Ben Golub Profile picture
22 Oct, 26 tweets, 10 min read
A thread on what we can learn about polarization of opinions from a simple behavioral network model.

Remember the DeGroot model? It says you decide what to think tomorrow by taking an average of what you and your friends think today.

Examples:

1/
Here is a condensed way of writing it using vector notation, which turns out to be very useful!

Here W has no negative entries, and each row sums to 1 (that's called "row-stochastic"). That makes sense, since each person is averaging others' views.

2/
We often want to think of the weights as coming from a social network, maybe something like this. The network tells you who are the friends that you listen to.

So we'd better establish a way of thinking of the updating weights as coming from a network.

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Here's a simple way: let G be the adjacency matrix of the graph, and think of the weights describing that you listen to someone in proportion to your "sociability," and the strength of the relationship between the two of you.

So now we can make W's from graphs, great!

4/
Maybe you would like to see the DeGroot process in action on a graph. Fortunately the awesome @vasu_maybe and @rawatanoop made videos!

Here we set sociability the same for everyone. The color of a node reflects its current opinion, where 0=white and 1=black.

5/
Now there's a lot to notice here but I want to call your attention to one thing:

notice that the two "communities" start out pretty diverse internally. Each quickly gets pretty similar inside in their opinions.

Differences ACROSS persist for much longer. Look:

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You could tell there are two opinion groups here even if I hadn't shown you the graph.

We want to understand how that works: who "clumps up" together, and how long it takes for their differences to dissolve.

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More broadly when we study this type of model, we want to link network structure to outcomes!

How does network structure matter for opinion outcomes – how fast they change, polarization, etc.?

What can we learn from opinion dynamics about the underlying network?

8/
Let's get one piece of housekeeping out of the way. If the underlying network is connected, opinions eventually converge. After all, people keep adjusting toward others!

There's a nice and pretty theory of what they converge to, but that's not the story we're telling today.

9/
Today, I'm interested in what they're doing on the way.

Let's watch these people talk about TWO issues according to the same model - say, immigration and abortion, starting from arbitrary initial opinions. We'll plot their opinions on two axes.

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Look at what's happening! They seem to be lining up on one "axis." (Here it looks almost vertical.)

Let's zoom in very close as they're converging (using a different scale for each axis so we can get a good look). We see them lining up on an axis and clumping up a bit.

11/
There are two questions here:

(1) How fast does diversity of opinions decay? That's the zoomed-out picture.
(2) What do opinions look like on the way? That's the zoomed-in picture.

Basic linear algebra gives us a fairly complete answer, which will state and then unpack.
The green thing is the answer to (1). The SIZE of the differences is determined by a certain eigenvalue of the network W - the second-largest one. The bigger it is, the slower we converge.

Bigger second eigenvalues happen when networks consist of well-separated communities

13/
Our network has a pretty big second eigenvalue, and this one would, too: it could sustain opinion differences for a long time.

Tight communities do that: they can come to a partial consensus inside, and maintain differences across. That's what we saw in the animations.

14/
When we divide by λ₂ to the power t, we are zooming in at a rate that keeps the picture looking constant - so we are now trying to understand the structure of disagreement, not its scale. The thing in this zoomed-in animation.

The rest of the DVZ result tells us all about that.
Here's what's going on with that, on the right-hand side: everyone has a "position." That is, on any issue, you can be put on a "spectrum" just based on the network. And on any issue, that's where you'll be. Centrist on abortion? Centrist on immigration. Due to q^(2).

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In our running example, the positions are actually basically just the horizontal locations of people in the picture as drawn!

The initial configuration of opinions on the issue "only" determines a, the "sign" and "scale" of how we line up on the issue.

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In this illustration we started with those on the left having dark (low) opinions and those on the right having light (high) ones, so a is positive: "right" correlates with "light."

If we'd started with an opposite opinion configuration on the same network, a would be negative.
Relatedly, the larger the initial disagreement between the two groups, the bigger disagreement will be eventually: that's an obvious scaling.
a captures that too.

Each dimension (immigration, abortion) has its own a, and together they determine the axis we saw in the videos.

19
In this example, the axis ends up sloping north-north-east -- that's determined by the a's of the two issues. The positions along that axis are determined by the q's.

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One last thing: you might think that either of the examples in the pictures below, which (visual) "chunk" of the network you are in will determine a lot about your q. That is, positions along the axis will clump in groups. That turns out to be true!

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Making that rigorous and precise is a story for another day. For now, let me close with some basic takeaways.

