When @thetimes allows someone like @NigelBiggar, who has no obvious legal expertise, to sound off on human rights law, it would be worth getting it checked by someone who can read a European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) judgment with some understanding.
Not that you need to be a lawyer to do so: you just need to be able to read a complex text with a bit of care. (A skill you’d think a professor of theology might have.)
The judgment is here. hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#%7B%22item…. As usual, the ECtHR sets out the facts and previous reasoning in some detail. For our purposes the reasoning starts at [130].
You then see three headings under which a State can - under the Court’s case-law - be held responsible for securing ECHR rights in a particular area: (a) that the area is part of the State’s territory; (b) “state agent authority and control” and (c) “effective control”.
Head (b) needs breaking down. Para 134 deals with diplomatic agents. Para 135 deals with cases where a state in a territory takes over the public powers normally exercised by the government of that territory.
Para 136 deals with cases where state agents have physical power over someone (ships/prisons/etc).
Head (c) (effective control) is about cases where a state actually controls a territory even though legally it may say that decisions are taken by a local administration: the paradigm case is Turkey/Northern Cyprus.
Pausing there, you can see that the last sentence in Biggar’s paragraph here is simply wrong. There are a number of routes to the conclusion that a State has responsibility for securing ECHR rights in an area. “Effective control” is just one of them.
The Court’s basis for finding U.K. responsibility to be engaged is at [143-150]. It doesn’t talk about “effective control” (head (c)). It didn’t need to: it had head (b) - in particular the para 135 line of cases (State taking over a government’s public powers in a territory).
Citing the relevant UN texts, it could show that the U.K. had assumed the powers of the Iraqi government over Basra.
So Biggar is simply wrong here. “Effective control” is not the decisive criterion (it’s only a criterion). There is no overturning of past case-law.
As to the “quoting at length” of national court decisions, the ECtHR always does that. In doing so, it isn’t “implicitly acknowledging” anything.
Now, whether you regard [135] (and Al-Skeini) as a satisfactory basis for attributing responsibility for securing ECHR rights in a territory to a state is an interesting question.
But discussion of that question - and of the wider question of UK adherence to the ECHR isn’t helped by incorrectly accusing the ECtHR of a sudden and unexplained U-turn: an accusation presumably motivated by a “this is an irrational and unpredictable court” narrative.
As for this passage, in the current climate of knife attacks on lawyers doing their job, a professor of theology might care to reflect on the lessons on loose language that one can draw from the history of Henry II and St Thomas a Becket.
To keep everything together, here are my comments on @NigelBiggar’s rather peculiar response to my thread.
@NigelBiggar I made it clear (2nd tweet) that you don’t need to be a lawyer to avoid your mistake: you just need to be able to read a complex text with a bit of care. (A skill you’d think a professor of theology might have.)
@NigelBiggar And your attack is even more odd since your defence, that “a Supreme Court judge read my book”, is (on any view) an appeal to professional authority.
@NigelBiggar I actually explain my argument that you’ve misread the judgment. If you have a counter-argument (as opposed to an appeal to authority), please explain it.
A central problem with the current government. Control, not persuasion, is the default. But in a democratic society, control is a lever that breaks in your hand: while persuasion is a lever that moves mountains.
Very good analysis of Rawls’ political philosophy by @Jesse_Norman. (Don’t be put off by the faint-praise description of him as the current govt’s philosopher-in-chief.)
The point that Rawls’ account doesn’t (can’t) take account of any specific conception of human good - or of unchosen attachments that makes us who we are - isn’t at all a new one (see eg Michael Sandel back in the 80s): but Norman puts it well.
Note that the claim that a satisfactory account of a good or just society must take account of who we actually are in the societies we are actually in sounds - in Norman’s hands - a bit conservative. But it isn’t necessarily so.
A few comments on the legal background to this (it’s the investigation of Darren Grimes in relation to interview with David Starkey where Starkey made grossly racist remarks).
1. For those muttering about New Labour legislation, the legislation at issue, creating offences relating to stirring up racial hatred, is the Public Order Act 1986. It’s Thatcher era legislation (Douglas Hurd being the responsible Home Secretary). legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/64/…
2. The basic offence (s.18) is (so far as relevant) using insulting language which you intend to stir up racial hatred or which is likely to do so. It doesn’t cover simply interviewing someone who then makes a racist comment (the offence, if any, would be theirs).
Cherry rightly put to Gove his claim in March that the UK would put in place a subsidy control system that the EU would recognise as robust.
She contrasted that claim with the BEIS 9 September pronouncement gov.uk/government/new… that as from 1/1/21 the UK would have no subsidy regime save for administrative “guidance” on how to comply with the UK’s WTO obligations.
Absolutely. I’d add that, in trying to persuade others why the rule of law matters, avoid using the phrase itself. It isn’t clear to those who haven’t been following, and sounds too much like “rule of lawyers”.
Instead, make these points (among others and in no particular order). Rules should be clear. Ministers shouldn’t decide for themselves whether they are acting within their powers or complying with rules: that’s for courts. Governments should stick to agreements they have signed.
Decisions should be taken only after those concerned have a real chance to be heard. Govt decisions should not be biased or contracts awarded to contacts without giving others a fair chance. Governments should be able to be taken to court if they don’t follow those principles.