The most egregious example of password-bansturbation that I know of, comes from the French data protection regulator @CNIL; take a look at this nightmare and imagine helping someone less capable navigate it:
@OpenRightsGroup@jimkillock@Forbes@bazzacollins@Facebook@FBoversight Observation number three: unless the user has explicitly opted into something which deletes chats after {1 minute, 1 hour, 1 day} etc, it would be rude to erase stuff - "where have my baby photos gone they were in that chat with my sister!?!", etc
I'm sorry to say "quelle surprise?" - precisely the same happened to the Facebook reporting mechanisms which (again) many people on (Twitter) demanded. :-/
Back in the 90's I worked for Company X, for whom Company Y was a key supplier.
X built a firewall with auto-block of src IPs upon attack (compare fail2ban)
BadGuyZ broke into Y & attacked X from Y's infra; the firewall blocked ALL X-Y comms & impacted N million dollars of biz.
"But we put these filters in for good reasons! Nobody could have foreseen this outcome!", etc… alas, no - censorship, blocking, & control systems ALWAYS have a nasty tendency to blow back in the faces of those who call for them.
Earlier today I got a shout-out for a presentation that I did at "Access All Areas 2" in 1995 - a UK @defcon-alike organised by @mala and @FakeDaveGreen (IIRC?)
Thing is: I still have the talk online, and it's mildly significant.
The pitch was "INTERNET TOOL OF DOOM!" which was riffing on the "SATAN" hysteria of the year previous, and also my experienced with publishing Crack, prior:
The attached are my speaker's notes, near verbatim, with some crappy 1996-era HTML added to infix the images and source code of the tools.
You can't make this stuff up: it appears that today's anti-Refugee flight out of @RAFBrizeNorton is a C130 doing low-level flying over pro-Brexit constituencies?
"Or it could just be a training flight", etc…
You have to applaud them for realising that the people who actually need a "show of strength" are [portion of] the British public who demand that "something needs to be done!"
The C130 has completed its grand tour of the south (including circuits over Salisbury Plain) and now has rather more reasonably been replaced by a less terrifying, more reasonable Shadow R1 surveillance aircraft at 17,000 ft, over Dover:
Statistics from 226599 DNS-over-HTTPS requests made to an upstream load-balanced group of 8 #DoH servers over Tor, by a DoHoT proxy, including responses served from local cache.
This includes what the proxy sees, not only what the user experiences.
More than 25% of requests are served back to the user from the cache.
In the event that the request needs to be sent upstream, the median response time back to the user is 241ms.
If we *remove* locally-cached responses, this is closer to what the raw proxy experiences:
So if you're just doing raw DoH over Tor and are round-robin-ing a pool of servers without caching or tracking response time, the median request time will be around 453ms and p90 will be 1153ms.
tl;dr - caching + load-balancing + tracking-speed, is essential.