Amid a big policy push for US semiconductor leadership, we have a new paper on how to strengthen America’s talent advantage in the sector: cset.georgetown.edu/research/the-c…
It includes 7 figures and 8 tables with 📊 on the semi workforce, from 6 sources.
Here are the highlights: [1/x]
First, current US immigration policies are directly at odds with the push to strengthen semiconductor supply chains. You can’t expect firms to move R&D and high-end production to the US while slashing their access to talent, as we argued in WSJ: [2/x] on.wsj.com/2HtGWd0
The square peg of immigration restrictions does not fit into the round hole of semiconductor leadership. For example:
(1) 40% of current US semi workers were born abroad (2) so are ~60% of current grad students (3) US is BY FAR the biggest net importer of int'l talent
[3/x]
The rival that US policymakers are most afraid of—China—acknowledges that workforce shortages hurt its semi industry. As past CSET research also showed (👇), CCP leaders rue the US's ability to attract and retain top Chinese semiconductor talent: [4/x]
To illustrate, consider int'l PhD stay rates from semiconductor-related fields: intention-to-stay rates among Chinese grads were around 90% in 2017 (latest yr w/ data), and been steady since 2011 despite a decade+ of CCP efforts to attract more people back. [5/x]
At the same time, even a small # of returnees could help China advance its industry — as the history of Taiwan's semiconductor success illustrates. So there's real risk there. In the policy section, we discuss several strategies for balancing these risks and benefits. [6/x]
Second, the paper breaks down the semiconductor supply chain to identify high-priority areas for education and research investments. This is important because the semi industry is highly specialized, and different segments involve very different types of tech. [7/x]
To study educational requirements across segments and companies, we use an underexplored detailed dataset of green card holders with detailed degree data. We find EE and CS dominate in design/EDA, but skill reqs are a lot more diverse at fabs and SME companies. [8/x]
This finding implies USG should invest broadly across the physical and computational sciences — as the supply chain evolves, skill needs also change, so a narrow approach is risky. Luckily US unis are strong across all fields. But int'l competition is rapidly increasing. [9/x]
Interestingly, country of origin among green card applicants also different across these different segments: India is the biggest talent source across all four segments, but much more dominant in Design and EDA than at fabs and SME companies. [10/x]
The paper has lots more data, plus recommendations re: how to protect the sector from tech transfer threats, how to educate more Americans to strengthen the sector's talent pipelines, and (pls indulge a personal nerdy favorite) how to improve tech workforce data. [11/x]
Finally, a big thanks to @james_a_lewis@FuDaoge@flaggster73, and especially semiconductor tutor par excellence @KhanSaifM, plus many others not on Twitter, for reviewing the paper! [12/12]
Drawing on forthcoming research, (twitterless) Will Hunt and I argue in @WSJ that two popular policy goals — (1) supply chain security for computer chips, and (2) immigration restrictions — are almost certainly incompatible.
First, why care about chip supply chains? One, DOD worries adversaries could sabotage chips used in US infrastructure and weapons systems — if chips were manufactured here, there'd be more security. It could also create much-needed jobs. [2/x]
For these two reasons, senior policymakers have pushed for more advanced semiconductor foundries to be built in the US. The White House, with some success, is using carrots and sticks to get semiconductor companies on board in that effort. [3/x]
Sen. Cotton says “it’s a scandal to me that we have trained so many of the Chinese Communist Party’s brightest minds to go back to China … .” He’s far from alone in thinking so.
But are Chinese students actually going back to China in large numbers? *a📊data📊thread* [1/x]
First, let’s talk CCP intentions. There can be little debate about it wanting more returnees. But the CCP does not have absolute control. Its officials have long complained that “the number of top talents lost in China ranks first in the world.” [2/x]
When China liberalized study abroad in the 70s/80s, Deng hoped 90% would return. That did not work out, and many plans since then have also failed to hit targets. Yes, the CCP is powerful. But to assess whether it’s achieving its goals, we need to look at actual data. [3/x]
I’m very excited that, after more than half a year of work, we just published our new report: “Keeping Top AI Talent in the United States”
It asks (1) how many int'l AI grad students stay in the US?, and (2) how can the US increase that number?
Here’s what we found. [1/x]
First, we found these questions are actually pretty hard to answer. We did ~9 months of data collection, gathering 2,000 comprehensive career histories of recent US AI PhD grads (& more in the pipeline). We also analyzed four other sources w/ relevant data.
The results hold a lot of good news for the US: retention of top AI grad students is very high, with 90% staying right after graduating and more than 80% still there after five years (when our data coverage ends). [3/x]