"The most well-known problem in American public administration stems from the appointment of politically well-connected incompetents to positions of administrative authority. Yet the negative effects of the spoils system are felt all the way down the organizational hierarchy" 1/2
"...the most senior positions are monopolized by individuals who come from outside... As a result, it is much more difficult to recruit talented and ambitious young people to the civil service, because there is no career path from entry-level positions to senior management." 2/2
-- From Joseph Heath, The Machinery of Government.
Westminster systems exhibit greater administrative competence than the US presidential system thanks to its permanent civil service (eg. Permanent secretaries in the UK & Deputy ministers in Canada).
An incoming president makes over 4,000 appointments directly, of which at least 1,000 require Senate approval. In total, common estimates put number of personnel who change during a presidential transition at around 50,000.
A few thoughts...
The lack of a permanent, upper-level civil service in US can be compensated for through independent agencies like the Fed. But in ordinary agencies, new administrations must not only find issue area experts, but appointees with the acumen to navigate the federal bureaucracy.
The big think tanks in DC function, in some measure, as holding pens for would-be senior civil servants and political appointees. They basically get to practice the skills of drafting and communicating policy, managing stakeholders, studying process, etc., until it's their turn.
K Street and the private sector also fill that role to some extent. Thus where the Westminster system has permanent civil servants, the U.S. is forced to rely on a quasi-permanent class of would-be civil servants forced to daylight as wonks, lobbyists, politicos, and executives.
This obviously exposes US public administration to far more rent-seeking, incompetence, and discontinuity between administrations than is necessary much less desirable. Appointees and transition staff aren't beholden to the normal professional ethics of career public servants.
In Westminster systems, the permanent civil service is duty bound to politically neutrality: civil servants are not to engage in partisan opposition to the government, nor in partisan activities in support of the ruling party; ie. neither disloyalty nor *excessive* loyalty.
In Canada, federal civil servants used to be prohibited from political party activism until our Supreme Court ruled that this violated freedom of expression outside of work hours. Yet the ethos remains strong. Deviating from impartiality is a sure fire way to never get promoted.
A strict ethos of political neutrality is a side-effect of having a permanent civil service. It's both codified and a strong norm / convention given the need for trust and continuity across governments of different political parties. Imagine the Hatch Act but on steroids.
The Hatch Act is such a joke in the US context because the senior civil servant and the political appointee are often one and the same person. Likewise, the holding tanks for would-be admin officials are inevitably tinged by ideological bias, whether its CAP or Heritage or AEI.
As a result, the US system has the worst of both worlds. Not only does it forgo the acumen of a permanent civil service to enable new administrations to efficiently execute a policy agenda, it also undermines the ethos of impartiality required for enduring public legitimacy.
This leads to all sorts of confusion in the public discourse. Trump's complaints about the Deep State, for example, seem to imply that a career civil service is a bad thing from the POV of executing his policy agenda. But in a sense this is upside down and backwards.
Trump's agenda was stymied because he *lacked* a permanent, high ranking civil service that knew how to effectively navigate the bureaucracy. Instead, he was forced to rely on his appointees, most of whom are incompetent, or randos from industry or some conservative think tank.
Meanwhile, to the extent that career staff under Trump have behaved in a less-than-impartial fashion, it's because the US *lacks* a true permanent civil service through which a strict ethos of neutrality can be cultivated, both as a norm and via promotions to senior positions.
This is not an endorsement, but I think the "Trump just likes tariffs"-take is missing the forest for the trees.
I think there's a p(=30%) chance that we are instead witnessing the first (albeit somewhat clumsy) phase of a deliberate strategy for controlled de-dollarization.
People will dismiss this as 5D-chessing Trump's economic ignorance, but I've been in or around this world (libertarian-populist fusionism) for over a decade, know many of the relevant thinkers and theories, and have a reasonable track record at interpreting the context clues.
I've had o1 summarize a steel-manned version of what I think might be going on (again, 70% chance I'm totally wrong / I'm right but they hit a political wall):
A steel-manned version of this strategy would argue something like the following:
1) Immediate Shock to the System (Tariffs)
- By imposing universal tariffs, the US intentionally undermines the stability of the dollar as a trade currency and signals that global partners can’t rely on “business as usual.”
- This short-term shock (“raising entropy”) is precisely the point: disruption forces other countries to reduce dollar holdings or consider alternative reserve arrangements, setting the stage for a monetary reset.
- Once international partners start pivoting away from the dollar, the US simultaneously slashes spending and raises tariffs to build fiscal resilience.
