Here's the @Reuters story on today's hastily convened press conference blaming Iran for the 'Proud Boys' email threats. reuters.com/article/us-usa…
I note these paragraphs in particular:
As Dimitri - who knows a thing or two about publicly blaming a foreign power for election cyber mischief! - notes, this was a *blisteringly* fast attribution:
To start with, the message was unsolicited and came in the middle of the night — around 1am Iran time — according to several recipients I spoke too. The gut feeling many had when they saw the SMS was that they were being targeted by hackers. Here’s one reaction: ↘️
New: A deepfake disinformation operation is targeting UK lawyer Mazen Masri and Palestinian rights campaigner Ryvka Barnard - a sign of how this technology is being popularized as a propaganda-spreading tool. reuters.com/article/us-cyb…
New: We're releasing a potted guide to recognizing GAN-created imagery in the wild, with input from @MuniraMustaffa, @HaoLi81, and others. Read it to understand how we determined Oliver Taylor was a fake - and how you can spot similar creations. graphics.reuters.com/CYBER-DEEPFAKE…
As far as I can tell, Oliver Taylor's writing career began late last year with a (now-deleted) article in the Jerusalem Post on Malaysia's Mahathir Mohammad web.archive.org/web/2020050521…
There's some NSO news today, but I'd like to enlist Twitter's help to find more. Here's how you can pitch in:
About a month ago, WhatsApp began issuing messages to 1,400 targets of Pegasus spyware, sending in-app "green badge" warnings to users. Here's what they look like:
Several people in India and Morocco have since come forward to self-identify as targets of NSO spyware. But we believe there are more out there haven't made themselves known and we'd like to speak to them. If you know of anyone who has received this warning, we're keen to talk:
-@Reuters has also collected pictures of what the "missed calls" associated with the spyware targeting look like. If you or anyone you know has seen this kind of activity, I encourage you to get in touch.
I’m at a press conference on how #GDPR is frustrating US law enforcement efforts online. DEA’s Jae Chung and DOJ’s Jason Gull speaking now.
Gull: “WHOis is turning into WHOwas ... We have information on who owned a domain six months ago, or a year ago now. It’s like having an old phone book.”
Problematic for urgent requests to preserve data in investigations.
Gull notes that WHOis was always problematic — full of false information and outdated information. He said about 1/4 of all entries were proxied through privacy services, but that many were very cooperative. Now the process of sending requests to preserve evidence is slower.
Last month I my attention was drawn to something suspicious: A fake LinkedIn profile connecting to Washington think tank types and senior US officials.
For a while now people have been worrying about the threat of “deepfakes,” AI-generated personas that are indistinguishable, or almost indistinguishable, from real live humans. I think I may have caught an example of one in the wild: apnews.com/bc2f19097a4c4f…
Most of the concern I’ve seen over deepfakes has been articulated in terms of impersonation — i.e. can a politician be made to say something they never said. But even imaginary deepfakes are a problem, for example to generate untraceable avatars.
For those in the US just waking up: The White House cybersecurity czar under Obama was targeted last year as part of an elaborate undercover operation aimed at critics of Kaspersky Lab.
I don’t know whether the operative involved here - alias Lucas Lambert - was able to get through to Michael Daniel; the @CyberAlliance said he had no recollection of any such meeting. But he clearly tried. Here he is asking Keir Giles for Daniel’s contact. documentcloud.org/documents/5742…
In early 2017, Kaspersky expressed an interest in joining the Washington-based alliance. According to one source, discussions dragged along and eventually died in February 2018.