A good answer to this question is “The Judge over your shoulder”, (JOYS), @GovernmentLegal’s guide to judicial review for civil servants. Looking at that guide again, I was struck by the opening passage. It’s very relevant to the current government’s review of administrative law
The IRAL terms of reference assume that judicial review is in tension with - has to be “properly balanced with” - effective government under law.
But that is a false tension. As JOYS points out, administrative law - and judicial review - *promotes and protects* effective government under law.
Let’s make that thought a bit more concrete, by looking at some of classic grounds on which judicial review can be granted.
Review on procedural/fairness grounds ensures that decisions with important effects on people’s lives are taken only after they have been properly heard: decisions not based on fair procedures will be worse decisions and will command less public acceptance.
Review on grounds of actual or apparent bias is a safeguard against favouritism and corruption, and helps maintain public confidence that decisions with major financial impacts are taken without bias.
Review on rationality grounds ensures that decision makers take their decisions on the basis of, and supported by, relevant evidence: that leads to better decision-making.
Review on grounds of excess of powers ensures that decision-makers respect the limits on their powers placed by Parliament, and helps protect our democracy.
(That is a safeguard of particular importance in the area of statutory instruments, where huge volumes of legislation, making profoundly important policy changes, go virtually unscrutinised by Parliament.)
And review on human rights grounds helps protect those whose fundamental interests may, for various reasons, not have been properly considered in the decision-making process, while ultimately allowing Parliament the final say.
(A point which is, again, of particular importance in relation to virtually unscrutinised statutory instruments).
In all these respects, judicial review – and wide access to judicial review – assists in ensuring “effective government” (reading “effective” here – as it should be read – as including “accountable” and “democratic”).
As JOYS sums it up: “Administrative law (and its practical procedures) play an important part in securing good administration, by providing a powerful method of ensuring that the improper exercise of power can be checked.”
That is a point that, in my view, should be emphasised by all those responding to the IRAL consultation.
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It is, I think, rather an over-statement by @SBarrettBar to describe this as a “consensus”: especially on a day when @HLConstitution said that it was an “open question”.
Powerful criticism of the devolution aspects of the Bill. Like me, the Committee considers that the @michaelgove claim that this is a “power surge” to devolved governments is “surprising”: their Lordships’ euphemism for “complete tosh”.
As to the aspects of the Bill dealing with the Protocol and breaching international law, they are damning. They have this to say about @SuellaBraverman and her advice.
I agree with @SteveBakerHW: the way out of the subsidy control impasse is for the current government to agree to “robust guarantees” on an independent and enforceable subsidy regime in the U.K./EU FTA.
The reasons why such a regime is in the U.K. interest anyway were set out in the letter linked to here (the signatories include committed Brexiters). The proposal builds on Conservative commitments in the election (also linked to). uksala.org/leading-uk-law…
It is (genuinely) surprising that @DavidGHFrost is “surprised” that the EU might expect UK movement back to a position flagged up by the Conservative manifesto.
@NigelBiggar I made it clear (2nd tweet) that you don’t need to be a lawyer to avoid your mistake: you just need to be able to read a complex text with a bit of care. (A skill you’d think a professor of theology might have.)
@NigelBiggar And your attack is even more odd since your defence, that “a Supreme Court judge read my book”, is (on any view) an appeal to professional authority.
@NigelBiggar I actually explain my argument that you’ve misread the judgment. If you have a counter-argument (as opposed to an appeal to authority), please explain it.
When @thetimes allows someone like @NigelBiggar, who has no obvious legal expertise, to sound off on human rights law, it would be worth getting it checked by someone who can read a European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) judgment with some understanding.
Not that you need to be a lawyer to do so: you just need to be able to read a complex text with a bit of care. (A skill you’d think a professor of theology might have.)
The judgment is here. hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#%7B%22item…. As usual, the ECtHR sets out the facts and previous reasoning in some detail. For our purposes the reasoning starts at [130].
A central problem with the current government. Control, not persuasion, is the default. But in a democratic society, control is a lever that breaks in your hand: while persuasion is a lever that moves mountains.