- This is meant to head off the classic “fiscal theory of the price level” risk—i.e., that ballooning debt would trigger an inflationary spiral when faith in Treasuries falters.
- By being the first mover, the US can control the pace of de-dollarization and mitigate the risk of a full-on default or hyperinflation event.
3) Future Phase: Capital Flow Controls
- Merely using tariffs might not be enough to pry the world away from entrenched dollar reliance, so the US steps up to more powerful levers: capital flow restrictions, transaction taxes, or “market access charges.”
- That further discourages foreign entities from holding US assets while bolstering domestic funding channels (or pushing the US to self-finance more of its debt).
- Though draconian, these measures accelerate the pivot to a new monetary arrangement by removing the implicit promise that foreigners can freely invest or transact in dollars.
4) Reset to a “Harder” Monetary Standard
- After orchestrating the initial storm, the US reveals a new, more disciplined monetary regime (for instance, a partial gold- or commodity-backed system) or at least a big Bretton Woods–style conference.
- The aim is to restore credibility by showing that, under the new rules, neither Congress nor the Fed can perpetually run deficits or inflate away debt.
- This new system, by design, makes it harder for the US to finance endless military adventures or large domestic deficits through reserve currency status—tying policymakers’ hands in the future.
5) Reindustrialization & Domestic Reset
- As the dollar eventually depreciates once its “exorbitant privilege” fades, US manufacturing becomes far more competitive internationally.
- Lower real wages and cheaper assets (in dollar terms) entice domestic investment in industrial capacity. Over time, that fosters a base of production and skilled labor that the US has struggled to retain in a dollar-dominant environment.
- Yes, US consumers face immediate pain through higher import costs and austerity, but the steel man argument says the country emerges with a more balanced external account and healthier industrial sector.
In short, the “positive spin” is that deliberate chaos now forestalls a worse forced collapse later, and that by preemptively engineering the demise of the dollar standard, the US can steer toward a monetary regime less prone to endless deficits or foreign entanglements—and ultimately emerge with a revitalized industrial base. The next key phase (if tariffs alone fail) would likely be direct controls on foreign capital flows, culminating in an overt reset to a “harder” standard meant to restore confidence post–de-dollarization.
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Me again: To reiterate, I'm not endorsing this strategy or even its internal coherence. This is just an educated guess at the underlying method to the madness, and a potential interpretive framework for understanding the admin's actions going forward (including things like dismantling USAID, etc).
This from @ByrneHobart also underlies my intuition that AI's impact on government will be more fragmenting than centralizing.
Mass production is giving way to mass differentiation, which undercuts the Coasian logic of a uniform regulatory state. thediff.co/archive/data-p…
@ByrneHobart I'm looking forward to the new Richard Langlois book which deals with these themes in the context of 20th century managerialism. As he notes, the second-best logic of vertically integrated managerialism already began unwinding in the 70s. amazon.com/Corporation-Tw…
@ByrneHobart The price system is becoming more important, not less, given growing computational complexity.
AI is a context machine and universal translator. There is no need for a proverbial lingua franca once you can construct faithful maps between different local contexts.
Who's making the GPT-4 teddy bear that will talk with your infant child and teach them a 2nd language? Seems like such an obvious product.
Furby is in for a massive upgrade. The camera in its head will recognize your child's face and send a push notification if it sees something strange. Parents will track learning progress, inject prompts and review transcripts through the app, all for a small monthly subscription.
This is how you build an AI moat. While the cost of inference will continue to fall, the subscription pricing to keep your child's best friend alive will be sticky indeed.
In any scenario where AI leads to super abundance it will be hard not to share in the wealth by accident. Monetary wealth would be a lot less relevant in general. Unless there's a middle-period where you need wealth to buttress the societal effects of sub-superintelligence.
Post-scarcity will never be a thing since many things, like land or social status, are intrinsically scarce. Not everyone can live in the posh part of town, and if they did, it wouldn't be posh anymore. Then there's energy, compute, rare metals, and other bottlenecks.
Whatever you think of the Singularity, we know most people have a poor intuitive grasp of exponential trends.
But with Stable Diffusion and ChatGPT, no one can now deny that deep learning is capable of borderline magic.
It’s crazy to think it’s just getting started.
I got into public policy because I didn’t see anyone else working on the nuts and bolts of futurist statecraft.
Current efforts tend to fall pray to the "horseless carriage" fallacy, as if a new technology will change one big thing but leave everything else the same.