Some quick reactions to the new lockdowns in Europe.

1. The degree of uncertainty is much higher than in the first wave. In the first wave, the (incorrect) belief was that the infection rate would quickly decrease and remain low thereafter.
2. This time, whether we can quickly decrease the infection rate, and whether we can keep it low thereafter, is much more in question. This is likely to adversely affect spending behavior by firms, and by workers.
3. The current plans are to allow more activity than in the first lockdown, for example by keeping schools open and thus allowing parents to go to work (whether this will have to be tightened is again uncertain), so the supply side effects may be smaller than in the first wave.
4. But higher uncertainty may lead to a larger adverse effects on consumption and investment, leading to lower aggregate demand, and a potentially larger decline in output.

Fiscal policy may need to be even more generous/aggressive than in the first lockdown. For two reasons:
5. First: In the first wave, help to firms directly affected by the restrictions largely took the form of loans and delayed payments of taxes. Following the same approach in the second wave would lead to very high levels of debt, and high bankruptcy rates.
6. Thus, help will have to be more in the form of grants than in the form of loans, a more costly option for the government.

Second: Given higher uncertainty, private demand is likely to be weaker, requiring a stronger boost to aggregate demand beyond protection measures.
7. This will probably lead to very high levels of debt. I continue to think that these levels of debt need not create a debt crisis. Interest rates remain low and, thanks to the ECB, are likely to become even lower in the short run.
8. And the fundamental factors behind the low rates strongly suggest that rates will remain low for a long time to come. Thus, it is highly likely that debt service will remain tractable.
9. Nothing is for sure in life, and even more so in this crisis. There may be more waves, more spending. Investors may become scared, risk premia may lead to higher interest rates, with the ECB unable to counteract the increase. But the risk is small and must be taken.
10. Pinching pennies and allowing bankruptcies on a large scale, limiting unemployment benefits, and letting demand collapse would be penny wise and pound foolish. Governments will need strong nerves. Let's hope they have them.

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More from @ojblanchard1

3 Sep
Quick reactions to the French economic plan released today.
The three legs, climate, competitivite (helping firms), cohesion (helping people) make good sense. The amount committed, 100 b euros on top of what has already been spent is substantial. But (there is always a but...)
Help to firms is largely in the form of a decrease in taxes on output (``impots de production’’). These are indeed not great taxes, as they must be paid independent of profit. Removing them is good for firms and for employment. But what is needed for the time being is different.
I believe there were better ways to do it. For example, wage subsidies (which Jean Pisani-Ferry, Thomas Philippon and I argued for) to COVID affected firms, the approach taken in the UK, or paying for fixed costs for COVID affected firms, the approach taken in Germany.
Read 8 tweets
8 Jun
When the virus struck, the priority was to protect fragile firms and workers. As the lockdown ends, the focus must change from protection to reallocation. How it should done is the topic of a piece by Jean Pisani Ferry, Thomas Philippon and me. bit.ly/3dIiHCY
The challenge is to do it in an environment of high unemployment, and high uncertainty both about the course of the virus and the end of physical distancing constraints, but also about which sectors will contract and which sectors will expand in the medium run
We argue for the following architecture. For workers, extending the duration of unemployment benefits. Where it exists, maintaining the partial unemployment schemes, that have kept the link between firms and workers, and allowed for a smoother distribution of funds.
Read 10 tweets
13 Mar
A 11-piece thread on Italy, the ECB, and the need to avoid another euro crisis. Start with the basics, the first two points being the most important.
The Italian government is behaving extremely responsibly—more so than many. It is putting health considerations and the control of the epidemic ahead of short term economic considerations---exactly as it should.
This commitment will have large economic and fiscal costs. But, at the interest rate that prevailed until yesterday (less than 1%) however, even a large increase in the debt ratio, even of the order of 10% to 20% does not put debt sustainability into question.
Read 11 tweets
24 Feb
1. The next few days will likely see an avalanche of analyses of the economic effects of the corona virus. Here are a few points, building on a previous thread. Basic point: Anti virus measures aim at the core of economic organization, the division of labor.
2. We have to assume that we shall see repeated and localized pockets of infection around the world for some time to come (maybe until vaccines come on line). These in turn will lead to quarantines, border closures, and disruption of economic relations.
3. Because the remedies are extreme, even small risks of infection and of death can have a drastic effect on economic activity.

From a macro viewpoint, it is an unusual supply shock. What can policy do?
Read 6 tweets
2 Feb
Macroeconomics 8th edition is out. Compared to the first edition (1997), I am struck by two things. The architecture has not changed. But the degree to which what was exotic then is, at least for the time being, the new normal.
On the architecture of the book. Short (first), medium, long run. Equilibrium in goods markets, financial markets, labor markets. A major role for expectations, and how medium and long run affect short run. I still think it is the right way.
Still struck at the importance of the IS relation. How trying to save more, by people or government, is likely to lead, in the short run, to less saving, less investment, less output. Fundamental insight that non economists often fail to have.
Read 8 tweets
4 Nov 19
Taking again the risk of discussing an MMT proposition, and fully expecting to be told that I have not understood….

One of the propositions of MMT is that, in contrast to standard mainstream arguments, government spending is automatically financed by money creation.
(This typically comes with statements that one must carefully look at the flows, but that once one has looked, the proposition is obvious)

I believe the proposition is both right, and utterly irrelevant.
It is right: When the government buys something or pays somebody, it draws on its Treasury account at the Fed (so long as there are funds on the account, as the account cannot go negative). This indeed automatically increases central bank money in circulation.
Read 9 tweets

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