An excellent read from @lawfareblog. @C_C_Krebs did a number of important things, but this one was both subtle & critical: “Yet Krebs, along with a handful of others ... retained their reputations for telling the truth on foreign threats to the integrity of American elections.”
In this age of perception hacks and IO, perception of security *is* security. And no one will believe a system is secure without a trusted source of truth. Empowering voices to serve they role will be very hard in today’s low-trust reality, but that even more important.
We need a trusted, apolitical, insulated voice that can speak with authority to the American people, giving them an accurate assessment of risk and security, and armor them against perception hacks, whether foreign or domestic.
We had this in 2020, but it was mostly a function of luck & the savvy and grit of a small cadre of public servants. We are deeply indebted to these leaders, but could we give their successors more protection to serve this critical role?
It’s an essential complement to (but distinct from) the Intel collection role played by the FBI and IC. It could be performed by the same institution, but doing this right means communicating openly & regularly with the public. And doing so as much about defense as collection.
The FBI director is protected through off-cycle terms to act as a check on politics. Could we create appropriate, purpose-built protections around the CISA directorship or a similar election security role? It would infuse the role with some of the principles of an IG.
Put simply, use the CISA directorship (or create a new role). Give it institutional & legislative protections for independence, & empower it to speak truth to the public about election security, perception hacks, and influence ops. Cc @Susan_Hennessey @benjaminwittes @alexstamos.

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh

Keep Current with Nathaniel Gleicher

Nathaniel Gleicher Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!


Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @ngleicher

22 Oct
1/ Today we published our first Inauthentic Behavior (IB) report. This report details how we tackle various forms of IB and offers some examples of recent enforcements to illustrate notable trends and tactics we’ve seen…
2/ For 3+ yrs we’ve publicly reported our removals of CIB networks. These are like the APTs of #IO. But deceptive tactics are not limited to CIB — spammers and scammers often rely on similar behaviors. We tackle both threats, but we tackle them differently.
3/ CIB actors tend to be unrepentant deceivers — if you’re running a network of fake accounts, you know you’re being misleading. IB violators want to push the boundaries, but may not intend to break the rules.
Read 7 tweets
8 Oct
1/ Today we announced 10 CIB takedowns, including 6 networks we removed during the month of September, and 4 that we removed as recently as this morning. We had already announced most of the Sept networks.…
2/More than half of these 10 networks targeted domestic audiences in their countries and many of them were linked to groups and people linked to politically affiliated actors in each country — the US, Myanmar, Russia, Nigeria, The Philippines and Azerbaijan.
3/ Half of the takedowns in this report began based on our own internal investigations, and the other half are based on information published/shared by external groups, including the FBI and investigative reporters.
Read 21 tweets
24 Sep
1/ Today we announced three CIB takedowns linked to Russian actors — all three had very limited global following, and even more minimal following in the US. But we know that networks like these can pivot in the the weeks to come, so we’ll stay vigilant.…
2/ These networks centered primarily around off-platform websites designed to look like independent or fictitious media organizations and attempted to engage unwitting people to write for them. This is similar to a Russian network we removed in August.…
3/ This is a good reminder that threat actors — including from Russia — will continue to try to manipulate public debate globally and in the US, including by trying to trick journalists into doing their amplification for them.
Read 6 tweets
21 Jun
1/ There’s been an important debate today about an online campaign to inflate ticket sales at the Tulsa rally, and whether this constitutes deceptive behavior (cc @persily @evelyndouek). Based on public reporting, this isn’t CIB as we define it. #thread…
2/ First off, it’s critical to analyze this based on the behavior, not the content. However one might feel about the intent here, what was the behavior this campaign engaged in, and is that harmfully deceptive or simply coordinated?
3/ Second, I’m going to address this from a platform perspective. For FB, the key question would be: did the people behind it engage in on-platform behavior that systemically deceived users?
Read 10 tweets
5 May
1/ Today we published our 3rd monthly CIB report: we removed 8 networks for coordinated inauthentic behavior in April.…
2/ Six of the eight networks were domestic and targeted audiences in their own countries — in the US, Georgia, Myanmar and Mauritania.
3/ Two of them were foreign and targeted audiences outside of their countries: We linked one to individuals in Russia, Crimea and the Donbass regions of Ukraine and two media firms in Crimea; another was linked to the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting Corporation.
Read 9 tweets
5 Jan
@DavidClinchNews @alexstamos Some rapid response systems exist and more could be built, but the broader point here is that for any sufficiently complex system, most unanticipated outcomes look strategic (complexity means observers infer intention), but many/most are actually the result of systemic entropy.
@DavidClinchNews @alexstamos Put another way: if something strange happens in a complex system, people often infer intent (it’s so sophisticated — they must have meant this to happen!), but often it’s an unintended result of the complexity itself. And this mismatch gets stronger for more complex systems.
@DavidClinchNews @alexstamos It’s almost a strange reformulation of the entropy in Murphy’s law: the more complex a system, the more opportunity for unintended consequences, AND the more likely observers will perceive those consequences as intentional.
Read 4 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!

This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Too expensive? Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal Become our Patreon

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us on Twitter!