1/ FASCINATING MOVE by SEC on whether a trust company qualifies as a bank under its rules. This enforcement action doesn't pertain to #crypto specifically but it applies broadly to the key question--does a trust co qualify as a bank under SEC custody rule? sec.gov/enforce/33-108…
2/ Answer was a resounding "NO" in this case--the trust co didn't qualify for exemptions that apply to banks bc trust co didn't exercise "substantial investment authority." This is a KEY POINT--a trust co that doesn't act as a fiduciary is NOT A BANK under SEC's rules.
3/ This is one of the big reasons why #Wyoming created #SPDI bank charter--bc trust cos are prob not qualified custodians under SEC rules. To be a bank under SEC rules custodian must either (1) take deposits or (2) act as fiduciary. Trust cos can't take deposits (only banks can).
4/ So, to be a qualified custodian, the trust co MUST ACT AS A FIDUCIARY. That's exactly the issue that the SEC raised in this enforcement action against a trust co today. What does it mean to be a fiduciary? Simply put, the trust co must exercise discretion over customer assets.
5/ How many US #crypto custodians that have trust company charters are "exercising discretion over customer assets?" I know of ONLY ONE that meets this standard.
What does this mean for #crypto? It means trust cos that act as custodians in US mkt will need to get bank charters.
6/ Thankfully, #Wyoming's #SPDI charter is available! 🤠 It has been open for applicants for a year now.
7/ This topic has been a fault line in the US #crypto regulatory landscape for a while. If a state-chartered trust co doesn't qualify as a bank under the SEC's rules but is claiming a bank's exemptions as if it were, whose job is it to enforce that-the SEC or the state regulator?
8/ Well today SEC answered that question via enforcement action against a state-chartered trust co. Folks-clearest way to be treated as a bank under SEC's rules is actually to be a bank! Thankfully that option is avail to #crypto industry thx to #Wyoming's SPDI. NOT LEGAL ADVICE!
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1/ CALLING OUT A DOUBLE STANDARD: I chewed on @CampbellJAustin's great🧵about selective enforcement against #crypto while protecting #tradfi, which prompted me to review the FTX fraud. Lo & behold, there seems to be ANOTHER pattern of selective enforcement
2/ The FDIC's Inspector General disclosed that 11 US banks "may have had involvement in alleged wire transfer fraud," & I tweeted the below screenshot of it on February 22, 2023:
1/ I'M STILL THINKING abt the bombshell Silvergate court filing. Here's the Warren crowd's #crypto bank scorecard:
❌Silvergate--suicided
❌Signature--suicided
❌Protego--OCC approval "expired"
〰️Paxos--ditto, but its non-bank is still going
✅ @custodiabank--survived & fighting
2/ Until the court filing, I didn't know the Fed "suicided" Silvergate by forcing it into an untenable choice👇: make #crypto <15% of its deposits (impossible in a short period of time) or throw in the towel. This touched off a bank panic the next day, costing the FDIC ~$40bn.🤦♀️
3/ @BarneyFrank et al made clear at the time that the FDIC "suicided" Signature, but we now know the Fed "suicided" Silvergate too. The timing lines up with the Fed blindsiding @custodiabank with a denial (w/ the White House). It was all coordinated--more than even I realized.
1/ I DUG INTO the Fed's latest master account list, released last night. The big news is what's happening with OCC-chartered trust companies--2 new ones applied for Fed master accounts. This is noteworthy for several reasons, explained below. Data here: federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems…
2/ But first, among the ~430 Fed master account holders that are not FDIC insured (or equivalent), 11 are trust companies chartered by the OCC:
3/ And 4 applicants for new Fed master accounts are OCC-chartered trust companies (of which two were crypto custodians whose applications went inactive amid #OperationChokePoint2.0👇--Paxos "withdrew" in Jan 2024; & Protego's charter approval "expired" in Feb 2023, per the OCC).
🚨 1/ BOMBSHELL REVELATION that Silvergate was liquid & solvent when the Fed forced it to close changes EVERYTHING when analyzing the March 2023 bank failures. Look at the dates:
* Mar 8: Silvergate voluntarily liquidates
* Mar 10: Silicon Valley fails
* Mar 12: Signature fails
2/ Stop & think about that timeline.
Think.
Would Silicon Valley Bank have failed had Silvergate not been forced by the Fed to close just 2 days earlier?
Recall the bank run at Silicon Valley really got started on Mar 9--the day after Silvergate announced it would liquidate.
3/ Reminder: Silvergate cost the FDIC's deposit insurance fund (DIF) nothing.
But the subsequent bank failures cost the FDIC's DIF dearly--Silicon Valley cost it ~$20bn, Signature cost it $2.4bn and First Republic (which failed weeks later, on May 1) cost it $15.6bn.
QUIET PART OUT LOUD: they're rightly worried abt Hong Kong via USD stablecoins becoming a hub for USD clearing that's outside US's reach, while the US dithers. But it's not just HK. Obvious fast path for Milei to dollarize Argentina is via USD stablecoins. ft.com/content/39f101…
2/ 👇But the US (under Sen Warren's control of the Biden Admin's financial svcs policy) is blocking everyone working on regulatory-compliant USD stablecoins, while letting big banks continue to build their own versions.😡 But the world already blew past the walled-garden versions
3/ And Warren has admitted what she's really up to: she wants a retail #CBDC in the US. And since she controls the Biden Administration's financial services policy, the US is heading toward a CBDC as long as Biden remains in power.