Great story by @wesleysmorgan: "the U.S. military has been quietly helping the Taliban to weaken the Islamic State...Remarkably, it can do so without needing to communicate with the Taliban, by observing battle conditions and listening in on the group." washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/1…
"...inside JSOC, the team working on this mission is jokingly known as the “Taliban Air Force,” one task force member told me."
"As negotiators closed in on their deal in Doha, officers repurposed tools honed against the Taliban: Reaper drones and an intelligence complex with nearly two decades of practice spying on Afghan guerrillas."
"Unwilling to communicate directly with Taliban commanders, the task force worked to divine where and how its old foes needed help by listening to their communications."
"Konar operations may offer a glimpse of what lies ahead for the United States in Afghanistan: the outsourcing of what has long been a core U.S. military mission — fighting the Islamic State and al-Qaeda — to the uneasily coordinated forces of the Afghan [gov't] and the Taliban"
"Joseph Votel, a retired Army general who commanded JSOC, told me that during his 2016-2019 tenure heading Central Command...it “deconflicted” with the Taliban — refraining from bombing Taliban units that seemed to be preparing for attacks against the Islamic State."
"It’s not clear whether the government in Kabul — which was not a party to the Doha negotiations but is now in its own talks with the Taliban — is aware of the role U.S. airstrikes have played in Konar. (Afghan government officials declined to comment for this story.)"
Not everyone sold on ISIS as a threat from Afghanistan: "“How much do we really need to worry about dudes in the back of these valleys, no matter what flag they’re flying?” Crowe asked. “If ISIS in the Korengal is mostly a bunch of Korengalis, why do we care?”"
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