In many US accounts of Operation Market Garden, the Brit Montgomery is the reason for failure. In a certain telling, an overly-ambitious Monty, seeking a power grab after his demotion from control of all Allied forces, sets in motion an operation w/ no chance of success
2 of 10:
In this account, Jim Gavin, the courageous, "lead from the front" commander of the @82ndABNDiv, inspires his men to fight through impossible odds, cross the Waal River & almost salvage the mission. He is an exemplar of combat leadership while Monty is a reviled figure.
3 of 10:
But there's another telling of this history out there, one that has a truth all its own, in which Monty established a bold strike to bring the war to an end & Gavin, an immature division commander, was the cause of failure. So, here is a simplified version of that story
4 of 10:
First of all, Gavin entrusted Roy Lindquist, commander of 508th PIR (& Gavin's least effective combat commander) with perhaps the most complicated portion of "Market": capture of the Njimegen bridge and the security of the Groesbeek heights.
5 of 10:
Some believe that Gavin confused Lindquist by giving him two critical missions without clearly prioritizing either one. Then, after the war, Gavin threw Lindquist under the bus, blaming his subordinate for misunderstanding his intent.
6 of 10:
Gavin, in a fit of indecision, did not prioritize the security of the only bridge not secured before Arnhem (the Njimegen Bridge). Had he done so, the 30 Corps may have zoomed by and made it to Arnhem in time to rescue the British paratroopers.
7 of 10:
Next, the 82nd lands more intact than the 1st British Airborne Division and yet still requires the assistance of Horrock's 30 Corps (the ground force component of OMG).
8 of 10:
According to this argument, Gavin's leadership deserves scrutiny. While he was an exceptional Regimental Commander, at 37 he was not ready to lead a Division. He may not, in fact, have been the great Division Commander many Americans consider him to be.
9 of 10:
That is, essentially, the case against Gavin. This is an incredibly complicated subject, so we're abbreviating things for Twitter. Of course, the Allied troops fought w/ incredible valor given the near-impossible odds and the enemy gets a vote.
FINAL:
Tonight at 7:30 PM Eastern, we'll be back with our American historian via live Periscope to defend Gavin. In the meantime, give us your take using the hashtag #TCAG. What do you think?
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
We can confirm that 120 Soldiers have left the Smoke Bomb Hill barracks, and we are working hard to move ALL Soldiers out of those barracks by the end of September. 1/4
In addition to the relocation efforts, 70 certificates of non-availability (CNAs) have been approved allowing recipients to find privatizing housing on or off the installation. Additionally, hundreds more have been pre-approved and being staffed for final approval. 2/4
Commands affected by these moves on Smoke Bomb Hill include units under the 1st Special Forces Command - Airborne and XVIII Airborne Corps units including the 20th Engineer Brigade and 35th Signal Brigade among other units/organizations across the installation. 3/4
Our Soldiers are speaking to us about the conditions at the Smoke Bomb Hill Barracks. It’s authentic and real feedback we need. We are listening and taking action!
Communication flow is every changing, and we are working to improve it. Our Soldiers deserve it. 🧵
We want all of our Soldiers to know we are working hard to make their quality of life better!
We have leaders across Fort Bragg already working to make their lives better, and we have resources committed to make this happen.
Moving 1,110 Soldiers won’t be quick, it will take time, but it will be done right. Our goal is to have everyone out of the SBH barracks by the end of September.