The US is the unique among peer countries in having a 3-crest pandemic (so far).
We are trending upwards now, as is much of Europe - with the key difference that Europe didn't have the summer wave that we did.
So let's look at that and a couple of other scenarios for total mortality, had we controlled it as well as other countries and regions have.
Let's start with top performers: East Asian countries.
You have to log-scale the chart to even be able to see them, compared to the US.
US is at 632 deaths per million.
If we'd done as well as Japan (13 per mil), it would have saved 203,000 Americans.
South Korea (8.5 per mil), we'd have saved 204,500 lives. US fatalities would be under 3000.
And at China's reported level, we'd have barely over 1000 deaths.
Those countries kept death tolls extremely low by taking action early, rather than that the wait-and-see approach that the US took.
What about Europe, which also took more of a wait-and-see approach?
Here are the hardest-hit Europeans. US per-capita death rate is slightly worse than Italy, marginally better than Spain, UK.
Notably though, bulk of their deaths came at the very beginning, then stabilized. They failed but turned things around. We have just kept on failing.
Italy is at 602 deaths per million.
On June 1 we were at 310; they were at 558.
If we'd done as well as Italy overall, about 10,000 lost Americans would still be alive.
If we'd matched Italy from June onward, around *90,000* lost Americans would still be with us.
Next - the better European performers.
France is trending badly now, but if we'd done as well as them to this point, 46,000 fewer Americans would have died.
If we'd matched Europe overall, we'd have saved 94,500 Americans.
If we'd matched Germany, 169,000 fewer deaths.
What about Canada? Culturally, politically, economically close to the US, and we share a massive border. So a reasonable reference point.
Similar story. If the US had performed as well as Canada overall, we'd have saved 117,000 people.
So don't be distracted. By any reasonable comparison, the US performance in this pandemic has been an utter catastrophe.
We were never likely to do as well as South Korea; but we should at least have been able to match France, Canada, or Germany.
Instead, we have needlessly lost between 15 (France) and 56 (Germany) times as many American as we lost on 9/11, beyond what our closest peer countries have lost.
There is no defense, excuse, rationale, or spin that can justify that. It is a leadership failure without parallel.
(Quick note on methodology - all calculations take the differences in FT's reported country net fatality-per-million figures and multiply by the US population of 328m in order to estimate the fatality differentials)
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Great thread on how massively difficult "shielding the vulnerable" would be in practice. Far harder than using public health measures to control the virus.
None of the "shielding" advocates are grappling seriously with this.
I have yet to see any of the herd immunity/shielding crowd lay out an affirmative agenda that reckons with:
1) how many would need to be shielded 2) what that shielding would entail 3) what support would be provided 4) at what cost 5) how the vulnerable would be identified
As the thread persuasively lays out, tens of millions would need to be shielded, requiring an ambitious plan to protect them while providing massive social and economic support at tremendous cost.
The Barrington crowd proposes nothing of the kind.
If you're sticking with me to the second tweet, chances are you know that the "cluster approach" has been in place for 15 years now, and orients humanitarian coordination, planning, and operations around the major technical sectors.
It's got problems.
As we, and many before us, have found, the sector-driven logic of the clusters is increasingly at odds with what the system needs from humanitarian coordination.
Humanitarian ops need to be demand driven, integrated across sectors, and devolve power/resources toward the field.
This is helpful update to that chart. Takeaway is much the same. (HT @CT_Bergstrom)
I do think there is a reasonable rationale for looking at the March/April phase a little differently than May/June onward. In early phase we were fighting this much blinder than from summer on.
The states that got hit in the first crest in March/April were largely places with major travel hubs to Europe/China, and dense populations. And due to federal failings they had little preparedness, little support, and a lot less knowledge on how to fight it.
Other states would likely have followed suit if not for the shutdowns that spread across the country from mid-March, and held in place into late April/May.
The shutdowns spared the rest of the country from NYC-like outcomes.
But I'm not entirely persuaded that the data referenced in this article is robust enough to support the headline. theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/…
The key element that doesn't seem present in this data - is how the level of transmission in schools relates to level of transmission in the surrounding community. Existing CDC guidelines focus on that as a principal driver of in-school risk.
So if the data are telling us that school transmission is consistently low irrespective of localized transmission levels, that's a super relevant finding - but isn't addressed in this data set (only school-based mitigation measures are captured).