my @jacobinmag on what slow progress in debt suspension talks this week tell us about G20's Grand SDG Bargain w private finance: it cements unequal power relationship, which poor countries cant challenge & private creditors have few qualms in exploiting.
it unpacks the political economy of the DSSI - the debt service suspension initiative - that was negotiated this week at the WB/IMF Annual Meetings, with disappointing results
indeed, quite infuriating, and not even bothering to pretend that the US Treasury cares about involving private creditors in debt relief, as European Ministries of Finance typically do
Goldman Sachs/Credit Suisse 2018 repo loans to Ecuador can easily fall under 'predatory lending' to poor countries. Not to exonerate Moreno government, but:
If you're a private institution, you take out repo loan to finance assets, say government bonds you previously purchased.
you 'sell' your government bonds to GS, agree to repurchase them later.
trick - you remain economic owner of government bond collateral & get interest payments from said government.
because you retain credit risk, your repo lender GS has to do collateral management.
w balance sheets: you, Investor 1, have pledged your Ecuador government bonds as collateral to GS, who's given you USD 90 cash for USD 100 of Ecuador government bonds. Haircut 10%.
Ecuador government bonds stay on your balance sheet (assets) because you remain economic owner.
HSBC offered $2 billion in return for $4 bn Eurobond sovereign bond collateral (a 50% haircut) and an undisclosed cash margin.
problem? Egypt had no Eurobonds (dollar debt) to pledge as collateral, shut out of international capital markets
Ministry of Finance issues $4 bn in Eurobonds, which it transfers to central bank to pledge to HSBC.
Lots of busy lawyers trying to untangle this from 'monetary financing' or MMT echoes that would unsettle IMF, an institution that doesnt like overt coordination cb-treasury
US-backed financial system MOU (memorandum of understanding) identified several benchmarks that Egypt needed to adopt.
US wanted Egypt to adopt several measures that promote securities market-based finance, including a primary dealer system, the privatisation of insurance companies and the adoption of US/EU style repo market.
African countries are facing serious COVID19 related debt distress. A short thread on why articles such as below, however well intentioned, play in the hands of (private) creditors.
basically, African countries are facing three camps in this fight: US-led official donors (including IMF&WB), China and private creditors.
None are a homogeneous block, but let's assume so.
Official donors agreed temporary liquidity relief - no debt service on official bilateral aid to December 2020.
African countries want this extended.
fascinating account of the politics of mega renewable energy project.
missed one angle, that Noor Ouarzazate plan in Morocco was built through a PPP project viewed by the World Bank as excellent example of its Maximising Finance for Development
Government of Morocco bears the heaviest burden of derisking - MASEN (state-owned) commits to purchase all power generated at the same price for 25 years and it also takes currency risk
remember 2008 GFC, when we became experts on shadow banking & regulators finally accepted securitization can create systemic risk instead of better distributing it?
12 years later, European Banking Authority + European Commission quietly dismantling that regulatory regime.
when Lord Hill got Finance portfolio at European Commission as olive branch to Cameron government in 2014, we got #CapitalMarketsUnion - a Trojan horse for private finance lobbies to fight back against FTT and bank structural separation plans of European Parliament
CMU rapidly became market-building strategy: 'we are back to working with, not on, finance' (Lord Hill) to breathe new life into European securitization market through STS initiative: simple, transparent & standardised securitization.
Senior STS tranche = preferential regulation