CHIS = covert human intelligence source legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/…: put simply, an agent who for whatever reason (personal, financial, even patriotic) agrees to help the police, MI5 or others spy on suspected criminals. They are authorised under #RIPAlegislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/… /2
CHIS play a vital role in disrupting terrorism and organised crime. Over the past year, CHIS operations by @metpoliceuk alone are claimed to have led to 3500 arrests, recovery of 100 firearms and 400 other weapons, seizure of 400 kg of Class A drugs, and £2.5m cash. /3
But what happens if a CHIS (e.g. to maintain cover) takes part in the criminality they are supposed to be informing on - by helping a banned terror group, handling stolen goods, supplying drugs - or worse? /4
Under the so-called "James Bond clause", MI6 agents can be authorised to break UK law abroad: legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1994/13/…. But police/spooks pre-authorising people to break UK law in the UK? That sounds different. /5
Last December, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal was divided on the issue of whether MI5 had an implied statutory power to authorise CHIS participation in criminality judiciary.uk/wp-content/upl… /5
The stakes were high - just look how the judgment started. Especially as the power is claimed not just by MI5 (as in that case) but by @HMRCgovuk, @NCA_UK, several other public authorities and every police force in the land. /6
The Government won 3-2, but the case is being appealed and no one could be confident of the result. So the Government has decided to seek Parliament's express authority, in the form of #CHISBill. /7
But Parliament also has a duty to scrutinise this Bill. Here are a few questions that colleagues in @HouseofCommons and then @UKHouseofLords will want to ask. /9
First, are we happy that all these bodies need not only to be able to run CHIS, but to authorise criminality by them? /10
Secondly, are we content that the processes for authorising CHIS to commit crime are sufficiently sound - in every one of these bodies, not just the biggest? The bottom line is self-authorisation with internal safeguards: lots of detail here. assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/upl…. /11
Thirdly, should the Act at least specify types of serious crime that can never be authorised? The Canadian CSIS Act s20(1) canlii.org/en/ca/laws/sta… does (how's it working, @cforcese?) Or would hard limits allow gangs to smoke out CHIS by inviting them to step over the line? /12
Finally, it's great that @IPCOffice will be keeping an eye on the use of these powers - after the event. /14
But should they be entrusted either with prior approval of authorisations (as for some other forms of covert surveillance, such as phone-tapping) legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2016/25/… ... /15
... or at least be notified of authorisations in real-time, so that they can raise the alarm if someone is way out of line? /16
To recap - the principle of this Bill deserves our strong support. But the detail matters, and we need to apply ourselves to it. /17 end
Correction: it’s s20(18) of the Canadian CSIS Act
And another: Commons second reading is Monday 5 October
My independent review of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 is published today. The Act generally works well, but my review examines some specific proposals for change. .gov.uk/government/pub…
A one-page summary of my #IPA2016 review is here. Tl;dr the Act has worked well so far, but an amending Bill should address some specific points and by 2030, technological change will require us to rewrite the vocabulary of surveillance and its oversight. https://t.co/ZmqH05jSpggov.uk/government/pub…
The rule of law is an undefined statutory concept. Lord Keen, who resigned over the “limited and specific” breach of international law in #IMA2021, and I sought clarity from our Law Officers in @HLConstitution https://t.co/aK3jpkk2ZL (0905:45-0920:15)./1Parliamentlive.tv parliamentlive.tv/event/index/5b…
There are well-established international definitions by the CoE Venice Commission and the EU (whose conditionality regulation of 2020 was the subject of a 25-judge ruling recently). So it would not be impossible to arrive at our own definition. /2
But it is clear from the Law Officers’ replies this morning that there is no common view within government, even though differences in relation to the issue of international law may have been pragmatically resolved. /3
I've been looking at the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme, added in its current form to the #NationalSecurityBill on the last day of its passage through the Commons. No html version available yet but it's Part 3 (ss 62-81) of the Bill: bills.parliament.uk/publications/4…. /1
I think I understand why the activities of specified persons (e.g. China, Russia, Iran and entities they control) need to be registered (cll 62-65). Hostile states need careful watching and hopefully this (and the penalties for non-compliance) will help. /2
Less obvious is why ALL governments and ALL bodies incorporated outside the UK should be required to register "political influence activities" including contacting an MP or issuing public communications aimed at influencing UK government decisions (cll 66-70). /3
The long-awaited Ouseley report into closed material proceedings has now been published. tl;dr - CMPs have enabled more cases to be tried, but special advocates need better resources.assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/upl…
Most of the concerns expressed during the passage of the #JSA2013 are found not to have been realised in practice. But there are 20 practical recommendations for improvement of the system. /2
The #NIProtocolBill is here, together with the claimed legal “justification” which is the doctrine of necessity. Sounds thin to me, not to say threadbare. gov.uk/government/new…
In short - necessity rarely excuses a breach, and only when (inter alia) the State’s act is the only way to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril, and when no other essential interest is seriously impaired by the breach: jusmundi.com/en/document/wi…
Useful 🧵 on today’s #CJEU Dwyer judgment - a notorious murder in Ireland that was only solved because location data was routinely saved for 2 yrs in case police needed access in a criminal investigation. /1
This enabled the crime to be pinned on a previously unsuspected architect, whose professional movements over a long period corresponded with those of the incriminating phone. /2
I was an expert witness in the case so will not comment further on a judgment that largely follows #CJEU precedent, whatever you think of it (other approaches are available: see #ECtHR). /3