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The almost ridiculously simple DeGroot model delivers that as society is converging to a consensus on controversial issues, the network determines how global discord decays.

The second eigenvalue determines how fast.

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A corresponding eigenvector determines where people fall along the axis of most durable disagreement. When there is a "community structure" to the network, long-run positions are very correlated with community identity.

A lot from a simple model!

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For more on all this, see Section 3 of this survey.

bengolub.net/papers/survey.…

A huge thank you to @rawatanoop and @vasu_maybe who made it possible to tell this story, and to many collaborators who have explained this stuff to me over the years, especially @JacksonmMatt

25/25
PS/ Everything together

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More from @ben_golub

20 Oct
Suppose two people each have some private information about, say, a stock. The first says her posterior expectation of its price, then the second learns from her statement and says his, etc.

Will they reach a consensus? Under common priors, yes. (See below.)

1/
People often learn this from GP (below), but they assume finite probability spaces & really use that.

Tweet proof shows that convergence to consensus doesn't rely on finiteness, and holds much more generally. (When was the martingale proof first written down?)

2/ Image
If we do assume each of us has a finite partition of the states, the tweet proof immediately implies convergence in finitely many steps:

our partitions can only change finitely many times, given that convergence happens, it must happen in finite time.

3/3
Read 4 tweets
19 Oct
An application of Aumann's agreeing-to-disagree result: certain kinds of war between rational countries are puzzling.

Since war involves destruction, better for one to surrender and bargain. But maybe each believes it'll get more by fighting? Suppose a country fights iff

1/3
it thinks it will win with prob > 0.5. In the notation below, let X = indicator that I win. Then war means it's common knowledge that Y>.5>Z.

That's impossible, but the proof below doesn't quite show it. Exercise: show there's no CK event E on which Y>Z.

War here is like speculative trade (cf. no-trade theorem): it can't happen due to different information ALONE, because by Aumann both of us can't rationally expect to win.

Thus, if war is zero-sum or worse, it entails irrationality or different priors.

3/3
Read 5 tweets
12 Oct
One of my favorite things about Bob Wilson, co-winner of today's prize, is how gentle a giant he is, how modest yet understatedly charismatic and funny. This rare recording gives a sense.

1/5

found this thanks to @mariannollar

"I'm here to today to argue that sequential equilibrium [his own invention with Kreps] -- which you said ... in 1982 completed the answer to the questions that Luce and Raiffa raised in 1957 -- well, MY stance was that that was a mild disaster!

2/5
"Sequential equilibrium turned out to have enormous flaws. And the revelation of those flaws has, I think, been actually opening up what the real challenge is for game theory in terms of establishing what its foundations are.

3/5
Read 6 tweets
11 Oct
Many thanks for sharing this, @sinanaral and @rodrikdani.

Paper here bengolub.net/papers/naivele…, and tl;dr version here bengolub.net/papers/naivele…

and an even shorter version below.

1/
We look at a society where people update their opinions according to the _DeGroot model of updating_. It says you decide what to think tomorrow by taking a weighted average of what you and your friends think today.

2/
Despite its simplicity and strong assumptions, DeGroot's model has been a surprisingly helpful workhorse in networks.

We ask: suppose initial estimates are centered at the truth θ and conditionally independent.

Do we get a "wisdom of crowds" in the long run? More precisely...
3
Read 10 tweets
4 Oct
Scott Feld who is responsible for an early formalization of the paradox, relates it to other great examples:

You think the subway is more crowded than it is, because most people aren't there to see it when it's not crowded.

1/
The average course size that students experience is bigger than the average course, because by definition the big courses have more students experiencing them ("the class size paradox.")

2/
When you go to the gym and look around, you feel relatively bad because the very frequent gym-goers are oversampled in your looking around, whereas the never-gym-goers are not sampled at all and don't make you feel (relatively) better.

3/3
Read 4 tweets
4 Oct
The friendship paradox!

This is the assertion that "your friends are more popular than you are."

Why? Simplest way to see it: some people have no friends. But because they appear in nobody's friendship circles, they're not making anyone else feel unpopular.

1/
The selection effect that applies to these friendless (a.k.a. degree zero) people also applies to other people: the more friends you have, the likelier you are to be represented in people's friendship circles. So popular people are oversampled as friends. Hence the paradox.

2/
Still, what is the paradox exactly, as a quantitative statement?

Scott Feld, who coined the term and made the paradox famous, had one way of formalizing it. It isn't my favorite way, but it's a classic, and worth meeting first.

3/
Read 10 tweets

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