The VC vs. trader “war” of crypto is reminiscent of the previous talent “war” between HFT and online ads: All of these boil down to latency vs. bandwidth trade-offs where "event-driven" investing depends on the condition number of a participants' value function
Trader: need max and min eigenval. of value fn. to be "close" (low condition number) because of regret minimization between your worst and best case outcomes

If your value function is smooth, this gives uniform bounds on the max/min eigenval. of hessian of your val. function
VC: need max eigenval. of value function to optimized

Things like the Tracy-Widom law force you to chase fat tails, terrible Sharpe, and anomalous portfolio construction
But in crypto, interpolating between “condition number maximizer” and “highest eigenval.” maximizer is possible and market condition dependent

DeFi, for better or worse, is better for condition number optimizers
But: All of this depends on knowledge of your value function.

Much of online and reinforcement learning assumes you don’t know it or learn it along the way

Philosophical question: can you ever know if a market favors condition number or max curvature optimization from data?
Local measurements likely can’t tell you the answer — one need only look to Morse theory for simple yet impractical counter examples

So who can interpolate the extremes and be the Hunter S. Thompson of this market?

🧐🧐🧐
For what it’s worth: I’m not saying that value functions are smooth, but like a lot of machine learning, I’m trying to gain intuition by thinking of what the world looks like *if* adversaries value functions *happened to be* smooth
tl;dr: traders can't hold too, long, VCs need to hold for a while, but holding for a while only works in illiquid market (low bandwidth) whereas holding for short times works in liquid markets (low latency)

Value function properties encode this difference!

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More from @tarunchitra

30 Aug
The number of traditional finance chads (e.g. @arbitragegoth) asking me questions about DeFi LP staking is 📈📈 📈

Here's what it is:
1. @synthetix_io / @kaiynne pioneered paying users for liquidity by staking CFMM LP shares
2. CFMM LP shares replicate options portfolios

👇🏾
∴ LP staking is equivalent to collateralizing a leg of an interest rate swap with future expected cash flows from an options portfolio

This is actually *really* hard to execute in normal finance — especially because the CFMM replication is a continuous combination of strikes
Traditional finance has focused on swaps as
a. In-kind (e.g. interest for interest)
b. Purely Synthetic (e.g. variance swaps, VIX)

DeFi let's you combine the two — in-kind on one side in exchange for synthetic on the other

Impossible to do this without non-custodial assets!
Read 4 tweets
22 Jun
Big Short 2.0: PoS and DeFi are mortgage-backed securities!

@alexhevans & I tried to find grand unified theory for the financial derivatives hidden in PoS and DeFi ➡️ uncovered mathematical equiv. to MBSs.

Why? Same payoffs and income inequality!
👇🏾
medium.com/gauntlet-netwo…
tl;dr:
- Synthetic levered assets in PoS and DeFi are MBSs.
- Improvements over meatspace/2008 MBS:
- Used to reduce inequality
- Avoid lending competition in PoS
- Numerical, probabilistic methods are key to correct design of these systems
The post motivates and provides background for our paper which just hit arXiv

The following are equivalent as portfolios

❇️ PoS w/ derivatives
❇️ Leveraged DeFi
❇️ Mortgage-Backed Securities

arxiv.org/abs/2006.11156
Read 23 tweets
16 Apr
Thesis: Crypto needs LIBOR if it is going to be a Eurodollar substitute

Antithesis: People trust centralized lenders/exchanges with fiat backed stablecoins

Synthesis: @Libra_'s new ≋LBR design *is* LIBOR

But can they do better than copying IMF SDR weights?

Yes! 👇🏾
First: What is 'Eurodollar'?

Eurodollars represent dollar deposits held in foreign banks.

There are a number of reasons people outside of the US want dollars (e.g. to buy oil).

Foreign banks charge extra interest for procuring & holding USD for you — an interest spread!
Americans referring to 'Eurodollars' usually mean rate spread (e.g. excess interest a foreigner pays for USD vs. a US national).

And eurodollar futures are the most traded product on CME

(Note: @ChiangRei and I used to trade the Eurodollar curve)

More:
unexpected-values.com/crypto-dollars/
Read 18 tweets
24 Mar
2020: Cambrian explosion in automated market makers — @UniswapExchange, @BalancerLabs, @ShellProtocol, @CurveFinance, ...

A question:

Is there a framework to understand why so many constant function market makers (CFMMs) work IRL?

Yes! Thread 👇🏾

arxiv.org/abs/2003.10001
First of all: Why are there so many different CFMM constructions?

IMO: CFMMs exist to automate ETF underwriting (e.g. @blackrock's ETF division):
- 'create' basket of synth. assets
- 'redeem' same basket

CFMM curve: redistributes rev. to traders, LPs, underwriters (devs!)
What are the advantages to doing this on-chain?

1. Arbitrary decimation: Don't need to redeem integer share quantities [no ILPs, no rounding errors!]

2. Underwriter fees are transparent: @UniswapExchange's sustainability fees are 100x smaller than Blackrock for the same service
Read 13 tweets
6 Jan
For those of you who were annoyed at having to read the Staking vs. Lending paper on DocSend — it is finally on @arxiv!

I'm excited to present it at SBC 2020!

In the spirit of @vgr:
1 like == 1 🥵🔥🌶 take about DeFi and security

arxiv.org/abs/2001.00919
@arxiv @vgr 1. On-Chain lending, by allowing for programmatic loans to instantly pass underwriting and settlement, tend to compete with their underlying security chain, as capital flies to the best combination of yields and security

@surja795
2. Staking derivatives (such as proposals from @sunnya97) and on-chain lending are very similar in spirit, but have very different pricing / volatility mechanics. This means that they could combine in a _cancellative_ fashion to preserve PoS network security

@camlCaseTech
Read 33 tweets
2 Dec 19
👋🏾 A little tweetstorm to dive into this!

First off, thanks to @hosseeb for figuring out how to make my erudite writing make sense to a large audience!

Why does this behavior happen in a system of rational participants! First... let's unpack what rationality means! 👇🏾

1/21
Rational agents in PoS should *always* view their token holdings as a portfolio to be allocated. Portfolios needs to be rebalanced based on market prices and yields that an agent in a PoS network can receive.

In PoW, the asset is somewhat disconnected from the means...

2/21
... of security, as the lack of liquid hash power derivatives (@JeremyRubin, @tzhen) adds in a Coase-like transaction cost to *immediately* converting hash power to a liquid asset.

On the other hand, PoS derives security from a hidden 'cost of capital' assumption, which..

3/21
Read 22 tweets

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