70 years ago today, the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir roared in North Korea. The @USArmy X Corps played a key role in this, the most harrowing fight of the Korean War.
A series of bad decisions involving the X Corps contributed to catastrophe in the Frozen Chosin.
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The X Corps, activated in 1942 in Sherman, Texas, fought in the Southern Philippines in WWII. The man on the left, Gen Franklin Sibert, commanded the corps during the war. Here Sibert is giving orders to the 24th Infantry Division commander on the island of Leyte.
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After the Japanese surrender, the Corps was inactivated and mostly forgotten.
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Fast forward to June 25, 1950: North Korea invades South Korea. The Korean War begins.
Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief of Far East (the commander for all forces in Korea) needed another Corps.
August 26, 1950: A General Order from MacArthur's Far East Command activates X Corps once again.
[pic: Inside MacArthur's Far East Command headquarters during the Korean War]
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MacArthur first decision regarding the Corps was, and remains, the source of controversy: he selected his Far East Command Chief of Staff, Ned Almond, as the X Corps commander.
[that's Ned to MacArthur's right, September, 1950]
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Ned, who disastrously dismissed concerns over the readiness of Task Force Smith in the war's early moments, was a MacArthur loyalist.
According to MacArthur biographer William Manchester, as Chief of Staff, Ned isolated MacArthur from his staff & from critical feedback
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According to Ned Almond biographer Dr. Michael E. Lynch [pictured], historian at @USAHEC, Ned was a difficult personality, seeking to dominate every room he was in. He couldn't get along with anybody other than MacArthur and this led to some bad decisions during the war
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Even before he took X Corps, Ned and Walton Walker [pictured], commander of @EighthArmyKorea, didn't get along. This is one reason, according to Richard B. Frank's biographer of MacArthur, MacArthur split his forces [with bad results] and didn't put X Corps under 8A.
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It's bad enough that MacArthur selected Ned. Even worse: Ned would command X Corps through combat and remain in his Far East Command Chief of Staff job!!!
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were shocked by the decision.
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The Corps consisted of two divisions: @7thID and 1st Marine Division. The organization was thrown together quickly for the September 15th Inchon Landing.
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While Inchon was a success, problems were clear. The corps never built cohesive teams. Almond didn't have time (or desire) to plan beyond Inchon and he didn't have the personality or leadership ability to engender a command environment that fostered teamwork.
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October 1950: MacArthur, sensing the end of the war, pushes for a double envelopment of North Korea, with 8A moving north to the capital of Pyongyang and X Corps on the east coast at Wansun via another seaborne invasion.
13 of 18: Ned, as Chief of Staff & Corps commander, should've advised MacArthur to stick to a single axis of advance up the peninsula. He didn't. The split of forces caused supply bottlenecks [Ned used his Chief of Staff position to ensure priority of supplies to his Corps vs 8A]
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In November, 1950, when massive Chinese counterattacks changed the nature of the fighting, Ned was undeterred.
He recklessly pushed his formations faster to Yalu without regard to their flanks, their supply status, or the brutal winter conditions.
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Ned repeatedly discounted the size and strength of the Chinese forces. He actually thinned out his front line across in order to move faster.
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Ned to his subordinate officers in mid-November: "The enemy who is delaying you for the moment is nothing more than the remnants of Chinese divisions fleeing north...We're going all the way to the Yalu [river in North Korea]."
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Amidst such questionable leadership, our boys pushed on. When the Battle for the Chosin Reservoir began 70 years ago, they fought the North Koreans and Chinese with limited supplies and a surprised, thinned-out force.
FINAL:
Our troops were also up again the indomitable forces of nature.
We can confirm that 120 Soldiers have left the Smoke Bomb Hill barracks, and we are working hard to move ALL Soldiers out of those barracks by the end of September. 1/4
In addition to the relocation efforts, 70 certificates of non-availability (CNAs) have been approved allowing recipients to find privatizing housing on or off the installation. Additionally, hundreds more have been pre-approved and being staffed for final approval. 2/4
Commands affected by these moves on Smoke Bomb Hill include units under the 1st Special Forces Command - Airborne and XVIII Airborne Corps units including the 20th Engineer Brigade and 35th Signal Brigade among other units/organizations across the installation. 3/4
Our Soldiers are speaking to us about the conditions at the Smoke Bomb Hill Barracks. It’s authentic and real feedback we need. We are listening and taking action!
Communication flow is every changing, and we are working to improve it. Our Soldiers deserve it. 🧵
We want all of our Soldiers to know we are working hard to make their quality of life better!
We have leaders across Fort Bragg already working to make their lives better, and we have resources committed to make this happen.
Moving 1,110 Soldiers won’t be quick, it will take time, but it will be done right. Our goal is to have everyone out of the SBH barracks by the end of September.