NEW at SCOTUS: yet another emergency request from the GOP to block pandemic-related voting accommodations. This time in North Carolina.
This request comes in a different posture from recent Republican requests, as it pits the GOP state legislature against the state board of elections, which entered into a consent judgement with advocacy groups pushing for the voting accommodations.
At issue: waived postmark and witness requirements and and an extended receipt deadline for mail-in ballots.
The main claim: "The Board’s attempt to rewrite the rules... through a back-door settlement...contravenes basic separation-of-powers principles, violates Plaintiffs’ equal protection rights, and guarantees significant voter and administrative confusion."
And here's a companion request from North Carolina's Republican Speaker of the House
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If you're wondering why CJ Roberts voted to reinstate the ban on curbside voting in Alabama tonight but voted to *permit* a voting accommodation in Pennsylvania on Monday...
The common denominator seems to be federalism: let the states run their elections as they choose.
Of course, it's a little more complicated than that.
In PA, SCOTUS refused to block a ruling from the state supreme court that extended (contrary to the legislature's wish) the deadline for mail-in ballots under the right-to-vote provision of the state constitution.
Barrett just told @SenBlumenthal that Loving v. Virginia (striking down mixed-race marriage bans) was based directly on Brown v. Board of Ed and was therefore correctly decided—but she can't opine on Griswold or Obergefell.
Her characterization of Loving is not quite right. 1/4
Brown v. Board was based *only* the Equal Protection Clause: the idea that separate schools are inherently unequal. The Court explicitly declined to consider whether segregation is also unconstitutional under substantive due process. 2/4
Loving, on the other hand, was based on *both* the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause, with *more* analysis devoted to the latter. It is a substantive due-process case, much like Griswold (right to contraception) and Obergefell (marriage equality). 3/4