1/7

Very good article about China’s debt-real estate nexus. The problem with Beijing’s “three red lines” response to excessive leverage in the property sector is that developers can only deleverage if real estate prices remain high enough to allow...

ft.com/content/c1144f…
2/7

them to liquidate assets and pay down debt without taking losses. If they take losses, their debt burdens get worse, not better.

If real estate prices mainly reflected underlying economic value, it would be possible to do so, but with among the most expensive real estate...
3/7

markets in the world (relative to per capita income), the lowest rental yields in the world, and by far the largest share of empty apartments and office space in the world, it is pretty clear that the Chinese real estate market is highly speculative.
4/7

In speculative markets rising debt is justified by rising prices, which are themselves supported by rising debt. It is a highly self-reinforcing process, both on the way up and on the way down, which means the longer it goes on, the more painful the adjustment.
5/7

Of course it also means that the only way real estate developers can deleverage is if some other sector leverages up, and there are really only two sectors that can do so. The first is households, but given their already-high debt levels relative to income, it is probably...
6/7

too risky to encourage more household debt, especially when they already seem worried about debt levels. The second is local governments, either directly (which is unlikely), or indirectly, by being forced to absorb the losses of real estate developers.
7/7

I suspect that the regulators are trying to engineer a slow bailing out of the developers so as not to set off a panic, but the longer they take, the more costly it will ultimately be. The debts of Evergrande alone must be terrifying to them.

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More from @michaelxpettis

12 Nov
1/4

Interesting article by @shuli_ren. The unusual combination in China of extremely high debt levels, slowing growth and very low default rates suggests what most of us suspected anyway: that default rates in China are largely determined...

bloomberg.com/opinion/articl…
2/4

by the regulators as part of their managing risks for the banking system. Most potential defaults are postponed or avoided by forcing banks and other institutional creditors to restructure their lending.

In that case you cannot use historical data to determine...
3/4

future expected default rates. Low defaults in the past will remain low in the future until the costs to financial stability get too high, after which they will rise sharply. This seems to have happened in Japan in the early 1990s when the bubble economy began to...
Read 4 tweets
11 Nov
1/6

Good article. Winston Mok is right to argue that improved social welfare and policies that raise rural incomes will help China "rebalance" its economy towards domestic consumption as its driving force.

scmp.com/comment/opinio…
2/6

In fact anything that directly or indirectly transfers income to ordinary households will help, although as Mok points out, we are talking about huge transfers – perhaps as much as 20-30 percentage points of GDP by his count.
3/6

But what he, along with most other analysts, doesn't discuss are the political implications of rebalancing, which also explain why it has been so hard to do in the past. Given the sheer extent of the Chinese imbalances (the greatest in history) for China sufficiently...
Read 6 tweets
9 Nov
1/4

According to this article, "some economists have warned of rising risks of deflation unless Beijing maintains a sufficiently loose monetary policy to boost demand."

It seems to be an article of faith among economists that loose monetary policy...

scmp.com/economy/china-…
is always inflationary, even though many years of rapid monetary expansion in China (and earlier, in Japan) never seemed to set off inflation – except when an agricultural crisis caused food production to collapse.
3/4

In fact I'd argue that loose monetary policy causes inflation only if it causes demand to rise faster than supply. When monetary expansion, however, is fed through credit expansion mainly into the production side of the economy, it seems to me that loose monetary...
Read 4 tweets
9 Nov
1/7

Because RMB is a managed currency, whether or not it rises depends on the PBoC, but if rising expectations cause significant continued inflow into RMB, there are basically three ways, or some combination, in which the PBoC can react.

ft.com/content/b9991e…
2/7

First, it can allow RMB to rise, which would be good for Chinese rebalancing but bad for China’s manufacturers. It would mean slower growth, but there are very few ways in which rebalancing does not lead to slower growth.
3/7

Second, the PBoC can intervene directly to prevent RMB from rising, in which case we will see domestic monetary expansion and probably more debt and more asset price increases. This would lead in the short term to faster GDP growth, but it would worsen the imbalances...
Read 7 tweets
7 Nov
1/4

China's October trade surplus soared again to $58.4 billion on the back of an 11.4% acceleration of export growth and a 4.7% deceleration of import growth. It should be pretty clear from this just how lopsided China's economic recovery has been.

scmp.com/economy/china-…
2/4

Almost all the recovery is on the production side, and what little recovery on the consumption aside has been indirect, as a consequence of supply-side measures.
3/4

The trade surplus for the past six months is a massive 4.3% of China's GDP (or 0.9% of the ROW's GDP). Anyone who thinks China's record trade surpluses are caused by China's earlier re-opening after Covid-19, and that they will soon...
Read 4 tweets
7 Nov
1/9

Of course regulators worry about Ant's disruptive potential. Its overwhelming success had less to do with its technological innovation and more to do with the fact that a lightly regulated entity will always outperform its highly regulated rivals.

scmp.com/business/banki…
2/9

Ma thought that his backdoor deregulation – which he called “disruption” – was a good thing, but while it might at first seem like China would benefit economically from the replacement of its neolithic banking sector with a swifter, more flexible financing and savings...
3/9

system, in fact an inefficient, financially repressed and highly controlled banking system has always been at the heart of the Chinese growth model. It is the existing banking system that is responsible for much of the past growth in excess economic activity.
Read 9 tweets

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