Why is it taking so long for the German government to abandon its failed China policy of 'change through trade'? A thread 1/11
When it comes to the People's Republic of China (henceforth #China), the German government has largely engaged in foreign trade promotion (Außenwirtschaftsförderung) 2/11
In his PhD thesis Norbert Schultes has pointed out that in foreign trade promotion the German government has let the private sector take the lead, which explains the highly corporatist approach 3/11
This makes foreign policy change through legislative means much harder, as the German government has essentially outsourced its foreign policy to the private sector 4/11
Outsourcing foreign policy to the private sector has also meant that corporate propaganda has always loomed large in the German public discourse about China 5/11
To justify trade and investments with an authoritarian China corporate lobbyists have for decades hyped the significance of the Chinese market for Germany’s traditionally export-oriented economy 6/11
I recently discussed this problem with a German media professional. In this conversation it became clear to me that groupthink contributed to this rather unfortunate practice among journalists 8/11
Germany's outdated China policy will only change if politicians and parliamentarians reassert the central role of the state and strengthen both democratic security and industrial policy 9/11
Academics and journalists should play their part by deconstructing both government and corporate propaganda which hypes the significance of China's market for Germany's export-oriented economy 10/11
Last but not least German citizens should take note of the totalitarian turn in Xi's China and demand an end to Germany's failed China policy of 'change through trade' /End
Herr @Ischinger stellt auf Twitter gerne Fragen, die er beantwortet haben möchte. Wenn er aber gefragt wird, soll man seine Position aus Veröffentlichungen rekonstruieren. Schauen wir uns also mal seine Unterstützung für Scholz an & befassen uns dann mit seiner China-Expertise /1
n-tv berichtet zur Maischberger-Runde das @ischinger letzte Woche in 🇨🇳 war, womöglich um @Bundeskanzler Scholz bei der Organisation einer Friedenskonferenz zu 🇺🇦 mit Beteiligung von 🇨🇳 und 🇷🇺 in der 🇨🇭im Juni zu unterstützen /2 n-tv.de/politik/Ischin…
@ischinger @Bundeskanzler Das erklärt jetzt auch, warum @ischinger allergisch auf Kritik reagiert, z.B. wenn man die Eignung Xi Jinpings 🇨🇳 als Friedensvermittler zwischen 🇷🇺 und 🇺🇦 in Frage stellt /3
A @Tagesspiegel report suggests that @Bundeskanzler Scholz still believes in the falsified Steinmeier doctrine of 'Rapprochement through interweaving'. According to this foreign policy paradigm, economic ties with autocracies lead to mutual dependency and stability. A short 🧵/1
In my forthcoming book 'Germany and China: How Entanglement Undermines Freedom, Prosperity, and Security' (2024) I deconstruct the Steinmeier doctrine. This paradigm is let down by mirroring and misunderstandings about the nature of democratisation processes in autocracies /2
As I argue in my book, the Scholz administration may not be able to learn from the mistakes made in Russian policy in time to adequately address the challenges posed by China's Xi regime. Scholz's reported comments confirm my concerns /3
Warum werden in 🇩🇪 ständig solche fragwürdigen Standpunkte zu 🇨🇳 veröffentlicht? Hier wird doch tatsächlich eine aktive Industriepolitik mit Wirtschaftsnationalismus gleichgesetzt. Das Prinzip Hoffnung ("Kooperation") soll es mal wieder richten /1 archive.is/rtkdK
Solche Ratschläge erinnern mich Sandschneiders Buch von 2011. Er argumentierte, dass Europa einfach nur Macht abgeben brauche, um in Zukunft zu gewinnen. Solche Empfehlungen haben m.E. dazu beigetragen, dass Deindustrialisierung in 🇩🇪 und 🇪🇺 einfach hingenommen wurde /2
Egon Bahr fand Sandschneiders Buch seinerzeit übrigens sehr mutig und sprach von "aufregenden Befunden" /3
Wang Jisi's contribution to the CSIS @CSISCBE report "U.S.-China Scholarly Recoupling" is indeed very interesting, especially when we also read the text by Alastair Iain Johnston about risk management in academic cooperation with China. A short 🧵/1
Wang mentions 'increased sensitivities' in the Xi era 'with regard to China studies in areas such as ancient and modern history, CPC history, ethnic relations, religion, social welfare, demography, and culture, not to mention the current political and economic transformation' /2
This point is important when we read Johnston's piece. He rightly criticises Xi's over-securitisation creating obstacles for collaborative 🇺🇸-🇨🇳research. Johnston also makes an interesting remark about different types of risks in academic cooperation with Chinese universities /2
Benjamin Creutzfeldt has written a very problematic opinion editorial for @China_Table. Employing cherry-picked anecdotes about China's alleged openness he uses logical fallacies to make his case for an unconditional 🇩🇪 engagement with 🇨🇳. A short 🧵/1 table.media/en/china/stand…
To support his claim that "the Chinese" still welcome us with open arms, he invokes motives such as a Lunar New Year Festival, pandas, student exchanges, Huawei study tours, and conference invitations. The introduction of 14-day visa free travel to China is also mentioned /2
He then discusses 🇩🇪s strained political relationship with 🇨🇳. He blames (1) strict quarantine requirements during Covid-19; (2) German 'unease' about the authoritarian form of politics in China, and (3) supposedly negative media reporting on the current state of affairs /3
Alpermann @BjoernAlpermann und Schubert @gstuzi sollten sich besser informieren. Sowohl in 🇬🇧 als auch in 🇩🇪 habe ich vor der Gefahr der KPCh für die Wissenschaftsfreiheit gewarnt und Selbstzensur unter Chinawissenschaftlern kritisiert. Ein 🧵 mit konkreten Beispielen /1
Als Mitglied einer Task and Finish Group der Universität Nottingham habe ich 2020-21 an der Umsetzung der UUK guidelines 'Managing risks in Internationalisation: Security related issues' mitgewirkt (s.a. mein Artikel in @APuZ_bpb ) /2 bpb.de/shop/zeitschri…
@APuZ_bpb Als Mitglied der Academic Freedom and Internationalisation Working Group (AFIWG) habe ich am Model Code of Conduct mitgeschrieben () und den CoC bei diversen UUK-Veranstaltungen vorgestellt /3 hrc.sas.ac.uk/sites/default/…