Post 1 tl;dr: Curvature controls pool price stability
Post 2: Curvature *directly* controls:
- LP profits when asset pairs are mean reverting
- ∃ a magic formula relating LP profit to adverse selection (probability α of LP realizing IL), curvature, and fees for *any* CFMM!
These results generalize Glosten & Milgrom (1984), Kyle (1985) to arbitrary CFMMs
This seminal work shows the shape of the order book represents the amount of adverse selection a market maker feels, leading to strategies where they remove liquidity to avoid adverse selection
Inspired by Jun Aoyogi's work on Uniswap adverse selection, we generalized his results to @CurveFinance & more
Similar to Jun, we construct a game between LPs 🐳, informed traders 🦍, & arbs 🧙 to find an equilibrium condition
But our game is different in a couple key ways 🔮
1. We model roundtrip trades: This is when an 🦍 makes a trade but ends up being wrong, this leads to 🐳, 🧙 profits
2. Our game more carefully connects impermanent loss to the shape of the CFMM as we explicitly consider the effects of changes in marginal price on LP share value
This shows that protective CFMMs like @BreederDodo and any CFMM @hosseeb says needs an oracle simply by reducing LP adverse selection by adjusting curvature
But this also intimates you can do this endogenously *without* an oracle if you are willing to store more on-chain state
So what does this mean for the future of CFMM design? 1. Curvature is dual to adverse selection (e.g. stablecoin-stablecoin trades aren't v. adverse, so you don't need much curvature) 2. Dynamic updates to a CFMM, either by an oracle or endogenously, need to account for shape
Designing dynamic update rules will inevitably be tied to designing the correct gradient flow that adjusts a CFMM's curvature
Given the centuries of work in differential geometry on such flows, it is inevitable that we will see them (and control theory) interacting with CFMMs
What's next? 🔮
The final post (and the release of the paper) will show how curvature and yield farming incentives (especially pool 2!) interact
We'll illustrate the optimization problem for *optimally* choosing farming rewards for pool 2
P.S. If you're designing options AMMs (@0mllwntrmt3, @anisimov_andrei, @AndreCronjeTech, @opyn_) all of this advice about curvature applies doubly so — next week's post will go more into curvature + Greeks
*simply works
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2. If you want to anonymize a transaction graph by using a lattice with dense spectra (like the Penrose tiling) to define a DAG, note that you aren’t guaranteed that there isn’t *any* local structure that an adversary can find — only that no tx ordering will be unique
2. (cont.) It is possible that prefixes of tx ordering overlap an arbitrary amount, so there isn’t as much transaction ordering entropy as there is from cryptographic graph traversals (e.g. expander graph walks in supersingular isogeny signatures, lattice based crypto)
This effectively looks at a mean-field, agent-based model of: 1. Noise traders 2. Informed traders 3. Strategic LPs
It shows that as the # of LPs goes to ♾, ∃ a sharp phase transition in LP profits as a function of the number of informed traders (defined via simple signals)
There’s also a kind of curious stability result that is vaguely reminiscent of “rugpull” dynamics: there’s only a stable equilibrium when there are < 4 LPs, if there’s more you have sharp edge equilibria that you can oscillate between (akin to the “last LP holds the bag”)
The VC vs. trader “war” of crypto is reminiscent of the previous talent “war” between HFT and online ads: All of these boil down to latency vs. bandwidth trade-offs where "event-driven" investing depends on the condition number of a participants' value function
Trader: need max and min eigenval. of value fn. to be "close" (low condition number) because of regret minimization between your worst and best case outcomes
If your value function is smooth, this gives uniform bounds on the max/min eigenval. of hessian of your val. function
VC: need max eigenval. of value function to optimized
Things like the Tracy-Widom law force you to chase fat tails, terrible Sharpe, and anomalous portfolio construction
The number of traditional finance chads (e.g. @arbitragegoth) asking me questions about DeFi LP staking is 📈📈 📈
Here's what it is: 1. @synthetix_io / @kaiynne pioneered paying users for liquidity by staking CFMM LP shares 2. CFMM LP shares replicate options portfolios
👇🏾
∴ LP staking is equivalent to collateralizing a leg of an interest rate swap with future expected cash flows from an options portfolio
This is actually *really* hard to execute in normal finance — especially because the CFMM replication is a continuous combination of strikes
Traditional finance has focused on swaps as
a. In-kind (e.g. interest for interest)
b. Purely Synthetic (e.g. variance swaps, VIX)
DeFi let's you combine the two — in-kind on one side in exchange for synthetic on the other
Impossible to do this without non-custodial assets!
tl;dr:
- Synthetic levered assets in PoS and DeFi are MBSs.
- Improvements over meatspace/2008 MBS:
- Used to reduce inequality
- Avoid lending competition in PoS
- Numerical, probabilistic methods are key to correct design of these systems
The post motivates and provides background for our paper which just hit arXiv