the needle towards western-style democracy unrealistic. It doesn’t mean don’t engage, but set a realistic mission - and that requires an honest assessment.