I think however that the article might downplay the most important point – the same one faced by every country that has had to adjust after an investment-driven growth “miracle”: while China must eventually rebalance demand away from investment and export dependence, and...
3/8
towards domestic consumption, this cannot happen except as part of a major social and political transformation.
That’s because there is no trick to rebalancing demand in China. It must shift income equal to at least 10-15% of GDP from businesses, rich people and the...
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government to ordinary households, and the longer it takes, the greater the build-up of debt and the concurrent overstatement of GDP.
But no country in history has managed such a shift without undergoing significant – often disruptive – social and political changes.
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That’s why all the exhortations in the world will have no effect. Only major wealth transfers matter, and these require significant political reform or disruptive adjustments.
One minor problem with this article is that it confuses household savings with national...
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savings, for example when it says: “When Chinese households do have cash to spare, they tend to hold on to it. Savings surged to a peak of 52 percent of gross domestic product in 2008 before the financial crisis hit, and still stand at around 45 percent.”
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The problem is not that Chinese tend to hold on to their cash: it is that they receive too small a share of what they produce, whether or not they save it, which is also why the main solution is not, as one analyst cited here claims, to build a better social safety net.
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Improving the social safety net will help, of course, but only because it is one of the ways income can be transferred to ordinary Chinese, but even the best social safety net in the world won’t drive China to more than a fraction of the necessary rebalancing.
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Was import substitution really as much of a failure as Arvind Subramanian, and many others, seem to think? He says that after Raúl Prebisch argued for it in the late 1950s and 1960s, “Many developing countries consequently focused on their...
domestic markets — and fell further behind the west."
But it was really in the 1980s, after the LDC debt crisis, that these countries fell behind – before that the Latin American grew at roughly 5-6% for two decades – and I would...
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say that the unsustainable build-up of a very inverted debt structure in the 1970s had far more to do with the need by international banks to recycle massive petrodollar flows than with anything intrinsic to the import substitution model.
Very interesting thread. Capital Economics says China’s GDP growth has been overstated by roughly 12% in the past five years – a very hefty number – while the San Francisco Fed accepts the numbers in aggregate but says Beijing has been smoothing out the data.
I don’t know enough to say whether either is true, but for me the biggest problem with China’s GDP growth data is that they do not have the same relationship to underlying economic growth that GDP growth data in other countries do, and so it is meaningless to compare...
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Chinese GDP growth with GDP growth elsewhere.
While GDP growth in most countries is a measured output that depends on volatile real economic activity, Chinese GDP is an input into the economic process in which local governments are required to add whatever additional...
In the first few decades of the last century the international settlements in China – in places like Shanghai, Hong Kong and Guangzhou – became important Chinese centers of cultural, intellectual and scientific innovation (including as the... scmp.com/economy/china-…
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birthplace of the CPC), perhaps because they operated within very different legal and political institutions. To a certain extent China’s Special Economic Zones of the 1980s and 1990s may have operated on similar principles.
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I've always wondered – given the obvious political constraints within China – if the country wouldn’t do a better job of encouraging technological, cultural and intellectual innovation by creating similar “innovation zones” with different legal and local-political...
I have no idea whether or not this “all-nation effort” will eventually be successful, but even if it is, until the project begins to produce more value than it costs it will absorb an enormous net amount of real resources – perhaps 1-2% of GDP for...
Those resources have to come from somewhere, either from households in the form of less consumption, from businesses and governments in the form of less investment, or from abroad in the form of a smaller trade surplus.
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It would be best economically for China if the resources could come at the expense of non-productive state-sector investment (or real-estate), but because these investments are about generating employment – and I don’t think semiconductor research generates as...
A little off my normal tweets, but I’ve already made reference here to Hiperson, one of my favorite young Chinese bands who just released their-widely acclaimed second album. They were in Beijing yesterday as one of the stops of their sold-out national tour and are off...
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to Changsha tomorrow, but spent most of the afternoon and early evening visiting my place where we chatted about their plans, the ambivalence they feel about the huge sudden success of the Chinese indie scene, and about social and political...
3/4 conditions in China and the world.
It would be great if people with hardened attitudes about China and the Chinese knew about bands like this and now much they represent the uncertainly and idealism of many young Chinese. They were supposed to...
China Beige Book is worried because “small and medium-sized companies are borrowing a lot less than they were in the second quarter.” I’ve been asked if this means that Chinese debt is likely to grow less quickly this year than expected.
No, not if we consider debt systemically, rather than in terms of linear increments. If China Beige Book is right (and I expect they are), less borrowing by SMEs to invest in expanding production doesn’t mean less debt overall. It just means a shift in the locus of debt...
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creation from SMEs to the state sector—and almost certainly a worsening of the debt burden.
This is because to the extent that China has a politically determined growth target that exceeds the real underlying growth of the economy (which I would guess is negative...