I think a key question for any newer right is whether it will fight hard *for* every vote, aspiring to the majorities Nixon and Reagan won, or whether it will be content to try to grasp the levers of state power on behalf of a 45-48 percent coalition.
The promise of Against-the-Dead-Consensus arguments on the right is that they aspire to build a *majoritarian* populism, not just sustain a defensive coalition propped up by a Senate edge. The voter-fraud fixation belongs to a we-can't-win-majorities mentality, not a winning one.
Against-the-Dead-Consensus conservatives should be spinning the results of a high-turnout election optimistically for their project. The GOP did not, in fact, collapse when more people voted! Trump even did a little better with black voters in Dem cities!
"We need lawsuits that identify the 187 illegal votes cast by black Detroiters and Philadelphians in an election that was actually decided by swings of tens of thousands of white voters in the suburbs" just seems like the wrong project for aspiring multi-ethnic populists.
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Let me briefly defend @ezraklein's claims about the centrality of polarization to America's problems against @ezraklein's argument that the "dearth of the democracy" is really America's biggest challenge. vox.com/21561011/2020-…
I'm sympathetic to the idea that the G.O.P. would be a better political formation if it were forced to compete more outside its rural/exurban base, which is one reason among many I don't particularly fear the abolition of the filibuster or the addition of new states. But ...
... one thing that 2020 should make clear is that the G.O.P., while not a majority coalition, is a *highly* competitive one relative to minority coalitions in the US past. It isn't staring down the barrel of demographic collapse. It's always within hailing distance of 50 percent.
Some of the agony is a rage against the injustice of winning popular majorities and being unable to govern. But it's important to recall that modern America has no tradition of 49-47 or 51-48 majorities leading to sweeping legislative change.
The major eras of ideological legislation -- New Deal, Great Society, and to a lesser extent Reaganism -- all depended on larger presidential majorities. Presidents who sought big change on smaller majorities (Bush after '04, for instance) have been quickly rebuked.
Proposed magazines:
The New Standard (The Bulwark + The Dispatch)
The Populist (American Affairs + Modern Age + The American Conservative)
Contrary (Sullivan/Taibbi/Greenwald + The Tablet)
The Populist should be based in Dallas, Contrary on the Pacific Coast, the New Standard in DC.
Persuasion, Harper's and the new Wieseltier venture can merge to form Liberty, based in Boston, occupying the Atlantic's former offices.
Any critique of Roberts has to acknowledge that he really has maintained the court's public prestige at a time when no other institution has much: news.gallup.com/poll/4732/supr…
And Barrett, I suspect, benefits from that cautious project; the polls showing plurality support for her nomination may reflect a (relative) trust in the court as well as a favorable response to the nominee herself.
The fact that Trump isn't on Twitter and Fox and Friends every day pressuring Congressional Rs to make a big-number deal with Democrats says a lot about why his brand of right-populism is likely headed to defeat rather than re-election:
To return to this @SohrabAhmari tweet, what's hard about building a "Red Toryism" (or, if you will, a "Sam's Club Republicanism") is that GOP stakeholders aren't interested. Trump once ran against them; now their inaction is tanking his re-election.
One reason "populists nearly always win a second term" in other countries is that they shift the right's econ policies to make them more, well, popular. Trump has done that a little, but not enough, and the delayed Covid relief is just insane malpractice.
I'm going to stick with the same assessment till the last: Trump is unfit and proves it every day, but he's incapable of an authoritarian coup and in the event of a FL-in-2000 tipping-point-state tie, his toxic rhetoric only makes him more likely to lose the post-election battle.
This take is the more plausible one, but under the same set of Bush-v-Gore-style facts that would lead John Roberts to rule for a normal Republican, he is less likely to rule for Trump.
Ditto for the two, maybe soon three, Trump-appointed justices: Every time the president opens his mouth, he makes it less likely that Gorsuch or Kavanaugh rules for him on a set of facts where they might rule for a President Pence or Rubio or Hawley.