1/5

Businesses will complain that this will cause them to lose competitiveness in international trade, and they might be partly right, but I hope Rengo nonetheless succeeds fully. Japan suffers from low consumption, part of the cost of which is...

bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
2/5

borne by Japanese businesses, in the form of slower growth, and part by its trading partners, in the form of higher trade deficits and rising debt. Raising Japanese wages would mean more domestic consumption, which means more domestic business investment...
3/5

and, ultimately, more and better growth.

While it would be more effective if the increase in wages were coordinated across all major economies, or if there were steps taken to prevent the benefits from flowing abroad, even without either, higher Japanese wages would...
4/5

benefit Japan and the world. Perhaps we would all benefit not from another traditional trade agreement that focuses on further cutting frictional costs among its members (and, in so doing, worsening the need for everyone to compete by undermining wages) but rather one...
5/5

that, by limiting the ability to export excess savings abroad, would weaken the role of finance and encourage members to raise domestic wages (and, with it, worker productivity).

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More from @michaelxpettis

19 Nov
1/8

Good article by @anjani_trivedi on what the recent bond defaults tell us about growing credit stresses within China. Those of us who have been watching this game for a long time know that every time we get some similar disruption in the credit...

bloomberg.com/opinion/articl…
2/8

markets, we all get very worried that this is the time in which "it" could happen.

But we have always to remember three things. First, it is very unlikely that this will be the time "it" happens. Any default large enough to convince investors that default risk is...
3/8

a real risk will also cause a disruptive and chaotic repricing of markets. Regulators know this must eventually happen, but it is always easy to justify postponing it a little longer, and they still retain the credibility and firepower to do so.
Read 8 tweets
19 Nov
1/4

The State Council will unveil new measures "to prompt its consumers to buy more, as the prominent restraint on the country's economic development lies in consumption."

Yet again Beijing proposes to rebalance demand by "upgrading" consumption.

xinhuanet.com/english/2020-1…
2/4

But of course that isn't how you rebalance demand. Only income transfers can do that. Some of the proposed measures will help a little, indirectly, to the extent that they subsidize consumption (e.g. lower gasoline prices, more efficient online delivery, etc.). This...
3/4

works by effectively transferring income from governments and businesses to households.

Most of the proposed measures, however, will have no net impact at all. They will mainly increase some forms of consumption at the expense of others. Until the household share of...
Read 4 tweets
19 Nov
1/4

Trump’s former chief economic adviser Gary Cohn is quoted here as saying that he does not think the trade tariffs that the Trump administration imposed on China worked because the US has continued to experience record trade deficits.

scmp.com/economy/china-…
2/4

He’s right: they don’t work. Tariffs might work in a world in which trade imbalances are driven by differential production costs or manufacturing advantages. In a world in which trade imbalances are driven primarily by savings and income imbalances, however, all they...
3/4

can do is divert trade, raise costs, and shift a country’s bilateral imbalances without changing its overall imbalances.

We must either engineer a new kind of trade agreement among countries that explicitly deals with these savings and income balances, or prevent...
Read 4 tweets
18 Nov
1/4

For nearly two years I've argued that we were going to see substantial increases in portfolio and FDI inflows into China, and so we are – to the point where I suspect that the PBoC is now wrestling with currency-appreciation concerns and with...

ft.com/content/93ad44…
2/4

indirect currency intervention. This will probably continue well into next year, and I don't think we need to worry too much about the risks to financial stability until total portfolio inflows begin to approach roughly half (from roughly 20% today) of the sum of...
3/4

PBoC reserves and dollars held by state banks.

What I found especially interesting in this article was that "in 2019, China’s outbound FDI was $77bn, less than half the level in 2017". Outbound FDI had probably dropped substantially because of concerns about...
Read 4 tweets
16 Nov
1/11

There is almost as much excited the-world-is-changing nonsense generated by the signing of the RCEP as there was by the creation in 2016 of the AIIB, and because of many of the same confusions over the sources and consequences of global imbalances.

scmp.com/news/china/dip…
2/11

According to this article, "the RCEP encompasses close to one-third of the world’s population and global economy, and is projected to add US$186 billion to the world economy through improved regional trade."
3/11

How? The RCEP countries together have been running current account surpluses of more than 2% of their collective GDP, and except perhaps in the cases of Australia and New Zealand, these surpluses are based on structural savings imbalances. They are consequently...
Read 11 tweets
16 Nov
1/7

The headline is a little deceptive. While October's retail sales (a proxy for consumption) were 4.3% higher than last October, the increase was well below expectations and, more importantly, much less than the 6.9% growth in industrial production.

bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
2/7

October, in other words, contributed to a worsening of the domestic consumption imbalance, not an improvement. While we are seeing the beginning of a recovery in consumption, there is no way consumption this year will be up – retail sales were down 5.9% in the...
3/7

first 10 months of 2020, compared to the same period in 2019. GDP, however, will probably be up 2-3% for the year. This means that the consumption share of GDP will actually decline this year by around 2 percentage points.
Read 7 tweets

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