Been thinking about the radical opposition between the PC-progressive concept of *representation* and the classical concept of *recognition*.
(which has the same etymological structure as *respect*: mutual knowledge, mutual seeing).
Every human being wants to be recognized *as human* by other humans. This is the root of true "inclusion": the recognition of a common humanity beyond our differences, where the word "humanity" has a metaphysical-religious significance (being relationship with the infinite).
By contrast, the concept of representation is psycho-sociological: I am defined not by my humanity, but by belonging to a certain group, more or less arbitrarily defined by singling out certain psycho-somatic or characteristics. As a result, I have a right to be "included"
not as a "I" but as a representative of my "group." Vice versa, I should feel "represented" by people who share my same features, which are the most important thing we have in common, and distinguish us from other "groups."
Needless to say, this is de-humanizing, and false to our elementary experience of being a person, who participates in a *true* human universality (bringing to the table all out ethnic and cultural features, for sure), and wants to be recognized *on that basis*.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Even some of the most intelligent critics of liberalism sometimes do not make a clear enough distinction between the terms in which the question arose in the the 19th century, and the terms in which it arises today.
In the 19th century, "liberalism" operated in the context of secularized Christianity (e.g. Kantian ethics) and attempted to separate morality from metaphysics and religion. As such it led to relativism, subjectivism and various other ills.
But after 1917 we have entered the stage of the expansion of political atheism which rejects classical (Aristotelian and Christian) ethics in favor of the "ethics of the direction of history" (Del Noce), which in turn leads inevitably to various forms of totalitarianism.
Historically Fascism was born as a revolutionary movement that rejected Marxist historical materialism (the link between the revolution and the necessary logic of history) while keeping the dialectical aspect (man as creator, politics as true religion, the primacy of praxis).
So, the Fascist type (Mussolini) was an "activist without a plan," who valued action and personal power as ends in themselves but had no vision of the future. This is why he ended up an ally/instrument of conservative forces that gave Fascism the appearance of being reactionary.
In that sense, some of today's "revolutionaries" seem more Fascist than Marxist. The "other half" of Marxism (sociologism, secularism, technocracy) is the ideology of the professional classes (so called "liberals" who are economically quite "conservative.")
1) What is acting today is actually "half-Marxism" because it has mostly shed Marx's philosophy of history, thus becoming "irrational." The "revolution" does not fulfill the plan of history but just a will to power, and is entirely "intra-bourgeois" like 1968 in Europe.
2) Conversely, liberalism has shed its 19th century Kantian or Protestant aspects, and has embraced the "other half" of Marxism: materialism, sociologism, relativism etc What DN calls "objectivized" Marxism without the revolutionary impulse.
My Sunday thoughts: the question of the moment is whether the protests will push for *reform* or pursue the mirage of *revolution*. I think the jury is still out, but the academic-journalistic complex is clearly pushing in the second direction, which matches their world view.
"Reform" recognizes that we must strive as hard as we can to realize permanent values (e.g. justice) which transcend us, and which we can achieve only imperfectly because evil (e.g. racism) lurks within everyone (original sin) and cannot be ultimately eliminated, only contained.
By contrast the "revolution" thinks that evil can be eliminated, because it resides NOT IN US but in "the system" and the system can be changed by the exercise of power. Thus it expresses a dualistic, non-biblical (gnostic) type of religiosity (modern prototype: Marxism).
From DN's' "Problem of Atheism" (1963): "The historical result of Marxism is, on the one side, Communist reality, in the way it has become realized, and on the other the affluent society ... In a certain sense, Marxism has already completely won, but negating itself most totally.
Because of this victory, there is the tragic situation of Christianity today, such as it never happened before: it is in a vise between two opposite types of society, which share a common origin, neither one of which is Christianizable. A parallel situation holds for liberalism..
The affluent society is characterized by 'natural irreligion,' by the 'loss of the sacred,' by the rejection of the dimension of tradition and of the past, because all values have been found to be relative to specific historical situations.
The modern opposition of universal/timeless vs. national/historical (Enlightenment vs. Romanticism) is really another manifestation of rationalism, namely of the denial of the transcendent. If truth transcends us, ideals must always find new partial historical realizations.
Thus, from a more traditional perspective ("Christendom") each "nation" corresponded to one implementation of a universal, inexhaustible call (embodied by the founding saint/king/evangelizer) which could take many historical forms while remaining universal.
By contrast, the modern idea of nation is, as DN says, a reduction of the idea of tradition, because it no longer refers to an ideal (which by nature is universal, although amenable to many "incarnations") but simply to a historical past that does not carry a universal value.