Thread by @johannes_saal

Since many were surprised about a terrorist attack taking place in Austria I will provide a (very) brief history of Jihadi activities in the country and try to contextualize what we know about the Vienna attack and its perpetrator so far.

A thread:

1) Surprisingly, Austria received until now little attention from researchers and analysts despite the country's long history as a hub for Jihadi activities and having one of the highest numbers of foreign fighters per capita in Europe (comparable to Belgium).

2) Already during the 1990s, Vienna served as an important logistic hub for the channeling of fighters, funds, and equipment to the foreign mujahideen in Bosnia. After the war, Bosnian Salafis in Austria played a crucial role in establishing Salafi enclaves like Gornja Maoca.

3) Until today, these homeland-diaspora connections to leaders of the Bosnian Jihadi movement like Yusuf Barcic and his successors Nusret Imamovic and Bilal Bosnic are important to understand the dynamics of Jihadism in Austria.

4) What always stroke me was that, in contrast to Germany for instance, the formation and consolidation phase of Salafism in Austria was dominated by more radical religious authorities such as Nedzad Balkan and Farhad and Jamaluddin Qarar (Abu Hamza and Abu Khattab al-Afghani).

5) The Qarar brothers first concentrated on the German reception of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, influencing young radicals in Austria, Bremen (Germany) and elsewhere. Later they sympathized with al-Zarqawi and eventually became followers of the Taqfiri scholar Abu Maryam al-Mikhlif.

6) Renouncing Bin Laden and al-Qaida, Austrian Taqfiris got in an ideological conflict with a new generation of radicals whose most prominent proponents were Mohamed Mahmoud (Abu Usama al-Gharib) and Mirsad Omerovic (Ebu Tejma).

7) While Mahmoud was imprisoned and later moved to Germany, Omerovic and other radical Salafis (most of Bosnian origin) established towards the end of the 2000s mosque communities in Vienna and Graz which became foreign fighter recruitment grounds as soon war in Syria broke out.

8) Salafi communities in Austria appeared to be ethnically more homogenous than their counterparts in Germany or elsewhere in Europe and almost exclusively frequented by Bosnians, Chechens, Albanians, and Turks. But cohesion was also caused by extensive family ties among members.

9) According to official reports almost 300 FFs left Austria for Syria/Iraq, according to my own data another 50 tried to do so. Most departures took place relatively early in 2013/14, showing that many Austrian FFs radicalized before the founding of the IS caliphate.

10) Especially in 2013, many FFs of Chechen (and to a lesser degree of Turkish, Bosnian and Albanian) origin left Vienna and Graz to join the Chechen group Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar (JAMWA). After internal conflicts, some Austrian FFs returned whereas others defected to ISIS.

11) The 2nd wave leaving after the founding of the IS caliphate differed insofar as they included entire families & mosque communities. From the Taqwa mosque in Graz at least 5 couples left with their 16 children! At the same time, teenagers increasingly tried to join the IS.

12) In the Islamic State, many Austro-Bosnian FFs initially fought in Bosnian katibat. Despite the unsuccessful attempt to establish German-speaking units, Austrian FFs continued to congregate. FFs from Germany, for instance, reported having met the "Ebu Tejma" group from Vienna.

13) Departures to Syria/Iraq mainly stopped as soon Austrian authorities started to close radical mosques, arrest leaders and their aides, and disrupt recruitment and facilitation networks, most importantly the one associated with Mirsad Omerovic (Ebu Tejma).

14) As one of the most influential religious authorities of the German-speaking Jihadi movement, Omerovic & his group coordinated a sophisticated facilitation network that provided funds, transportation, contacts in the Balkans & Turkey, and recommendation letters.

15) Although I think claims by some former FFs that the Vienna-based network served as a conduit for FFs from entire Western Europe and the Balkans are exaggerated, its importance for many FFs from Germany and Switzerland cannot be underestimated.

