Haenel surprisingly wins German #Bundeswehr assault rifle competition against favorite Heckler&Koch, with its Mk556 AR15-architecture based product. No official confirmation yet but supposedly rifle matches spec and is cheaper than HK offering. Image Hk433 top, Mk556 below.
Haenel has a long history, but faced many changes due to hailing from Suhl, Thuringia in East Germany. Company re-established itself with production locally in 2008, but belongs to the Merkel Group (no relation to the Chancellor), which itself is owned by UAE-based Caracal Int.
A very interesting decision to be sure, with all sorts of ramifications, potentially overall very positive for GER small arms presence. Still, a protest by HK seems at least likely.
Good read here. As TFB notes, the decision is yet to be confirmed and possibly subject to protest. Also, Haenel already delivers the G29/RS9 sniper rifle for German SOF since 2016, so they do have established reputation with the customer. thefirearmblog.com/blog/2020/09/1…
As also noted in comments for above article, Haenel ironically was the company directly responsible for development of the StG44, the OG of assault rifles. This just to put their role in this competition as "underdog" into wider context.
Since the debate is already taking amusing twists and turns, here's another effort to inject facts for information of interested parties. Good review on the CR-223, which is the civilian semi-auto version of the Mk556:
Also, via @AugenGeradeaus now official confirmation from MinDef on selecting Haenel Mk556 as winner. Says parliamentary approval of purchase is hoped for by the end of 2020. Reaffirms HK right to object legally if they wish to do so.
A very good piece in German on what will happen next in this procurement. Key parts: HK protest may delay all steps by months but unlikely to change outcome. Operational evaluation will also take one year before full production order.
Another article emphasizing technological change and making assertions on operational conditions in submarine warfare, that is unfortunately deeply problematic regarding basic research into the topic it features. A quick thread.
Submarines do not feature significant signature optimisation against radar, because radar doesnt work underwater. The writer overstates the limited utility on masts used at periscope depth. Hull shaping in recent years emerged as a response to minimising returns on active sonar.
Magnetic signature optimization is not a recent trend, but has been practiced for decades. It was the primary driver for German post WW2 SSK design using amagnetic steel, with some significant problems for the West German submarine program over poorly spec'ed steel.
One aspect that has surfaced in the Australian submarine debate, which I find somewhat irritating, is the assertion that larger submarines (in this context SSNs) are easier to detect. They're really not. Quite the contrary. 1/7
Generally speaking the first thing engineers want to have more of when incorporating signature reduction measures (in submarines these are mostly acoustic, both for radiating noise and signal returns via active sonar) is real estate, ie size. 2/7
This is because all other requirements being equal you can put in more dampening measures (rafting & other equipment separation for reducing vibrations). In case specifically of nukes it makes fancy stuff like natural circulation easier (the much talked-about reactor pumps). 3/7
"China now is demanding that it pay only Russia's heavily subsidized domestic price for the natural gas, and China will not commit to buying a substantial quantity of such gas every year."
As I mentioned previously: China is in it mostly for China. Russia remains extremely wary of its "partner" for myriads of reasons (economic, military etc). The "partnership" is really not that, and IMO the forces working against developing it into one will persist.
And yes, this IMO was a major driver of Russian tapping DPRK, as someone they are far more comfortable dealing with. For much the same reasons the relationship with Beijing remains "complicated", the one with Pyongyang is far simpler. Which suits both parties.
Australian government just axed substantial parts of the LOTE (life extension) efforts for Collins submarines, while going ahead with the overall program. A few thoughts on the matter. Official statement here. 1/9 minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases…
Key aspects: 1) Government received advice from Defence in consultation with US that adding Tomahawk to Collins is not viable and does not represent money for value.
No details. But torpedo tube launched Tomahawk is currently out of production. 2/9
In order for any production restart to make economic sense AU would have had to sign up for a group buy. Possible partners were RN, which uses tube-launched Tomahawk on Astute, and the Netherlands, who wanted to add capability to Walrus & also use it on Orka successor. 3/9
A few thoughts on the issue of China's new corvette/light frigate sized combatant and what its point is, may be, and pertinently, has been stated to be, going off this article in TWZ.
We do have one image from the yard giving this design an official purpose. Text declares the celebration of the launch of a project for a "comprehensive test platform". The design is partially visible in the graphic (minor differences but its clearly intended to be the same ship)
That issue should make the nature of this effort less mysterious. Now, in the context of PLAN testing of weapons, sensors etc its worth noting the service does operate more bespoke test ships, specifically the Type 909/A/910-series (designation somewhat blurry AFAIK).
Thankfully the actual report by the German audit office is free to read, so I just looked at that instead. Link can be found here (pdf). Bullet points follow, as a comedy in eight acts: 1/ bundesrechnungshof.de/SharedDocs/Dow…
Effort to replace MCM capability by 2027 dates back to 2014. A standing commitment to NATO is to provide 11 boats with improved capability by 2031. Navy estimated original funding requirement at 2.7 bln Euros. 2/
For that cost Navy wanted 11 new, boats capable of long range deployments (current boats designed for Baltic/North Sea), improved C2 for multinational ops, wider USV/UUV integration. Despite all this obviously requiring larger boats, Nayv claimed it did not. 3/