16) My research found that many followers of Omerovic in Vienna, Graz, Weiden, Munich, Bremen, Hamburg, and Winterthur (Switzerland) used Omerovic's extensive contacts to radicals in the Balkans and Turkey as well as to senior members of JAMWA and IS to reach Syria.

17) In the period 2012-2016, around 50 Austrian FFs were killed (according to official reports) and 33% returned (according to my own estimation). The fate of the remaining 150 FFs is mostly unknown although some are reportedly held captive in Northern Syria or Iraq.

18) The significant decrease in departures in 2015 was accompanied by the increasing threat of domestic terrorism as IS incited its followers to attack their homeland instead of traveling to the crumbling caliphate.

19) Already in November 2014, a 14-year old Merkan G. who failed to immigrate to the Islamic State was arrested for plotting a bomb attack on a railway station. Two years later another teenager, Lorenz K., planed with two like-minded peers from Germany a similar attack.

20) Lorenz K. admired Mirsad Omerovic. The trio which included 12-year old (!) Yad A. from Ludwigshafen already acquired explosives, tested their self-made bombs, and Yad's attack on a X-mas market only failed due to a malfunctioning bomb.

21) After the arrest of his conspirators, Lorenz K. continued his plan to attack the Vienna metro system. The whole time he was in touch with the admin of the German pro-IS Telegram channel "Intiqami" and eventually did send his bayah to Mohamed Mahmoud in Syria.

22) In June 2017, an IS sympathizer from Linz murdered a senior couple suspecting them to be involved in right-wing politics. The stabbing attack on a soldier guarding the Iranian embassy in March 2018 was probaly another Jihadi-inspired attack in Austria.

23) These unsuccessful & low-profile attacks are probably one reason why Austria never received the same attention as other European states in recent years & why many are surprised about the attack taking place in Vienna. In a broader context, it is clear that ISIS isn't defeated

24) Despite the more sophisticated modus operandi, the Vienna attacker Kujtim Fejzulai fits well into the attack pattern of recent years: individuals who failed to join the IS abroad, loosely connected to its members who provide instructions and publish claims of responsibility.

25) Although it seems that we’re dealing with a new Jihadi generation, Fejzulai didn’t radicalize recently but tried to reach the Islamic State in Afghanistan and Syria before. Likewise, this attack was obviously planned since he previously tried to acquire the necessary weapons.

26) Much verified information only will be revealed during the ongoing investigation and, hence, I do not want to speculate. However, it seems that despite acting alone Fejzulai was involved in a broader transnational radical network that bases on connections made years earlier.

27) Fejzulai frequented an infamous mosque in Vienna that was visited by Jihadi radicals like Mohamed Mahmoud and Lorenz K. Likewise, some individuals arrested in connection to the attack tried to join IS and plot attacks in the past (can’t say more about this at the moment).

28) Especially the connections to radicals in Winterthur are very interesting for me. I already mentioned that Mirsad Omerovic was a religious authority for local leaders like Valdet Gashi & Sandro V. The recent trial of the latter showed how close they were as they talked daily.

29) Like in Vienna and elsewhere in Austria, not all radicals of the Winterthur group left for Syria/Iraq due to various reasons I discussed above. And although the public and authorities might have lost interest in them, they did not necessarily disappear or deradicalize.

30) As far as I know at least one of the two individuals arrested yesterday belonged to the youth group around Gashi and Sandro whose remaining members continued to meet in private after the infamous An Nur mosque in Winterthur closed in 2017.

31) Most information in this thread bases on the research I did for my PhD thesis “The Dark Social Capital of Religious Radicals. Jihadi Networks and Mobilization in Germany, Switzerland, and Austria, 1998-2018” which will be published with @Springer_VS in the next months.

32) I will try to constantly update my analysis in the next days as new information is revealed. If you are interested in more details on the dynamics of Jihadism in German-speaking Europe I would be happy if you support my research by buying my book as soon it gets published.